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

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
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE
THE
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.
Carlisle
Oakville
Petersburg
Headersburg
Chambersburg
Greenwood
Fayetteville
Mercersburg
Greencastle
Waynesboro
Gettysburg
Hanover
Littlestown
Emmitsburg
Union Mills
Taneytown
Middleburg
Westminster
Hagerstown
Funkstown
Williamsport
Mechanicstown
Boonsboro
Middletown
Liberty
Frederick
Sharpsburg
Shepherdstown
Harper's Ferry
Charlestown
Berlin
Urbana
Cooksville
Clarksburg
Winchester
Berryville
Newtown
Leesburg
Poolesville
Brookville
Guthersburg
Rockville
Upperville
Middleburg
Bransville
Front Royal
Rectortown
Aldie
Centreville
Alexandria
Sperryville
Warrenton
Warrenton Junc.
Bull Run
Manassas Junc.
Rappahannock Sta.
Brandy Sta.
Culpepper C.H.
Stevensburg
Dumfries
Aquia Creek
Falmouth
Fredericksburg
Madison C.H.
Chancellorsville
The Wilderness
Orange C.H.
Gordonsville
Blue Ridge
Shenandoah Valley
Cumberland Valley
Potomac
Rappahannock
Rapidan
Hazel Run
Occoquan
Pamunkey
Mattapony
Baltimore & Ohio
Washington
Alexandria
Scale: 12 Miles to 1 Inch.

Scale: 12 Miles to 1 Inch.

12 24 36 48 MILES

THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG

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PREFACE

THIS book has been written as far as possible from original sources. Of these the most important are the "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," containing the reports and despatches of all the principal actors on both sides; also Vol. III. of "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," which contains the personal narratives of some forty eye-witnesses of the battle. These two authorities are absolutely invaluable. Other works consulted have been, Swinton's "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," Longstreet's "From Manassas to Appomattox," Col. Edmonds' "American Civil War," Gordon's "Reminiscences of the Civil War," Fletcher's "History of the American War," White's "Life of R. E. Lee," Long's "Memoirs of General Lee," Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," and other biographies, besides a number of pamphlets and magazine articles.

The plans of the battlefield, which accompany this volume, are reduced from a large-scale map, kindly supplied to the writer by Lt.-Col. Cope, U.S. Engineers. To him the writer is indebted for much interesting information and for his general kindness and assistance while visiting Gettysburg in the autumn of 1908.

THE WRITER.

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THE

CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

1. The Military Situation.

In the spring of 1863 the War of Secession had been in progress for nearly two years. During this time the struggle had been carried on with the greatest gallantry and determination by both sides, but with a result little commensurate with the efforts put forth, or with the terrible sacrifice of men and money. The objective of the Northern forces, operating in the Eastern theatre of war, was the capture of Richmond, the Confederate capital and seat of Government. Two lines of advance were available; one overland from Washington by way of Gordonsville or Fredericksburg, the other by sea to Fortress Monroe in the Yorktown Peninsula, a point in the possession of the Federal forces, and thence up the Peninsula towards Richmond. Both lines had already been tried, the first three times, the second once. All these attempts had failed disastrously. In April, 1863, a fourth effort to reach the enemy's capital by the overland route was made by General Joseph Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac. His army, 130,000 strong, was facing the Confederate Army of Northern

Virginia under General Robert Lee, numbering about 60,000, at Fredericksburg, on the opposite bank of the River Rappahannock. He formed the plan of holding the Confederate general to his lines with a portion of his own force, and of marching with the remainder up the river, crossing by the upper fords, and so taking the enemy's fortified works at Fredericksburg in rear. This movement was successfully effected, and on April 30, Hooker with 70,000 men seized the Chancellorsville House in Lee's rear, confident that his adversary had now no choice between either surrender or an ignominious retreat. But Lee's marvellous skill, backed by the admirable fighting powers of the force under his command, was equal to the situation. Seizing advantage of his central position to deal with his enemies in detail, he held the one in check with a small portion of his own force, and concentrated all his strength against the other. On May 5 Hooker was forced to recross the Rappahannock and to acknowledge defeat. The result was a grave disaster to the Union army, the loss of 17,000 men, and the complete shattering of all confidence on the part of the troops in the ability of their commander. On the other hand so brilliant a victory, won over such heavy odds, raised the morale of the Confederate troops to the very highest pitch, and confirmed their admiration and regard for their great leader.

Such then was the situation in Virginia in May, 1863. The effect of the battle of Chancellorsville was to destroy for a time the power of offensive action in the Army of the Potomac. The troops were sullen and dispirited. Certain of the senior officers were bitterly incensed with General Hooker,[1] whose manner to his subordinates was curt and much

[1] Notably General Couch, who declined to serve under him any longer.

lacking in tact. In addition President Lincoln and his military adviser, General Halleck, had lost all confidence in his ability, and were anxious to relieve him of the command as soon as possible. On the other side the result of the victory was to confirm the Confederate Government in its opinion that the time had come to change the defensive policy of the Confederacy in Virginia, and to carry the war into the enemy's country. The reasons influencing this decision were many, but they may be briefly summarised into two, firstly the conditions under which the Confederacy was sustaining the burden of the struggle, and secondly the state of affairs in the Western theatre of war.

Firstly: It is a recognised maxim of war that decisive results can never be obtained by the maintenance of a simple defensive. As the war went on, the people of the Northern States showed a determination and constancy of purpose, for which their opponents had not formerly given them credit, and it was now manifest that their resolution to compel the submission of the seceded States would never slacken, until their last dollar had been spent, and their last man put into the field. The wealth of the North was boundless, her resources immense. In a contest of endurance the South must inevitably be beaten. Her only chance lay in striking some staggering blow at her opponent, such as the capture of Washington, or the destruction of the Army of the Potomac, which would convince the North that the struggle was hopeless, and would force her to come to terms. To achieve this result an offensive campaign was necessary.

Secondly: While the recent events in Virginia had been uniformly favourable to the Southern arms, the situation in the Western theatre of war was very gloomy. Vicksburg, the great Confederate fortress on the Mississippi, was closely besieged by the Federal

forces under General Grant. Attempts to relieve it from the East by General Johnston and from the trans-Mississippi States by Kirby Smith had failed, and it was now evident that unless a diversion could be made Vicksburg must fall. This might be effected by an invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania, so as to threaten Washington and Baltimore. Both President Davis and General Lee knew well how sensitive the Federal Cabinet was in regard to the safety of the Capital, and a Confederate victory on Northern soil would almost certainly force the President to draw large reinforcements from the Western armies, and so relieve the pressure on Vicksburg.

2. The Theatre of Operations.

The theatre of operations in the Eastern States may be considered to be bounded on the North by the River Susquehanna, on the east by Chesapeake Bay, on the South by the River James, and on the West by the Shenandoah and Tuscarora Mountains. In order to grasp the significance of the military movements, four special features of the terrain should be carefully noted. These are :—

1. The Potomac, flowing south-east and dividing the strategic area into two portions.
2. The Shenandoah Valley, stretching along its western side.
3. The Blue Ridge Mountains, and their continuation north into Maryland.
4. The position of Washington, the Northern Capital.

The Potomac, which rises in the Alleghanies, flows first north and then eastwards, finally breaking through the mountains at Harper's Ferry and entering the plain of Virginia. Below this point it is unfordable, and constitutes a formidable obstacle to the passage of an army. The Shenandoah Valley affords

admirable facilities to a force wishing to invade Maryland, or to turn the flank of an enemy's army in Northern Virginia. This facility is afforded in virtue of the Blue Ridge, which forms the eastern wall of the Valley, and is impassable for troops except at the defiles, or "gaps." Thus a small force holding the gaps can entirely protect the flank and rear of an army moving down the Valley until it crosses the Potomac, when a similar protection is afforded by South Mountain. The importance of Harper's Ferry, situated at the debouchure of the Valley, is self-evident. The town itself, which stands on a bluff at the junction of the Shenandoah and Potomac, is commanded by the surrounding hills and is indefensible, but a position had been selected and fortified on the Maryland Heights, opposite the town, on the north bank of the Potomac. Sixty miles below Harper's Ferry stands Washington, situated on the left bank of the Potomac, at the point where that river broadens out and becomes a wide estuary. The position of Washington, so close to the scene of hostilities, was bound to exercise a powerful influence on the course of operations. The safety of the national capital was a factor, which could never be disregarded by the Federal commanders; and it is only by keeping this constantly in mind that the causes governing the movements of both sides during the campaign can be properly understood.

Northern Virginia, considered as a whole, was eminently unsuited to military operations, the country being sparsely populated, wild and wooded, and the roads few and bad. Fredericksburg is the only town of any importance between Richmond and Washington. It stands on the right bank of the Rappahannock, a small stream which takes its rise in the Blue Ridge, and flowing through a very wild and thinly populated district, unites with the Rapidan a few miles above Fredericksburg. Both streams can be crossed

at numerous points in these parts of their course, but below the town the Rappahannock is tidal and unfordable. Maryland and Pennsylvania are very suitable for military operations, and being as yet untouched by war could support a considerable army living on the country. Of the railways the principal ones to note are : the line from Washington to Gordonsville, that from Richmond to Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which formed the principal line of communication between Washington and the West. The only fortified towns in the strategic arena were Washington, Richmond, and Harper's Ferry. The defences of Washington were very formidable and required a permanent garrison of over 30,000 men to hold them. Those of Richmond consisted only of redoubts for infantry of a semi-permanent nature, sufficient to secure the city from a sudden attack by a small force.

The civil population of Northern Virginia was devoted to the Confederacy, that of Pennsylvania equally strongly in favour of the Union. In Maryland sentiment was divided, but on the whole inclined to the South, this feeling being strongest in the eastern portion of the State, and especially in Baltimore.

3. Organisation of the Union and Confederate Armies.

At the beginning of May, 1863, the Northern armies in Virginia and Maryland were distributed as follows :

The Army of the Potomac, effective strength, 97,000[1], under Maj.-General Hooker, at Falmouth, on the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg.

In the Shenandoah Valley. The Eighth Federal Army Corps, strength 19,000, under Maj.-General

[1] The nominal strength was 111,000.

Schenck, at Harper's Ferry and Winchester, including a detachment of 3000 men at Frederick City, Maryland.

At Washington—36,000 men under Maj.-General Heintzelmann, forming the permanent garrison.

In the Yorktown Peninsula—20,000 men under Maj.-General Dix at Fortress Monroe and Norfolk.

In Western Virginia—5000 men at Romney and New Creek.

Total Union forces, actually effective, in Virginia and Maryland, approximately, 177,000.

The Army of the Potomac was organised into six corps as follows :—

First Corps	Maj.-General Reynolds.
Second Corps	Maj.-General Hancock.
Third Corps	Maj.-General Sickles.
Fifth Corps	Maj.-General Meade.
Sixth Corps	Maj.-General Sedgwick.
Eleventh Corps ..	Maj.-General Howard.
Twelfth Corps	Maj.-General Slocum.

Army Troops.

Provost Guard ..	Brig.-General Patrick.
Engineer Brigade; ..	Brig.-General Benham.
Reserve Artillery ..	Brig.-General Hunt.

Cavalry Corps :—Maj.-General Pleasonton.

First Division	Brig.-General Buford.
Second ,, ...	,, ,, Gregg.
Third ,, ...	Col. Duffie.

Each Corps was composed of either two or three divisions and the divisions of two, three or four brigades. To each Corps was attached an artillery brigade of five batteries. The effective strength of the different corps varied from 13,000 to 9000 men. The cavalry divisions numbered approximately 4000 men each. The Reserve Artillery was organised into five brigades, of four or five batteries each, a

total of 23 batteries and 110 guns. Two brigades of horse artillery, each consisting of five batteries, a total of 50 guns, were attached to the cavalry. The following is a summary of the whole of the artillery attached to the army.

	4½-in.	20-pr. Parrotts.	3-in.	10-pr. Parrotts.	Total.
Rifled Ordnance	8	6	148	60	222

	12-pounders.	6-pounders.		
Smooth bore Ordnance.	136	4		140
		Grand Total		362

The army was based on Aquia Creek on the lower Potomac. All its supplies came by water to this point, and thence by rail for a distance of 15 miles to Falmouth, General Hooker's headquarters on the Rappahannock.[1]

The Army of Northern Virginia was organised into three Army Corps as under :—

First Corps	Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet.
First Division	Maj.-General McLaws.
Second „	„ „ Pickett.
Third „	„ „ Hood.
Second Corps	Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell.
First Division	Maj.-General Rodes.
Second „	„ „ Early.
Third „	„ „ Johnson.
Third Corps	Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.
First Division	Maj.-General Heth.
Second „	„ „ Anderson.
Third „	„ „ Pender.

[1] For details of the organisation of the Army of the Potomac see Appendix A.

Cavalry Division	..	Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.
First Brigade	.. ..	Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton.
Second ,,	.. ..	,, ,, Robertson.
Third ,,	.. ..	,, ,, Fitzhugh Lee.
Fourth ,,	.. ..	,, ,, W. H. F. Lee.
Fifth ,,	.. ..	,, ,, Jenkins.
Sixth ,,	.. ..	,, ,, Jones.

Each infantry division was organized into four brigades, except those of Rodes and Anderson, which had five. The average strength of divisions was about 7000 men, including the divisional artillery of four batteries. Two artillery battalions of four batteries each constituted the Corps artillery of each Army Corps. There was no general artillery reserve. Six horse artillery batteries were attached to the cavalry division. The aggregate effective strength of the army at the end of May, 1863, was 80,500 of all arms, and 257 guns. It occupied a strongly fortified position about six miles long, on a range of hills behind the town of Fredericksburg, with cavalry piquets watching the river both above and below. Richmond, fifty miles to the south, formed its base, supplies being brought up by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. A considerable amount of supplies was also drawn from the fertile Shenandoah Valley.[1]

A small Confederate cavalry force under General Imboden, about 2000 strong, was operating in the mountains of Western Virginia. With this exception the whole of the Confederate forces in the field, north of the James, were represented by the army commanded by General Lee. The defences of Richmond were manned by the town militia and five brigades of enlisted troops, viz. those of Cooke, Ransom, Jenkins, Wise, and Corse.

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[1] For details of organisation of the Army of Northern Virginia, see Appendix A.

4. Character of the American Armies.

A few remarks on the composition and character of the American armies may be useful to those unacquainted with the previous history of the war.

The forces on both sides were raised almost entirely by voluntary enlistment.[1] The type of recruit obtained was excellent, and the quality of the Union and Confederate troops was at this period of the war very high indeed. On the Union side two years of strenuous fighting had weeded out all those whose hearts were not in the business; and the subsequent feelings of disgust and weariness of the war, for which the dreadful slaughter of Grant's '64 Campaign was chiefly responsible, had not yet supervened to choke the steady supply of recruits, required to make good the enormous wastage of the armies at the front. Later on this supply dried up; and the many incidents at the siege of Petersburg, which disgraced the previous proud record of the Army of the Potomac, were the direct result of the large infusion of an inferior foreign element into that of native-born Americans, who at this period constituted the bulk of the men in the ranks.[2] It may be said therefore that in the year 1863 the Union armies generally were at a higher pitch of excellence than at any other period of the war. The same is true of their opponents. Never before or after had the Army of Northern Virginia such perfect confidence of ultimate victory as at the opening of this campaign. In fighting qualities there was little to choose between the soldiers on either side. The Confederate infantry certainly showed greater

[1] A Conscription Act was passed by the Confederate Government in the early days of the war, but its provisions were not strictly enforced. Conscription was not resorted to in the North until 1864.

[2] An exception must be made in favour of the Irish, who were universally acknowledged to be second to none in the Union armies.

élan in the attack; the fury of their charges was extraordinary, and may well bear comparison with that of the French infantry under Napoleon. But on the defensive the Union troops showed a stubborn determination equally great, combined with a capacity to recover quickly from even the most signal disasters, which more than once surprised and disconcerted their opponents. The intelligence of the rank and file was very high, and the readiness with which the men appreciated and adopted the methods of fighting most suited to the country, proved a cause of surprise to many foreign critics. The infantry were armed with a long-ranging muzzle-loaded rifle, and bayonet. Regiments usually went into action in two lines, with a third line of skirmishers thrown out in front. At decisive range the skirmishers withdrew to the flanks, and took part in the charge. Fire discipline was generally indifferent. Bayonets were seldom fixed, for fire action alone nearly always decided the issue of an attack. The artillery on both sides was excellent as regards the *personnel*, but the Federals had a great advantage in equipment; while as regards the transport and supply services of the army, the Confederates were deplorably deficient. As regards the cavalry, great improvement had been made in this branch of the Federal army since the early days of the war. The men had had time to learn their work, and junior officers, with real aptitude for this arm of the service, were beginning to come to the front. The Confederate cavalry, commanded by Stuart, formed an admirable force, and their leader's name is of course world-famous. The cavalry on both sides were armed with carbine and sabre. Dismounted fire-action was very frequently employed, and in this work the American troopers excelled; but they were also trained in shock action, and showed on numerous occasions that they could charge home, when called upon to do so.

Discipline, judged by European standards, was lax. As a rule, officers of tried capacity, who had won the confidence of their men, found it easy to enforce discipline, whereas incapable or unlucky commanders found the task correspondingly difficult. The chief evil, that resulted from this slackness of discipline, was straggling. This sometimes reached enormous proportions, and nothing proved adequate to stop it. It is only fair to say, however, that at this period of the war such straggling occurred almost entirely on the line of march; in the actual presence of the enemy, no troops in the world behaved better.

Among the junior ranks of the officers there was little to choose between either side. The incapable had been weeded out long ago,and those that remained proved, with very few exceptions, capable, intelligent, and devoted to their duty. In the higher ranks the balance of talent was distinctly on the side of the Confederacy. Among the Corps Commanders of the Army of the Potomac there were able men and stubborn fighters, but none whose talents or reputation could compare with those of Stuart, Longstreet, Hill, or Ewell. General Lee's character is too well-known to require any description. He was at this moment at the crowning point of his military career. His opponent, General Joseph Hooker, possessed courage, determination, and sound military judgment; he was in addition a popular hero, known to the Northern public as "Fighting Joe" Hooker. As a Corps Commander he won golden opinions; but more than this was needed to overcome his great opponent, and in the Chancellorsville campaign Hooker had miserably failed to justify the high hopes reposed in him by the army and the country.[1]

[1] For a detailed account of the composition, character and training of the American armies the reader is referred to the admirable description given in Henderson's "Campaign of Fredericksburg," from which the above summary is largely taken.

5. The Confederate Plan of Campaign.

It must be acknowledged that in determining to assume the offensive, General Lee had undertaken a very formidable task. His own army, augmented to the utmost, was barely 80,000 strong, and he had opposed to him double that number, backed by the vast resources of the North in men and money. Lee had behind him an impoverished country and a bankrupt Government. Yet there were many factors in his favour. The disparity of force was more apparent than real. The Federal forces were dispersed into isolated bodies, separated by long distances, and were acting independently of one another without reference to a general plan. The several generals were responsible for their actions to the General-in-Chief at Washington and to him alone. The Commander of the Army of the Potomac, by far the largest and most important force in the field, had no power to direct the movements of the armies in the Shenandoah Valley or in the Peninsula, so as to assist his own operations. This evil system had been rich with disaster in the past, and was destined to lead to further calamities in the future. The Army of the Potomac was temporarily disorganised by its recent defeat at Chancellorsville, and its commander was distrusted by his troops and disliked by the Government. Finally the Army of Northern Virginia was filled with supreme confidence in its powers, and of contempt for an enemy who had been so disgracefully beaten, while Lee's own matchless genius was a factor worth many thousands of bayonets to the army which he commanded.

To dislodge Hooker from his position on the Rappahannock was a difficult task. A frontal attack was out of the question, and his lines of communication, running to Aquia Creek, only 15 miles away, were unassailable. Two things only could move him, a threat against Washington or an invasion of Pennsyl-

vania. In order to effect either, it would be necessary for Lee first to disengage his army from that of Hooker, and then to throw it across the Potomac before his opponent could have time to grasp the meaning of the movement. The easiest route from Fredericksburg to Maryland under the circumstances was by way of Culpepper Court House, Chester Gap, and thence down the Shenandoah Valley. By this route his march would be screened, first by the Rappahannock, and then by the Blue Ridge. If, however, his opponent ascertained early what was in the wind, he could, by rapid marching, reach Harper's Ferry by way of Warrenton and Centreville before his opponent, for whereas Lee's route formed the arc of a circle, Hooker would be marching along the chord. Moreover by moving towards the Shenandoah Valley Lee would necessarily have to uncover the direct route to Richmond, and a rapid march by Hooker on the Confederate Capital would automatically force Lee to abandon his plans and fall back to protect his communications. On the other hand if Lee were to succeed in placing his army across the Potomac in a position to threaten Washington before Hooker could make up his mind to move, then it was morally certain that the pressure of public opinion would force the Federal Commander to retreat to the defence of the Capital, although not a single man might be standing between his army and Richmond.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE RAPPAHANNOCK TO THE POTOMAC.

1. Opening Movements of the Campaign.

The plan by which General Lee proposed to disengage his army from that of Hooker and to throw it north of the Potomac was as follows: The Corps of Longstreet and Ewell were to march from their lines on the Rapidan and Rappahannock to Culpepper Court House, and thence towards Chester Gap in the Blue Ridge, their right flank being covered during this movement by the cavalry force under General Stuart. The Corps of A. P. Hill was to hold the fortified lines on the hills behind Fredericksburg, concealing as far as possible the departure of the remainder of the army, until such time as the movement should be fully developed. It was then to follow in the track of the other Corps.

On June 3, the first move of the campaign was made. McLaws' division of Longstreet's Corps received orders to march from Fredericksburg to Culpepper, and Hood's division on the Rapidan was given the same direction. At the same time Jenkins' cavalry brigade moved forward from Brandy Station towards the Shenandoah Valley as an advance guard. Imboden's brigade, which was then at Staunton, 110 miles up the Valley from Harper's Ferry, was ordered towards Romney, a village among the mountains north-west of Winchester, with instructions to break

up the communications between that place and the west. On June 4, Ewell's Corps began to follow Longstreet towards Culpepper.[1]

The Federal piquets were not slow to notice that a movement of some sort was in progress in the enemy's lines, and at once reported this information to Hooker. With the object of ascertaining if Lee's army was still in position behind Fredericksburg, Hooker directed Sedgwick to throw a pontoon bridge across the river below the town, and send a force across to attack the heights. On June 6, Howe's division of the Sixth Corps crossed the bridges and began to feel the Confederate position. Some sharp skirmishing took place, the lines seemed to be strongly held, and Sedgwick reported to Hooker that the enemy was still there in force. Yet so delicate was the operation on which the Confederate Commander was now engaged, that Sedgwick's slight demonstration was sufficient to cause a check to the whole movement. The Corps of Longstreet and Ewell were both halted, and held in readiness to move back, if Hooker developed a serious attack. Then, when Sedgwick's crossing was seen to be in the nature of a reconnaissance only, the movement was resumed, both Corps reaching Culpepper on June 8. At this point was concentrated the cavalry force under General Stuart, numbering about 11,000 sabres, ready to cross the Rappahannock, and cover the right flank of the army in its further advance towards the Shenandoah Valley. The presence of this large body of hostile cavalry at Culpepper, swelled as it was by rumour to far more than its actual strength,[2] caused Hooker much uneasiness. He believed that Stuart was preparing to make a raid on his communications, similar to that

[1] Lee's report.

[2] See Hooker to Halleck, June 5, in which he reports that his cavalry estimate Stuart's strength at 20,000.

which he had carried out against McClellan in the Peninsular Campaign of 1862.[1] He therefore determined to clear up the uncertainty by striking the first blow himself, and on June 7 ordered General Pleasonton, in command of the Federal cavalry, to cross the Rappahannock, attack Stuart, and gather all the information possible as to the movements of the enemy in that quarter.

2. Cavalry Engagement at Brandy Station.

Pleasonton's force was concentrated at Warrenton Junction, watching Hooker's right flank, and consisted of three very weak divisions under Buford, Duffie, and Gregg, numbering all told about 7500 sabres with six batteries of horse-artillery. His command had been strengthened by the addition of two infantry brigades, under Ames and Russell, from the Sixth Corps. He decided to divide his force into two portions, Buford and Ames to cross the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford, Gregg, Duffie and Russell at Kelly's Ford, seven miles below Both columns were then to move on Brandy Station, where they would unite, and the whole was then to advance on Culpepper.

On the night of June 8, both columns moved quietly down to the left bank of the Rappahannock opposite their respective crossing points, and waited for daylight. On the Confederate side there seems to have been no anticipation of an attack. The brigades of Hampton, W. H. F. Lee and Robertson were camped at Brandy Station, Jones' brigade was watching Beverly Ford, and Fitzhugh Lee was higher up the river. At dawn on June 9, Buford pushed across the ford, surprised the Confederate piquets, which cannot have been very vigilant, and burst into Jones' camp, scattering the Confederate cavalry, and capturing a number of important despatches.

[1] See Hooker to Halleck, June 5.

Leaving Ames to hold the ford, Buford pushed on, driving Jones' brigade before him in disorder as far as St. James' Church, a short distance from Brandy Station. Here Jones succeeded in rallying his command and making some sort of a stand. In a short time assistance reached him, Stuart in person hastening up with the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Hampton to his support. Stuart's batteries were most judiciously placed, and in spite of the most determined efforts on Buford's part, the enemy's further advance on this side was checked. In the meantime Gregg had crossed at Kelly's Ford unopposed, and had advanced on Stevensburg, detaching Duffie to watch his left flank. He had not gone far before he came in contact with Robertson's Confederate brigade, sent by Stuart to secure Kelly's Ford. Gregg was pressing him slowly back towards Stevensburg, when the heavy firing from the direction of Brandy Station warned him that Buford was hotly engaged. Sending word to Duffie to follow him, Gregg moved rapidly by his right flank on Brandy Station, to effect the pre-arranged junction with the other column. He met with no opposition until he was approaching Fleetwood Hill, which overlooks Brandy; but here a section of artillery had been posted by Stuart, which, although quite unsupported, opened fire in the most plucky manner. Stuart had already ordered up Fitzhugh Lee's brigade to strike Buford in flank, and now, leaving W. H. F. Lee to hold him in front, he hurried with Jones and Hampton to meet Gregg. The leading regiment of Jones' brigade reached Fleetwood Hill barely fifty yards ahead of the enemy. Without halting to dress their lines, the Confederate cavalry advanced to the charge, and flung their opponents back. The Federals rallied and returned to the attack, and a desperate hand-to-hand struggle ensued for the possession of the hill. The arrival of Hampton's brigade decided

the issue. A vigorous charge by this fresh body of cavalry routed the already wavering Federals, who were driven entirely from the field with a loss of three guns, three hundred prisoners, and several colours. At this moment Buford renewed his attack from St. James' Church, but W. H. F. Lee kept him in check by repeated charges, until Stuart, having disposed of Gregg, was able to come to his relief. Fitzhugh Lee was now threatening Buford's right flank, and the latter, realizing that his attempted combination had failed, determined to fall back on Beverly Ford. In the meantime Gregg, having been joined by Duffie, was thankful to be able to effect his retreat to Kelly's Ford unmolested. The whole of Pleasonton's force then fell back across the Rappahannock, covered by the infantry, the Confederates making no attempt to harass them in their retirement. The action had lasted, off and on, all day. The Federals lost three guns, 484 killed and wounded and 382 missing, a total of 866 casualties. Stuart's loss was 301 killed and wounded, and 184 missing, among the wounded being W. H. F. Lee.[1] The general result of the engagement was a Confederate victory. The preliminary advantage won by the Federal Cavalry over Jones' brigade was more than counterbalanced by the severe punishment inflicted on Gregg's division by Stuart. In his plan of attack Pleasonton committed the common error of selecting for the junction of his two detachments a point which was in the immediate presence of the enemy. What actually happened was that this point was found to be occupied by the Confederates; Gregg and Buford were unable to make their junction, and Stuart, from his central position, was able first to check Buford, and then

[1] The command of his brigade passed to Colonel Chambliss. See Stuart's report, "Official Records," Vol. 27, No. 565, for details of this action. Also Pleasonton, *ibid.*, and Henderson, "The Science of War."

turn upon Gregg. No use was made of the Federal infantry beyond guarding the fords, a serious error, as the presence of these troops would probably have turned the scale in favour of the Union Cavalry.

3. Operations in the Shenandoah Valley.[1]

The despatches which Pleasonton had captured in this foray across the Rappahannock proved beyond doubt that an important movement of some kind was in contemplation by the enemy, but its exact nature was still uncertain. Hooker moved the Third Corps up to Rappahannock Station to dispute any attempt at a crossing at that point, and requested permission from Washington to move with all the rest of his force across the river, and attack Lee's communications with Richmond.[2] But in the meantime the latter was acting. The tentative nature of his first moves was due to the necessity of watching closely to see what his opponent would do in reply. Now that his operations were fairly launched the faster they moved the better, and on June 10 Ewell received orders to march with all possible speed into the Valley, and fall upon the enemy's force holding Winchester.

The Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley were disposed thus. At Harper's Ferry were 6300 men under Brig.-General Kelley and a detachment of 3000 men and six guns under Colonel Tyler at Martinsburg. At Winchester was Maj.-General Milroy with a force of about 7000 effective men, including

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[1] The best authority on the operations in the Shenandoah Valley is afforded by the record of the Court of Inquiry on the Evacuation of Winchester, in which every detail is clearly elucidated. Doubleday gives a good account from the Northern standpoint.

[2] Hooker to Halleck, June 10.

a brigade under Colonel McRennolds posted at Berryville. The whole was under Maj.-General Schenck, commanding the Eighth Army Corps, under whom were also the forces, about 5000 strong, at Romney and New Creek in Western Virginia. Since its evacuation by Jackson in November, 1862, Winchester had been occupied by the Federals, who had fortified it by a ring of redoubts, built on the hills that encircle the town. The country round Winchester forms one of the most fertile portions of the Shenandoah Valley, and the occupation of the town by the Federals had the effect of depriving the enemy of the rich resources of the district for the supply of their armies in Virginia. Nevertheless Milroy's position was strategically unsound. He was too far off to receive effective support from Kelley at Harper's Ferry, and his small force was liable to be overwhelmed by superior numbers. This fact was clearly seen by General Halleck, who was personally strongly averse to the retention of Winchester. In a series of despatches and telegrams to General Schenck between January and June, he repeatedly urged the latter to keep his troops well closed up, to expose no large force in advanced positions, where it was liable to be cut off, and particularly to leave nothing but a small observing post at Winchester.[1] However, General Schenck saw fit to disregard these instructions, being influenced in this course of action partly by reluctance to abandon a position upon which much money and labour had been expended

[1] Halleck to Schenck, June 11 :—" Harper's Ferry is the important place. Winchester is of no importance except as a look-out. The Winchester troops, excepting enough to serve as an out-post, should be withdrawn to Harper's Ferry."

Do., do., June 14 :—" If you have not executed my orders to concentrate at Harper's Ferry, you will do so immediately. Unless there is a more prompt obedience of orders, there must be a change in the commanders. See to this immediately."

in fortifying it, and partly by the repeated assurance of General Milroy that he could hold the town against any force which the enemy was likely to bring against him.[1] A cavalry raid by Stuart or Imboden was the most that Milroy considered he had to fear. The Army of Northern Virginia did not enter into his calculations. Winchester was in telegraphic communication with Falmouth by way of Washington, and it seemed impossible to suppose that Lee could detach any large force towards the Valley without its departure becoming known to Hooker in ample time for the later to send warning to Milroy. Nevertheless this was the thunder-bolt that was about to burst upon the unsuspecting Union forces.

The task before Ewell was a somewhat difficult one. A direct advance upon Winchester would indeed give the town into his hands, for Milroy's small force could not hold it against his entire corps of 22,000 men. But the latter, after evacuating Winchester, would probably fall back on Kelley at Harper's Ferry, and the united Federal forces, 16,000 strong, would be able to oppose a formidable barrier to any attempt to cross the Potomac. Ewell therefore determined to intercept Milroy's retreat to Harper's Ferry, pen him into Winchester, and destroy him there. On June 12th, the head of his corps, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, passed through Chester Gap into the Shenandoah Valley, and reached Front Royal by evening. On the morning of the 13th, Ewell ordered Rodes and Jenkins to march north, and cut the enemy's communications with Harper's Ferry. Jenkins encountered McRennolds' Brigade at Berryville about noon, and after a sharp engagement the Federals withdrew towards Winchester.

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[1] See Milroy to Schenck, June 11 :—"I have the place well fortified, and am well prepared to hold it. . . . against any force the rebels can afford to bring against me."

Meanwhile Rodes was pressing forward down the Valley. On the afternoon of June 14 he appeared before Martinsburg, and attacked the garrison of 3000 men under Colonel Tyler. The engagement lasted till dusk, when the Federal commander succeeded in effecting his retreat across the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and marching down the left bank of the river joined Kelley's division at Harper's Ferry. His artillery, however, was less fortunate. In an endeavour to escape north along the road to Williamsport it was vigorously pursued, and five out of the six guns fell into the hands of the Confederates.

It can hardly be believed that on the morning of June 13, General Milroy was still in ignorance of the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia had left its lines on the Rappahannock! Yet such was the fact. On June 12, he had sent out strong patrols along the Strasburg and Front Royal roads. The former found nothing beyond a few outposts. The latter encountered Ewell's advance-guard, and on its return to Winchester, about 3 p.m., reported the presence of a large force of the enemy's infantry and cavalry on the Front Royal road. This was significant enough. But so firmly convinced was Milroy that he could not be attacked by Lee's army without receiving due notice of its approach, that he disregarded this report, considering it inaccurate or exaggerated.[1] He still clung obstinately to his belief that he had only to deal with Imboden, or possibly a cavalry raid by Stuart. On June 13 Ewell, with the divisions of Johnson and Early, moved from Front Royal direct on Winchester. Some skirmishing occurred with the Federal patrols, but darkness intervened, and Ewell determined to defer his attack till the following day, when his dispositions would be

[1] See Milroy's report, "Official Records," Vol. 27, No. 383.

complete. Johnson was ordered to form his division facing the redoubts on the south-east side of the town, while Early was directed to march round behind the cover of the hills to the north-east, and deliver his attack when the enemy should be engaged with Johnson.[1] The skirmish on the 13th had one important result. From a captured prisoner Milroy learnt the startling news that the troops in front of him were not cavalry merely, but Ewell's army corps, and that Longstreet was not far behind. The statement received confirmation when late that night McRennold's brigade marched in, tired and foot-sore, having covered 30 miles since mid-day. He reported that a large force of infantry was now in rear of Winchester, between the Federals and Harper's Ferry. Milroy's true position, thus suddenly revealed, was extremely critical. He was vastly outnumbered and almost surrounded. Why then did he not retreat, while there was still time to do so? The explanation is that Milroy still could not bring himself to realise that Lee had stolen a march of five days over his opponent, and that the Army of the Potomac was still in its old lines on the Rappahannock. A forced march to Harper's Ferry would necessarily involve the abandonment of his sick, stores, and artillery; and this he considered too great a sacrifice. On the other hand, if he could hold out at Winchester for twenty-four hours, he confidently believed that Hooker would by then be up to his relief. He therefore determined to hold the town, and his troops made hurried preparations for the inevitable attack on the morrow.[2]

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[1] See Ewell's report, "Official Records."

[2] Milroy's report:—"I still hoped that there had been some corresponding action of the army of the Potomac, and that if I could sustain myself for twenty-four hours I would be relieved."

4. Defeat of Milroy.

At daylight on June 14, Johnson opened the attack. After some stubborn fighting his troops effected a lodgment in the suburbs, but the fire of the redoubts compelled them to relinquish what advantage they had gained. But Johnson's movements were only a feint. The real attack was about to come from a very different direction. On a ridge to the west of the town, outside the ring of forts, a line of earthworks had been thrown up by the garrison to command the Romney road. This was held by two regiments of infantry and a field battery. A patrol, sent out by Milroy in the early morning, reported on its return that no enemy was in sight to the west, and in consequence the troops holding the line of earthworks had no suspicion of the presence of a hostile force. Suddenly, about 2 p.m., out of the woods in their front, a masked battery opened on the works with deadly effect. For nearly an hour the bombardment was continued with such force and accuracy that the Federal infantry were unable to raise their heads above the parapets. Under cover of this fire a Confederate column, advancing with a loud yell, carried the entrenchments with a rush, driving the defenders headlong back on the main forts. It was Early's division, which had marched round the town under cover of the hills, and had quietly deployed for the assault without awakening a suspicion of its presence in the minds of the garrison. A fierce artillery duel was maintained between the forts and the Confederate batteries until night put an end to the action, but no further attack was made by the infantry. Ewell had gained his end. The Federal army was now shut in on all sides except the north, and as darkness fell Johnson closed Milroy's last avenue of escape by placing three brigades across the road to Charlestown.

During the night Milroy summoned his officers to a

hasty council of war. The situation seemed desperate. The redoubts indeed were intact, and so long as they were held, the town could still be defended, but a prolonged resistance was impossible, for there was not more than one day's supply of rations for the troops. Not a sign was to be seen of the Army of the Potomac, or of any other succour for the hard-pressed garrison. Only one other course remained —to abandon sick, stores, and guns, and endeavour to cut a way through the enemy to Harper's Ferry. This Milroy resolved to attempt. During the night the guns were spiked, the ammunition thrown into the wells, and the public property destroyed as far as possible without noise. The redoubts were silently evacuated, and the troops formed up for the march. On June 15, at 2 a.m., the column filed quietly out of the town, and took the Charlestown road. Four miles out the advance-guard struck Johnson's division, drawn up across the turnpike. Milroy deployed his troops for the attack, and the men, knowing the desperate position that they were in, and that all depended on their overcoming the force in their front, advanced with resolution against the Confederate line. Some of Johnson's troops gave way, but his reserve soon restored the battle, and the Federals, dispirited and disheartened, broke up in disorder. Ewell had already discovered the retreat, the information being conveyed to him no doubt by the civil population, who were wild with exultation at the disaster that had befallen the invaders. Milroy's horse was shot beneath him, and in the darkness and confusion all order was lost. Some of the Federals struck off to the right of the turnpike, some to the left. Both these parties, minus many stragglers, succeeded in reaching the Potomac, and crossed safely into Maryland with the commanding general, but the greater part of Elliott's and McRennolds' brigades were intercepted and captured. Ewell took 4000

prisoners, and all Milroy's stores and artillery also fell into the hands of the victors. Had Rodes left a brigade at Charlestown when he advanced on Martinsburg, it is difficult to see how a single man could have escaped from the disaster at Winchester. But in any case the scattered remnants of Milroy's force, a mob of fugitives without order or morale, proved of little further value during the campaign. His force had been blotted out of existence.[1]

Ewell was not the man to waste valuable time after a victory. Leaving Early to collect the captured stores and send the prisoners to Richmond, he commenced his march down the Valley the same day, arriving at Martinsburg by evening. Jenkins had already crossed the Potomac into Maryland at Williamsport. Kelley, not wishing to share the same fate as the unfortunate General Miles during Lee's former invasion, had already evacuated the town of Harper's Ferry, which is indefensible, and had fallen back to the Maryland Heights on the north bank of the Potomac. Not a single Federal soldier remained in the Valley.

5. Review of the Operations in the Shenandoah Valley.

Thus with brilliant success closed the first phase of General Lee's campaign. The Valley had been cleared of Union troops from end to end, 4000 prisoners, 28 guns, and large quantities of stores and transport had been captured, all at a cost of less than 300 casualties.[2] Several causes contributed to this remarkable success. Chief among them was the extraordinary secrecy and rapidity of the Confederate

[1] See General French's report to Halleck from Harper's Ferry, dated June 30 :—" I leave over 3000 men who came from Winchester, ready to take the rear at the first alarm."

[2] Lee's report.

movements. The march of Lee's army from Fredericksburg to the Valley, a distance of 60 to 70 miles, was conducted unknown to Hooker or Halleck, until the moment when Ewell and Milroy came into actual collision at Winchester. It was not until June 14, when that place was already surrounded, that Hooker telegraphed to Washington the all-important information that Ewell and Longstreet had passed through Culpepper towards the Valley.[1] This astonishing ignorance was due, partly to the skilful manner in which Stuart handled his cavalry so as to conceal the march of the Confederate columns, partly to the supineness of the Federal cavalry force, which, since the severe handling it had received at Culpepper on June 9, had remained concentrated about Warrenton, doing nothing. General Ewell showed both skill and energy in his conduct of the operations in the Valley, which brought about Milroy's defeat, and his orders were promptly and ably executed by his lieutenants.

Turning to the Federal side, the chief responsibility for the disaster must rest undoubtedly upon General Schenck. It was due to him that Milroy's division remained in its exposed position at Winchester, in spite of the repeated directions of General Halleck for the force to be withdrawn. General Schenck took it upon himself to disobey the orders of his commanding officer, and when the disaster occurred, sought to excuse himself on the flimsy pretext that he regarded these orders as suggestions rather than commands.[2] Such conduct could not fail to have a most prejudicial effect upon the discipline of the

[1] See Halleck to Schenck, June 14:—"It is reported that Longstreet's and Ewell's Corps have passed through Culpepper to Sperryville, towards the Valley." See also Hooker to Lincoln, same date.

[2] See Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the Evacuation of Winchester, "Official Records," Vol. 27, No. 400.

Army. It is difficult to understand why General Schenck was not called upon immediately to explain his conduct before a court-martial, and this would probably have been done had he not with considerable "slimness" diverted the blame from himself by throwing it upon his subordinate, General Milroy, whom he placed in arrest immediately after his arrival in Maryland. No possible blame can be attached to Milroy for not evacuating Winchester previous to June 13. His was not an independent command. He was bound to remain at his post until ordered to leave it, and up to the end he received no such order.[1] On the other hand, his own reports gave his superiors a totally false idea of his situation. His fatal error lay in disregarding the report, which his patrols sent in on June 12, of the presence of Confederate infantry on the Front Royal road. It forms a curious example of the way in which a general can be misled, when he ignores all reports which fail to square with his preconceived ideas of the enemy's movements. Milroy was so sure that he could not be attacked by Lee without warning, that he refused to believe any evidence to the contrary, until the Confederate bayonets were actually glittering on every road round Winchester.[2] In the subsequent retreat and rout of his command, he did all that was possible under

[1] On the evening of June 13, instructions to evacuate Winchester were sent by General Schenck, but by that time the wires had been cut, and the order never reached Milroy.

[2] See Milroy's official report:—"I believed that Lee could not move his large army with its immense artillery and baggage trains and perform a six-days' march in my direction unless I received timely notice of this important fact. The immense cavalry force at the disposal of General Hooker strengthened this confidence. Therefore on Friday, when I perceived indications of the approach of the enemy in some force on the Front Royal road, I felt confident that it was composed of the forces which I had faced, or that the expected cavalry expedition of General Stuart was in progress."

the circumstances, and he was acquitted of blame by the Court of Inquiry, held subsequently to investigate the causes of the disaster. Nevertheless in the eyes of the people he remained the chief culprit. His defeat made a deep impression in the North. Swinton's comment, unjust though it is to a brave but unfortunate soldier, aptly expresses the feeling of the people: "His defence of the post, entrusted to his care, was infamously feeble, and was the worst of that long train of misconduct that made the Valley of the Shenandoah to be called the 'Valley of Humiliation.'"[1]

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[1] Swinton—"Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac."

CHAPTER III.

THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.

1. Hooker Retreats to Centreville. Operations round Richmond.

Before turning to consider the movements of Hooker and Lee, we must follow shortly the career of Jenkins in his triumphant march into Pennsylvania. Jenkins had crossed the Potomac with his brigade at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th, at the moment when Milroy's ill-fated force was disintegrating into fragments at Winchester. By the evening of the same day he had entered Chambersburg. His advance created the utmost consternation and dismay among the farmers of Pennsylvania, who were now to feel the horrors of war on their native soil and in their own houses. The Confederate troopers, riding far and wide through the country, levied heavy tolls on the farmers in the shape of horses, cattle and provisions, which were collected and sent south to Rodes at Williamsport. But the conduct of the troops was exemplary. The personal effects of the inhabitants were scrupulously respected, pillaging of any description was sternly put down, and the good discipline and self-restraint of Jenkins' troopers, let loose for the first time on a hostile and helpless population, won the unstinted admiration of their enemies themselves. The panic everywhere was intense. Thousands of terrified farmers were flying across the Susquehanna, driving before them their sheep and

cattle. Fortifications were commenced at Harrisburg, which lay directly in the path of the invading army, and General Couch, to whom had been hastily assigned the defence of the Susquehanna, called out the local militia. But these hasty levies, without discipline or experience of war, offered but a feeble barrier against the march of Ewell's veterans. The real defence of Pennsylvania rested on the Army of the Potomac, far away to the South, in its old lines at Centreville, waiting patiently till its commander could make up his mind what to do.

The positions of the Confederate forces on the night of the 15th were as follows :—

Jenkins' brigade at Chambersburg.
Rodes' division at Williamsport.
Imboden's brigade west of Winchester.
Early and Johnson's divisions at Winchester.
Longstreet's corps at Culpepper.
Hill's corps at Fredericksburg.
Stuart, with the independent cavalry, at Culpepper.

Lee's army was thus spread over a front of nearly 100 miles, with the enemy's force concentrated within striking distance of one extremity of his extended line. It would seem as though on this occasion he was acting with a rashness that no success could justify ; but a careful study of the situation will show that the position was not nearly so dangerous as it seems, and, as usual, Lee had based his movements on a far-seeing comprehension of the whole situation. Hooker was aware on the 13th that Ewell had entered the Valley, and he had just learnt that Longstreet had left Culpepper. The inference was that the force in his immediate front could not be very large, and the situation seemed to offer an excellent opportunity for an effective blow. As early as the 5th he had telegraphed to Halleck that if the enemy moved in the direction of Culpepper, it would offer a favourable

opportunity for an attack on Fredericksburg. On the 10th, when the cavalry action at Culpepper had revealed to him that this operation had commenced, he telegraphed again, asking permission to attack Hill. But the fear of a sudden raid on Washington hung like a millstone round the necks of Lincoln and his military advisers. They failed to see the dangers to which their enemy had exposed himself by his bold movements. They saw only the swelling flood of invasion which was surging down the Shenandoah Valley. Halleck replied to Hooker with a refusal to grant the requested permission. The disaster at Chancellorsville was still in the minds of himself and the President, and there is some excuse for their hesitation to allow the sole army on which Washington depended for its safety to become entangled again in the depths of the Wilderness, while a Confederate force of unknown strength was north of the Potomac. All this was divined by Lee. It was not the first time that he had successfully played on the fears of the President for the safety of the national capital, and it was for this reason that he had not feared to leave Hill in a position which at first glance seemed one of imminent peril.

Hooker, deprived of power to take the offensive, had no course open but to retreat. On the 13th he broke up his camp at Falmouth and put his army in motion. The left wing, composed of the Second, Fifth and. Twelfth Corps, retired to Dumfries on the 14th, and Fairfax Court House on the 15th. The right wing, comprising the First, Third and Eleventh Corps, withdrew to Centreville on the 15th, the Sixth Corps remaining at Manassas. During the retirement, the cavalry under Pleasonton, with their head-quarters at Warrenton, continued to watch the right flank of the army. Hooker remained in this position three days, from the 15th to the 18th. Jenkins was riding at will through Pennsylvania, but Hooker dared not cross

the Potomac until he was satisfied that Lee's real objective was not Washington.[1] In fact, the latter, having secured the initiative, was compelling his opponent to conform to his own movements, one of the greatest advantages possessed by the offensive. As soon as Hill saw that Hooker had withdrawn, he broke up his camp, and moved on the 14th towards Culpepper. Lee's object now was to close up his attenuated line, and to throw his whole force as quickly as possible into Maryland. So, while Hooker was marking time at Centreville, Longstreet left Culpepper and moved along the foot of the Blue Ridge, while Hill pressed on to Chester Gap, as fast as his troops could march, to join Ewell in the valley. Longstreet's march was covered by Stuart, who left Culpepper on the 16th, with instructions to seize and hold the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains.

We must turn for a moment from the movements of the main armies to note very briefly the subsidiary operations that were taking place in front of Richmond. When Lee moved forward from the Rappahannock to the Valley, he left Richmond practically destitute of troops. The defenceless state of the city was well known at Washington, and it was considered a good opportunity for employing the large Federal force in the Peninsular in an attempt to capture the Confederate Capital by a *coup de main.* On June 13, at the time when Ewell was entering the Shenandoah Valley, General Getty, with a force of 7000 men, advanced from the White House, and, moving up the York River, planted himself across the Fredericksburg railway at Hanover Junction, seventeen miles north of

[1] See Hooker to Halleck, June 19 :—" Lee's delay in my front has caused me to doubt his intentions of throwing over any considerable force on Maryland shore. It is the impression of General Pleasonton that his infantry are still on the opposite side of Blue Ridge, and that it is his intention to attack in this direction," *i.e.* towards Washington.

Richmond. At the same time General Keys, with 5000 men, threatened the city from the east, approaching as near as Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy, only six miles away. The excitement in the Confederate Capital was naturally very great. Lee's army was far away, and the enemy was almost at the city gates. The Government, however, did not give way to panic. Not only did President Davis forbear to recall Lee from his projected invasion of Pennsylvania to come to the relief of the Capital, as he might well have been justified in doing, but he actually permitted the slender garrison to be reduced still further.[1] General Lee had requested that Corse's brigade of Pickett's division, which he had left behind at Richmond, might be sent to join him in Maryland, and this brigade left Hanover Junction only two days before Getty's cavalry raided that place, destroying the railway, blowing up bridges, and doing other damage to public property. All the country between the Pamunkey and the Rappahannock was dominated by General Getty. He had thus succeeded in cutting Lee's direct line of communications with Richmond, and the position of the Confederate Capital, hemmed in by enemies, seemed desperate. But at this crisis the fact was demonstrated once more that the best defence is nearly always a vigorous offensive. Lee was protecting Richmond far more effectually than he would have done, if his army had been behind the earthworks surrounding the city. The Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania quickly drove all thoughts of offensive action out of the minds of Lincoln and Halleck. General Dix, in command of the Union troops in the Peninsula, suddenly received orders to withdraw the forces threatening Richmond, and to send the bulk of his command to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. This was done, and the war-cloud that had hovered

[1] See Davis to Lee, June 28, Official Records, Vol. 27.

so threateningly over Richmond passed away, leaving behind it no trace save burning buildings and the broken bridges on the Fredericksburg railroad [1]

2. The Cavalry Operations. [2]

It is proposed to follow with some care the cavalry operations of the next five days, from June 16 to the 21st inclusive, for they afford a most interesting example of the way in which the independent cavalry of an army operates to conceal its movements. Stuart had with him five brigades, those of Hampton, Robertson, Fitzhugh Lee, Chambliss, and Jones, about 10,000 sabres in all. His instructions were to cover the movements of the Confederate army down the Shenandoah Valley. Pleasonton had his divisions concentrated at Warrenton and Catlett's Station on the 16th. His force had been augmented to some 12,600 sabres by the addition of a fourth division under Brig.-General Kilpatrick, but half of these had not yet joined him, so that on the 16th he could hardly have had more than 10,000 actually present. His orders were to guard Hooker's right flank, to feel the enemy, and to ascertain as far as possible his numbers and dispositions.

Stuart left Culpepper on the 16th and moved north, halting that night at Salem on the Manassas Gap Railway. He left Wade Hampton's and Jones' brigades behind at Culpepper to watch Warrenton, with orders to follow in the rear of Hill's column, as soon as the latter passed that point. On the 17th he proceeded to occupy the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains, sending Fitzhugh Lee's brigade to Aldie's Gap and Chambliss to Thoroughfare

[1] See correspondence between Generals Halleck and Dix on the conduct of this expedition, in Official Records, Vol. 27, No. 1.

[2] See reports of Generals Stuart and Pleasonton for the details of these operations.

Gap. Robertson was placed in support of the latter at Rectortown, while Stuart himself took up his position at Middleburg. The same day Pleasonton left Warrenton and moved north with his whole force. About noon his patrols came into collision with the Confederate cavalry at Aldie. Ascertaining that the enemy was holding the gap in force, Pleasonton determined to press the attack at this point. The action continued with varying fortune till dusk; finally Pleasonton secured possession of the gap, the Confederate cavalry falling back on Middleburg. Stuart, satisfied that this was the point at which the enemy was endeavouring to break through his screen, effected a counter concentration of four brigades at Middleburg by calling up Jones' brigade from Culpepper. Here on the 18th he was attacked by the whole of Pleasonton's force, reinforced during the day by Kilpatrick's division, which took part in the fight. Stuart made no attempt to hold his ground, for he was heavily outnumbered, but fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground, and by nightfull Pleasonton had gained five miles. The 19th passed quietly, but on the 20th and 21st the action was renewed, Stuart falling back through Upperville into Ashby's Gap, where a portion of Longstreet's corps covered his retreat. Pleasonton made no attempt to press him further, but fell back the same day to Middleburg, and with this the series of cavalry engagements came to an end.[1] The Federal cavalry had succeeded in wresting from Stuart the whole of Loudon county; but they had failed to penetrate his front, or to gain any information of Lee's movements. On the 18th Hooker was still ignorant of

[1] The total loss of the Confederate cavalry from the 16th to the 21st was 510 killed, wounded, and missing. Stuart claims to have captured 400 prisoners, mostly from Duffie's division. The total Union loss was 883. See reports of Stuart and Pleasonton in Official Records.

his opponent's designs. Since the 15th he had held his army at Centreville, waiting for information. Ascertaining on the 18th that Pleasonton had seized the gaps of the Bull Run mountains, he moved forward to occupy them. His army was then disposed along an excellent defensive line, covering all the approaches to Washington from the West, with three corps in the front line and three in support. In this position he remained six days, trying to gain information of the enemy's intentions, and carrying on an animated dispute with Washington.

It would be difficult to find a more striking illustration of the moral effect in war of a bold strategic movement, skilfully veiled by a powerful force of cavalry, and of the bewilderment produced in the mind of an enemy by such a movement, than is afforded by a study of the telegrams that passed between Hooker and Washington during these six days. Neither Halleck nor Hooker knew where Lee's army was, nor what his intentions were. There is an element of humour in the way in which each accuses the other of withholding information, the truth being that each was equally ignorant. The whole of Pennsylvania was in a tumult, the wildest reports coming from that quarter.[1] No one knew Lee's real strength, or whether he meant to invade Pennsylvania, or to attack Washington. And the cause of all this mystery and confusion was the admirable way in which Stuart had done his work, in spite of the persistent efforts of Pleasonton to break through the veil, and see what was behind. On the 21st we find Hooker writing to Halleck:—"This cavalry force has hitherto prevented me from obtaining satisfactory information as to the

[1] Halleck to Hooker, June 18:—"I can get no information of the enemy other than that sent to you. Rumours from Pennsylvania are too confused and contradicting to be relied on. Officers and citizens are on a big stampede."

whereabouts of the enemy. They have masked all their movements."[1] Such words from the mouth of the enemy constitute the highest praise that can be given of the manner in which Stuart had fulfilled his task.

3. Invasion of Pennsylvania.

Ewell's troops, which had been resting at Williamsport since their march down the Valley, crossed the Potomac at that place on the 22nd, Ewell himself, with the divisions of Johnson and Rodes, pushed on to Chambersburg, which was entered on the following day, while Early's division, which had been ordered to march on York, halted on the night of the 23rd at Wrainsborough. Jenkins had already seized Carlisle, and was actually threatening Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. On the following day the corps of Longstreet and Hill crossed at Williamsport and Shepherdstown respectively. The only portion of Lee's army still south of the river on the 24th were the cavalry under Stuart at Snicker's Gap, and Imboden's brigade at Hancock in the Shenandoah Valley. The covering screen of cavalry which had hitherto served so well to hide his marches was now absent, and it was probable that in a day or two the enemy would be in possession of full information as to his numbers and dispositions. The strategical situation now underwent a change. While Lee remained in the Valley his intentions could only be guessed at, and his opponent was in consequence unable to move. When he crossed into Maryland all doubt was removed, and Hooker was at liberty to take such steps as he considered best to meet the situation thus clearly presented. Whereas previously Hooker's movements depended on Lee's, now the position was reversed, and Lee's

[1] Official Records, Vol. 27.

subsequent action depended upon what Hooker would do. In the meantime he pushed Ewell's corps onward into Pennsylvania to threaten Harrisburg, and spread as much panic and alarm through the country-side as possible, in the hopes that the Federal Government would be frightened or coerced into recalling troops from the West, and so lightening the pressure on Vicksburg.[1]

General Early's division, marching on June 24 from Wrainsborough, reached Gettysburg on the 26th, scattering there a small force of the Pennsylvania militia, and on the 28th entered York, which was surrendered to Early without resistance. He immediately despatched Gordon's brigade to Wrightsville, with instructions to seize the great bridge over the Susquehanna at that place. It was defended by about 1200 of the State militia, but these stampeded at the first shell, burning the bridge behind them.[2] This was a great disappointment to Early, who had intended, if he could secure the bridge, to cross to the left bank of the Susquehanna and attack Harrisburg from the rear.[3] During the two days that he occupied York, a very heavy contribution, both in money and in kind, was levied on the town, while his cavalry, scouring the surrounding country for miles, brought in cattle and supplies, burnt bridges and stations, destroyed Government property, and created the maximum amount of terror and consternation over the country-side. General Ewell, with the divisions of Johnson and Rodes, reached Carlisle from Chambersburg on June 27, and remained there three days, making requisitions on the inhabitants and collecting supplies. The alarm in Harrisburg at the appearance of so great a hostile force within twenty miles of the city was very great. A force of about

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[1] Lee's report, Official Records.
[2] Gordon's report, Official Records.
[3] Early's report, Official Records.

12,000 militia, but no regular troops, had been hastily collected for the defence of the State Capital, and the command assigned to General W. F. Smith. At Bridgeport, on the opposite bank of the Susquehanna, which is at this point over a mile wide, earthworks had been thrown up to protect the bridgeheads and the approaches to the city from the west. On June 29 Ewell was on the point of advancing on Harrisburg, when he received an order from General Lee to march at once to Gettysburg. Other events had been transpiring in Maryland which rendered an immediate concentration of the Confederate army imperative. On the 28th a scout had come into Lee's lines at Chambersburg with the information that the Union army was at Frederick. This was the first news he had received since the 22nd of the movements of Hooker,[1] whom he had hitherto believed to be still on the south side of the Potomac. His own situation, as thus revealed, was somewhat critical. His army was scattered at three points, Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York, while the enemy's concentrated force was within a few days' march. A counter concentration was the first thing necessary. On the same day he sent dispatches to Early and Ewell, ordering them to march at once on Gettysburg, that place being selected as occupying a central position with regard to the different portions of his army.[2] By this narrow margin did Harrisburg escape the humiliation of surrender, and the material loss of requisitions and indemnities, for there is little doubt that the Pennsylvania militia could have offered but a feeble resistance to Ewell's veterans had his attack on the city been seriously pressed.

[1] Mosby, in his recent work, "Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign," denies this, but his arguments do not carry conviction. See Longstreet in "From Manassas to Appomatox"; also Lee's report.

[2] Lee's report.

4. Hooker's Movement to Frederick: His Resignation.

Hooker had remained since June 18 in his position between Leesburg and Thoroughfare Gap, covering the approaches to Washington, and waiting for the enemy to disclose his next move. On June 24 he received a message from Harper's Ferry that the Confederate army was crossing the Potomac. On the 25th a report came in from Hagerstown that 90,000 men of Lee's army had passed through the town.[1] The estimate of numbers was exaggerated, but the substance of the information was correct. At last the veil was lifted! Pennsylvania, not Washington, seemed to be the enemy's objective. Hooker's subsequent action was prompt. On the same day that he received this report the Union army began to cross the Potomac at Edward's Ferry. The Twelfth Corps marched towards Harper's Ferry, the Second, Fifth and Sixth were concentrated at Frederick City, while the First, Third and Eleventh moved to occupy the gaps of South Mountain.

Up to this time Hooker's movements had been purely defensive. But at last, after these weary days of waiting and watching, he saw an opportunity to strike a blow at his too-daring opponent. From the moment that the shattered wrecks of Milroy's force had streamed across the Potomac, the garrison of Harper's Ferry had been hourly expecting attack. Situated on the flank and rear of any army advancing up the Cumberland Valley, the position was of such obvious importance that it seemed inconceivable that Lee would dare to throw any considerable force into Maryland until he had first secured, or at least masked, this formidable outpost of the enemy. If further argument were needed, it was afforded by his action during the previous Confederate invasion

[1] Official Records, Vol. 27.

of Maryland. Since June 15, the garrison had strained every nerve, by strengthening the existing works and building new ones, to place their position in a state to meet successfully the long-expected assault.[1] But to the astonishment of the Federals, Lee ignored Harper's Ferry entirely. He did not attack, he did not even mask it. When he crossed the Potomac on the 24th, he left not a man behind.[2] This was the opportunity that Hooker determined to seize. Maryland Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, were held by a mixed force of 10,500 men under General French, who had taken over the command of the troops there on June 26.[3] His force was made up of the original garrison of 3000 men, the wrecks of Milroy's division, about 3000 strong, and 4500 reinforcements from Washington.[4] Hooker proposed to reinforce French with the Twelfth Corps under Slocum, and send the whole to cut Lee's lines of communication down the Cumberland Valley, which lay unprotected and inviting attack. But as the garrison of Harper's Ferry was not under Hooker's orders, he wrote to Halleck on the 26th, requesting permission to employ the force in this manner. Halleck sent back a refusal, couched in the following terms :—

"Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much labour and expense incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity."

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[1] Tyler's report, Official Records.

[2] Exclusive of the cavalry, and these had orders to join him as early as possible. See page 59.

[3] General Kelley was transferred to West Virginia, and handed over the command at Harper's Ferry to Brig.-Gen. Tyler on June 15, who in turn handed it over to General French on the 26th.

[4] French's report.

To this Hooker's reply forms the best comment possible :—

"I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten thousand men here in position to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river, and as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of it for them. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops moved to where they could have been of some service. Now they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his Excellency the President."

Although marked by a tone unbecoming to a subordinate, this letter contains nothing but the truth, a complete exposure of the fatuous policy pursued by General Halleck. The letter was followed almost immediately by another, in which Hooker requested permission to resign his command. The friction between Halleck and himself had become intolerable.[1] The disastrous effect of such antagonism on the conduct of the campaign is too self-evident to need any proof. Hooker himself was fully alive to the fact. On the 16th he had written to Lincoln :—

"You have long been aware, Mr. President, that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the Major-General commanding the Army, and I can assure you that so long as this continues, we may look in vain for success."

The position, in fact, was impossible. A general,

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[1] The despatches that passed between Halleck and Hooker form curious reading. The sneers, retorts, and scarcely veiled insinuations, with which they are filled, are hardly credible until they are read.

who was hampered by his Government, disliked by his officers, and distrusted by his men, could scarcely have conducted the campaign with success, however brilliant may have been his personal talents. His resignation was accepted, and on the 28th General Hardie arrived at head-quarters, with an order appointing General Meade, the commander of the Fifth Corps, to be his successor.[1]

It may be thought by the average reader that to change the commander of a large army in the midst of a complicated campaign, at a moment when affairs were rapidly approaching a climax, was an act of unparalleled folly on the part of the Federal Government. And so in almost any other case it would have been. But, as Swinton has pointed out, a measure which with most armies would have been the height of rashness, was here safe and easy. And it is a remarkable fact that the change of commanders did not delay the movements of the Army for a single day. A short interview with Hooker placed Meade in full possession of all the dispositions of the different corps, and the complicated business of transferring the command was completed without the slightest friction whatever.

5. Character of General Meade: His Advance towards Gettysburg.

The new Commander of the Army of the Potomac, the sixth that that Army had had since the beginning of the war,[2] was in many ways a contrast to Hooker. He was a quiet, firm, self-contained man of forty-four, had served in all the Virginian campaigns, and was known as a capable, earnest, and vigorous

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[1] General Sykes took over the command of his corps.

[2] The other five were: McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker.

officer. His address to the Army, on assuming the command, was brief and manly, in marked contrast to Hooker's orations. Throughout his tenure of the supreme command he gave no sign that he possessed in the slightest degree the attributes of military genius. His qualities were solid rather than brilliant, and as such he may be said to have typified the principal characteristics of the Army itself.[1]

When Meade took over the command, he found himself possessed of two advantages which were denied to his predecessor. He was given full control of all the forces in the theatre of operations, and he was kept constantly informed by his cavalry of the enemy's movements. Two courses lay open to him. He might adopt Hooker's plan of acting against his opponents' flank by throwing forward his army through the gaps of South Mountain on Hagerstown, and thus severing Lee's communications with Virginia. Or he might advance north, keeping to the east of South Mountain, and bring the enemy to battle before he should have time to seize Harrisburg. The first plan was the boldest, and would have the most decisive results, for to Lee's army, fighting with its back to the north, defeat must mean annihilation. On the other hand, it would expose all the eastern portion of Maryland and Pennsylvania to the enemy's attack, and would certainly be strenuously opposed on that account by the Government. Meade's chief characteristic was caution. His single thought was to avoid defeat, and he decided to adopt the safer if less promising plan.[2] In this he was perhaps right. The Army of the Potomac, brave and resolute as it always was, lacked some of the *élan* which

[1] Meade's appointment to the command came as a surprise to the Army, which had thought that it would be given to General Reynolds, the commander of the First Corps. See Doubleday in "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

[2] Meade to Halleck, June 28.

repeated victories had given its opponent. Its commander was new and untried. As a strategist he was no match for Lee. It was certainly wiser to run no risks with the sole army on which the Union relied, at a moment when such tremendous issues were at stake. So the army was set in motion on June 28 along the roads leading northward, the points marched on being Emmittsburg, Taneytown, and Westminster. On the same day General French received orders to abandon Harper's Ferry, to fall back with his command to Frederick, and effect a junction with the Army of the Potomac.[1] The front and flanks of the Army in its northward march were covered by the cavalry, Buford's division being on the left flank, Kilpatrick in front, and Gregg on the right.[2]

6. Operations of Confederate Cavalry under Stuart.

Since June 21 Stuart with five brigades of cavalry had been holding Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Lee was naturally most anxious to regain touch with his cavalry as early as possible, for ever since crossing the Potomac he had been without the services of a single brigade. On the 22nd he had sent instructions to Stuart to cross into Maryland not later than the 24th, and immediately to push on and feel the right of Ewell's Corps. Two brigades were to be left behind in the valley to watch Hooker so long as he remained inactive, but as soon as he withdrew from their front they were to cross the Potomac, and close in on the

[1] It is curious to note that Halleck accepted without demur the abandonment of Harper's Ferry, when it was ordered by Meade, although he had positively refused to give Hooker permission to do so.

[2] Duffie's division had been broken up, and distributed among the other three.

rear of the army. The instructions given were general in their character, and allowed Stuart considerable latitude, particularly with regard to the most suitable point at which to cross the Potomac; but great stress was laid on the importance of getting into touch with Ewell as quickly as possible.[1] Stuart proposed to carry out his orders by leaving the brigades of Robertson and Jones in the valley to watch Hooker, and with the remainder passing right round the Federal camps, crossing the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, and so rejoining the army. He felt confident of his ability to regain touch with Ewell by June 27 at the latest, while he considered that such a daring feat would not only have a great moral effect on his own command, but would confuse and distract the Federal General, and cause the utmost alarm in Washington.[2]

Stuart left Ashby's Gap at midnight on the 25th, with Chambliss, Fitzhugh Lee, and Hampton's brigades, meaning to reach Edward's Ferry. But unfortunately for the success of his plans the same day saw Hooker commencing his northward movement, and Stuart found every road blocked by the Federal columns marching towards the river. Had he been discreet he would have abandoned his bold scheme; but the fascination of a raid entirely round the Federal Army, such as he had carried out successfully twice before, was too strong for Stuart, and he clung to his original plan. But the Federal movements necessitated a much wider circuit than he had intended, and it was not till the 27th, two days behind Hooker, that he crossed the Potomac at Drainsville and hurried on to Rockville, where an immense wagon train of stores and supplies for the Union Army fell into his hands. The excitement in Washington was intense.

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[1] For text of this despatch see Chapter VIII.

[2] Stuart's report.

Communications with the army were broken, and the wildest rumours spread through the city. But Stuart had no time to waste threatening the Capital. The Federal Army, now commanded by Meade, was marching steadily northward, and it was clear that he could not hope to get into touch with Ewell's Corps, as his orders directed, before the latter reached York. So on York he directed his march, and riding all night passed through Brookeville and Cookesville, crossed the Baltimore and Ohio Railway on the 29th, and reached Westminster at 5 p.m. on the same day.[1]

On the 28th the Army of the Potomac was located as follows :—

First and Eleventh Corps marching on Emmittsburg.
Third and Twelfth ,, ,, ,, Taneytown.
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps marching on Frizzleburg.
Buford's cavalry division at Fairfield.
Kilpatrick's ,, at Littlestown.
Gregg's ,, near Westminster.

It will be seen that Stuart and Gregg were in close proximity. Meade had kept his head in the most admirable manner when his communications with Washington were broken by Stuart, but he could not altogether disregard the presence of the famous Confederate cavalry leader with 6000 sabres on his flank and rear, and he therefore instructed Gregg to intercept Stuart at Westminster.[2] But by the time the former had reached the town Stuart had already passed through, and was approaching Hanover. The place was held by a cavalry brigade under General Farnsworth. Stuart pushed on Hampton's brigade to seize it, and after some sharp fighting drove out the defenders, capturing a number of prisoners. Soon

[1] Stuart's report.
[2] Meade's report, Official Records.

after he was himself attacked by Kilpatrick, but successfully maintained his position till nightfall, when he evacuated the town and resumed his march on York. Now occurred a most unfortunate piece of bad luck for the Confederates. Early had received Lee's order to countermarch on Gettysburg on the evening of the 29th. He commenced his march the following morning, moving by the road to Heidlersburg, while at the same moment Stuart was approaching York by the Abbotstown Road. The two columns passed within a few miles of one another without either being aware of the other's proximity,[1] and Stuart arrived at York to find that Early had disappeared. In spite of his disappointment, he lost no time, but set out immediately towards Carlisle, whither he supposed Early had gone to join Ewell. He reached that place on July 1, to find it in the enemy's hands, but he gained at last the all-important information that the army was concentrating at Gettysburg. Exhausted as his men were, their indefatigable leader immediately turned his horse's head in that direction and resumed the march. Hundreds of men, worn out with their exertions, slept in their saddles, but the column still pressed on, until late in the afternoon of July 2 Stuart reported his arrival to Lee in person on the field of battle.

He had covered 200 miles in seven days, a very fine performance; he had thrown Washington into a panic for two days, had destroyed large quantities of stores intended for the Army of the Potomac, and had gained accurate knowledge of the enemy's movements. On the other hand he arrived on the battlefield with horses and men exhausted by their exertions, and in bad condition for further operations; the information he had acquired came too late to be of service, and the panic in the capital was very quickly

[1] Stuart's flankguards could not have been very alert.

allayed. Finally and most serious of all, for eight days, that is from the day that he entered Maryland, General Lee had been without the services of a single brigade of cavalry. His orders had not been carried out. Robertson and Jones were still in the Shenandoah Valley, although the Union Army had left their front six days, and Stuart had failed to carry out his instructions to get into touch with Ewell. During this period Lee was groping in the dark, while his opponent was kept supplied by his cavalry with abundant information.[1] We shall see presently the important effect produced by these errors on the subsequent course of the campaign.[2]

7. Military Situation, Night of June 30.

To appreciate the reasons for General Meade's dispositions, it should be remembered that his primary object was to relieve the pressure on Harrisburg. In this he was immediately successful, for on June 30 both York and Carlisle were free from the presence of the invaders. Further than this Meade had no definite plan; but he had noted the line of Pipe Creek, a tributary of the Monocacy, as a suitable position for fighting a defensive battle to cover Washington and Baltimore, and it was with the view of bringing his Army on to this alignment that he now directed the movements of the different corps.[3]

On the night of June 30 the Sixth Corps on the right was at Manchester, the Fifth at Union Mills, the

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[1] Stuart, however, succeeded in occupying the attention of both Kilpatrick and Gregg, in futile attempts to catch him, at a time when their presence was urgently needed at Gettysburg. It was Buford who supplied Meade with information: the others achieved nothing. For criticism of Stuart's action see Chapter 8.

[2] See Stuart's report for details of these operations.

[3] Meade to Halleck, July 1.

Second at Uniontown, the Twelfth at Littlestown, and the Third at Taneytown, where Meade had fixed his head-quarters. The First and Eleventh Corps, forming the left wing of the Army, were pushed forward towards Gettysburg, the First Corps under Reynolds halting for the night at Marsh Creek, four miles short of the town, while the Eleventh halted at Emmittsburg. Buford's cavalry division covered the front, and was already in possession of Gettysburg. Kirkpatrick's and Gregg's divisions were on the right flank of the Army at Hanover, looking for Stuart. Turning to the Confederate movements, Hill had reached Cashtown with two of his divisions, while the third under Anderson was still on the west side of South Mountain. The weather was very bad, and as it was considered unnecessary to hurry, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops.[1] Longstreet was at Fayetteville, with Pickett's division at Chambersburg guarding the trains. Ewell, with Rodes' division, had halted for the night at Heidlersburg; Early, marching from York, was also near that place; while Johnson's division, which had escorted the trains along the road to Chambersburg, was at Greenwood. The cavalry were situated thus: Stuart between York and Carlisle, Jenkins with Ewell, Imboden at McConnelsburg collecting supplies, Robertson and Jones still south of the Potomac in the Shenandoah Valley.

It will be seen by a glance at the map that on the night of June 30 the leading brigades of Hill's and Reynolds' Corps, both marching on the same point, were within ten miles of one another, and if both continued on the same course a collision was bound to occur. Yet neither Lee nor Meade desired it. The former, ignorant of his opponent's movements, was intent only on a concentration of his scattered forces,

[1] See Lee's report.

and he had selected Gettysburg merely as being the most convenient centre.[1] The last thing that he desired was that his point of concentration should prove to be situated under the enemy's very eyes. It is one of the commonest faults of strategy, and one of the most fatal. Nor did Meade want to fight at Gettysburg. His intentions, as expressed in his despatch to Halleck, July 1, were to concentrate his army on the line of Pipe Creek, covering his depots at Westminster, and there await an attack. He was particularly anxious to avoid having to assume the offensive.[2] Under these circumstances his dispositions seem somewhat obscure. If he meant to fight behind Pipe Creek, there seems no reason for throwing his left wing forward to Gettysburg. It will be noted that on the night of June 30 the Confederate Army had the advantage of being much more concentrated than its opponent, whose right and left wings were more than 30 miles apart. The danger to which the Union left wing was exposed, if it advanced to Gettysburg, is obvious. It was extremely likely to encounter the enemy in superior numbers in an isolated position, and to be crushed before the remainder of the Army could come up to its assistance. The movement in fact was strategically unsound, and it was destined to lead to a terrible disaster to the Union arms.[3]

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[1] See Lee's report.

[2] Meade to Halleck, June 30.

[3] It is possible that the impetuosity of General Reynolds, who was in command of the left wing, was the cause of this false move. Reynolds was a Pennsylvanian. As such he was eager to prevent the further invasion of his native State, and his ardour may well have overcome his prudence. On the other hand, it is definitely stated in Meade's report that he himself ordered the forward movement to Gettysburg.

CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

1. Description of the Field.

An observer, standing on Cemetery Hill, immediately south of Gettysburg, can obtain an excellent view of the whole of the ground to the north and west of the town, which was to form the scene of the battle of July 1. The turnpike roads to Chambersburg and Hagerstown leave the town on the west, and separating at an angle of some forty degrees pursue a switch-back course over a succession of low undulations which run north and south. Seminary Ridge, which is the first one encountered, offers a pronounced slope on its eastern side at this point, and is dotted with copses and small clumps of trees. On its western side the gradient here is very slight, and merges gradually into a second undulation overlooking the bed of Willoughby Run, a small stream, often dry at this part of its course. Beyond the Run the Chambersburg road ascends a long gradual slope and disappears over a distant crest, the hills of South Mountain closing in the horizon. Standing on Seminary Ridge, between the two pikes, and half hidden by trees, is the Lutheran Seminary, from the cupola of which a wide view can be obtained. Some 2000 yards to the north rises Oak Hill, a prominent eminence, which commands all the ground south of it as far as the Chambersburg pike. A railroad track runs parallel to this road, passing through a series

GETTYSBURG, POSITIONS JULY 1.


HANOVER RAILROAD
CHAMBERSBURG PIKE
Oak Hill
PODES
Ramsdr
O'Neal
Baxter
Gordon
Grant
Wilkeson's
Hays
EARLY
Smith
Jones
Hoke
Lane
Scales
Thomas
McIntosh
Pegram
Daniel
Iverson
Doles
Ramseur
Battle
Dockery
Sheets
Avery
Colquitt
Walker
Lowrance
Perrin
Archer
Brockenbrough
Pettigrew
Marshall
Fry
Garnett
Kemper
Armistead
Wilcox
Posey
Mahone
Wright
Sanders
Davis
Cadmus
Meredith
Stone
Dunlop
Root
Biddle
Gamble
Stannard
Doubleday
Reynolds & Tidball
Seminary
GETTYSBURG
ROWLEY & WADSWORTH
SEMINARY RIDGE
ROBINSON
SHURZ
Von Amsberg
Wyttenbach
Dilger & Wheeler
Hart
Stevens
BARLOW
Devin
McPherson
PENDER
Harper
Heth
Willoughby Run
Marsh Creek
Rock Creek
Culp's Hill
Cemetery Hill
Stevens' Knoll
Cemetery Ridge
Seminary Ridge
Willoughby Run
Marsh Run

of shallow cuttings, and after skirting the town sweeps to the north and runs towards Hanover. From the north end of Gettysburg there run two main roads to Mummasburg and Carlisle respectively. The ground here is flat and open, consisting largely of cornfields, through which flows Rock Creek, a small stream easily fordable. The greater part of the ground described above is very suitable for the movements of troops, while the successive ridges offer admirable positions for artillery.

2. Collision at Gettysburg. Repulse of Confederate Attack.

It will be remembered that on the night of June 30 Heth's Confederate division was near Cashtown, bivouacking by the road side, and the First Union Corps under General Doubleday[1] at Marsh Creek, both within a few miles of Gettysburg. On the evening of the same day Buford's cavalry division, covering Doubleday's advance, reached the town. Buford established his piquet line along Willoughby Run and round to the north as far east as Rock Creek, the main body taking up a position on the crest overlooking the Run, on either side of the Chambersburg pike.[2] At daylight on July 1 the Confederate troops were under arms and marching towards Gettysburg. Buford was aware of their approach, but instead of falling back upon the First Corps, he determined to hold the town with his cavalry, until the Federal infantry could come up to his support. At about 5.30 a.m. the first shot of the battle was fired by Heth's advance guard, which came into

[1] General Reynolds was in command of the left wing of the army, comprising the First, Third and Eleventh Corps, the command of the First Corps devolving upon Doubleday.

[2] Buford's report.

collision with the Federal piquets. These were quickly driven in, and the Confederate skirmishers, swarming down to the bed of the Run, opened fire on Gamble's brigade. Firing continued in a desultory manner for some hours until about 10 a.m., when the van of the First Corps, consisting of Wadsworth's division, led by General Reynolds in person, arrived on the field. Under Reynolds' personal direction Cutler's brigade was deployed across the turnpike, overlooking the Run, while Meredith's brigade, coming up a little later, took up position in McPherson's Wood on the left. The cavalry, which had been hard pressed and had suffered severely, was then withdrawn, Gamble's brigade being formed up behind the Seminary, while Devin was detached to watch the right flank.[1]

At this moment Heth launched his attack. He had deployed his division with the brigades of Davis and Archer in the front line, Pettigrew and Brockenborough in support, while his artillery, consisting of four batteries, came into action at a range of some 1300 yards on the ridge west of the Run. Davis' brigade crossed the dry bed of the Run, pressed rapidly up the slope beyond, and striking Cutler's right flank drove back his brigade in great disorder towards Seminary Ridge. The Confederates, however, pursued too far. In their rapid advance they lost all order, the supporting brigade was not up, and Doubleday, seeing the disaster that had befallen his right, threw his reserve on Davis' right flank, crumpled it up, and forced the whole to retreat with great loss across the Run.[2] This success re-established the Union right. On their left Archer had crossed the Run and pushed into McPherson's Wood, but so vigorously was he met by Meredith that after a determined encounter the Confederates were driven

[1] Doubleday's report. [2] *Ibid.*

out of the wood and back across the Run, Archer himself and many of his men being taken prisoners. But the Federals had not gained this success without paying a heavy price for it. General Reynolds was dead, shot through the head while personally directing the movements of Meredith's brigade.[1] So fell General Meade's right-hand man, the most brilliant officer in the Army of the Potomac, a victim to his own impetuous rashness. The Confederate assaults on both wings had been repulsed, and Doubleday, who was now, by the death of Reynolds, the senior officer on the field, re-formed his line in its old position. A lull ensued in the action, but as both sides were rapidly receiving reinforcements, it was obvious that the struggle would soon be renewed.

About noon Pender's Confederate division of Hill's Corps reached the field from Cashtown, and was deployed to the right of the Chambersburg pike in rear of Heth. Ewell's Corps was also close at hand. Rodes' division, marching in the morning from Heidlersburg, reached the neighbourhood of Oak Hill about 1 p.m., Devin's piquets reporting its appearance to Doubleday. Early's division, coming from York, was approaching from the north-east, a direction which would bring him upon the right flank and rear of the Federals. On the Union side the remainder of the First Corps, comprising the divisions of Rowley (late Doubleday's) and Robinson, reached the Seminary about 11 a.m., closely followed by the leading brigade of the Eleventh Corps, which had marched from Emmittsburg that morning. General Howard, in command of the latter, rode on ahead of his troops to Cemetery Hill, where he received the sad news of Reynolds' death. This left him the senior officer on the spot. A glance over the field revealed the gravity of the situation, and he at once

[1] Meredith's report, Official Records.

sent back a message to his own corps to hasten forward, and another to General Sickles at Taneytown, urging him to march at once with the Third Corps on Gettysburg.[1] His hasty glance over the ground led him to the conclusion that Cemetery Ridge formed the only suitable position for his small command, but owing to the necessity of extracting the First Corps from its exposed situation it was impossible to adopt this plan.[2] By 1 p.m. the divisions of Barlow and Shurz appeared on the field, and were ordered by Howard to form in line on Seminary Ridge, north of the Chambersburg pike, thus prolonging Doubleday's line *en echelon* to the north. But this order was never executed. Devin's reports indicated that the enemy was approaching in great strength from the north. The Eleventh Corps was therefore ordered to form front in that direction, the line being formed in the level fields north of the town, Barlow's right resting on a knoll above Rock Creek and Shurz's left on the Mummasburg pike. The two divisions numbered about 6000 men in all. Steinwehr's division, which came up last, together with two batteries, was retained by Howard as a reserve on Cemetery Hill, where he took up his own position. Rowley's division of the First Corps had been pushed forward to fill up the gaps in Doubleday's very weak line, Stone's brigade on the right, resting on the turnpike, Biddle's on the left of Meredith. Robinson was held in reserve at the Seminary, which his troops put into a rough state of defence. It will be seen that the Federal position now formed a kind of obtuse angle ; the line, however, was not complete, a gap of over 700 yards intervening between the left of the Eleventh Corps and the right of the First. The artillery was thus distributed :—

3 batteries on Seminary Ridge and 2 batteries on

[1] Howard's report. [2] *Ibid.*

the turnpike, in rear of the firing line; the whole in action against the Confederate batteries behind Willoughby Run.

3 batteries in rear of the Eleventh Corps, in action against Oak Hill.

2 batteries in reserve on Cemetery Hill.

1 battery with Gamble's cavalry brigade.

3. Renewal of the Attack: Defeat of the Federals.

The battle, which since 11 a.m. had been hanging fire, was now bursting out again with renewed intensity on all sides. General Ewell reached Oak Hill in person about 1 p.m., and his keen military eye at once perceived the importance of this position, which would enable him to bring an enfilading fire upon the First Corps.[1] Four batteries were rapidly brought into action on the hill, and their fire produced a most telling effect, the two Federal batteries on the turnpike being withdrawn in a shattered condition, while Cutler's brigade was so cut up that it was withdrawn to the edge of the woods on Seminary Ridge.[2] This movement exposed Stone's flank, compelling him to refuse his right, so that his line became a right angle, resting on the turnpike. Rodes had deployed his division for attack with the brigades of Daniel, Iverson, O'Neal, and Dole in line, and Ramseur in support, the centre of his line being intersected by Seminary Ridge. The gap in the enemy's front had not escaped his notice, and now at 2.30 p.m. he pushed forward O'Neal and Iverson to seize the interval.[3] At the same moment Doubleday had ordered up Robinson's division from the Seminary to close the gap. Baxter's brigade, advancing to do so,

[1] Ewell's report, Official Records.

[2] Doubleday's report, *ibid.*

[3] Ewell's report, Official Records.

came violently into collision with Iverson and O'Neal, but he managed to hold his own, punishing severely his assailants, until Paul's brigade came up to his support, when a vigorous counter-attack hurled Iverson back with great slaughter and the loss of 300 prisoners.[1] This success was highly inspiriting to the Federals at the moment, but it ultimately proved most disastrous. For Baxter, in the excitement of his countercharge, had advanced over 500 yards beyond the position assigned to him on the left of the Eleventh Corps, so that his right flank, which should have been covered by Von Amberg, was now entirely exposed. As Iverson fell back, Daniel's Confederate brigade advanced and attacked Stone's right wing, while Davis' brigade assaulted his left. The fighting here was very desperate, Colonel Stone and his second-in-command, Colonel Wister, both being shot down, while Daniel's loss was equally severe, for he was exposed to an enfilade fire from Cutler's brigade. On the Confederate right Heth's division renewed the attack on McPherson's Wood, where Meredith and Biddle still stubbornly held their own.

It was now nearly 4 p.m. On the extreme left of the Confederate line Early was at last in position to attack. He formed the brigades of Hoke, Hays, and Gordon in line across the Heidlersburg road, on both sides of Rock Creek, with Smith's brigade in support. Four batteries came into action in the fields east of the road, completely enfilading the Eleventh Corps.[2] On the Union side all was foreboding and despair. Doubleday and Shurz sent to Howard, asking urgently for reinforcements. Howard replied that he had none to spare, for he considered it essential to hold on to Cemetery Hill as an ultimate rallying point.[3] To

[1] Iverson's report, Official Records.
[2] Early's report, *ibid.*
[3] Howard's report, *ibid.*

all appeals for orders he replied, "Hold on a while longer, for I am expecting Slocum at any moment." The crisis had now arrived. A little after 4 p.m. all the Confederate forces on the field under Hill, Rodes, and Early advanced simultaneously to the attack. On the Union right the issue was quickly decided. Gordon's brigade rushed forward with a yell against Barlow's division, Barlow himself was shot down, and his troops gave way and broke to the rear. This exposed Shurz's right flank. Dole, advancing impetuously, drove him back, and the whole of the Eleventh Corps retreated in the wildest disorder towards the town. Steinwehr, on Cemetery Hill, threw in Coster's brigade to check the rout, but the reinforcement came too late. Coster became involved in the rush of fugitives to the rear, and was rolled back with the rest.[1] Meanwhile an appalling struggle was raging round the First Corps. The rout of Shurz's division exposed Doubleday's right flank. Robinson's division, attacked in front by Ramseur, in flank by O'Neal, and in rear by Dole, was surrounded and cut to pieces after a desperate resistance. Out of 2500 men who went into action, 1690 were killed or wounded.[2] Stone's brigade, attacked by Daniel, Davis, and Scales, suffered an even more terrible loss, only 400 men out of 1300 fighting their way back to Seminary Ridge.[2] Cutler was able to effect his retreat comparatively unmolested, but the loss in this brigade had already amounted to nearly 1000 casualties.[2] On the left Biddle and Meredith still managed to retain their ground against Heth and Pender, but to hold on any longer was manifestly hopeless. Doubleday, seeing that the day was lost, sent one of his staff to ask Howard for orders. This officer found the General at the Cemetery, looking the picture of

[1] Howard's Report, Official Report.

[2] For details of casualties see "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

despair, for he had just witnessed the rout of the Eleventh Corps.[1] Howard could do nothing but order Doubleday to fall back fighting in as good order as possible. This was done, although with great difficulty, the Union line being rallied on Seminary Ridge. Here these brave troops, unshaken by the fearful ordeal that they had passed through, prepared to hold the position long enough to enable the Union batteries to be withdrawn. The Confederates, flushed with triumph, advanced with yells that rang over the whole field. Their assault was stubbornly met, Heth being slightly wounded and Scales' brigade much shaken. This gallant defence served its purpose. The Union batteries were got off in safety, and then, abandoning the ridge, the shattered remnants of the once splendid First Corps retreated to the town.[2] Here a terrible scene ensued. The Eleventh Corps, pouring in total rout through the streets, came into violent collision with Doubleday's gallant regiments, which still retained some semblance of their organisation. The townspeople, hurrying to their doors, saw with sorrow and dismay the disaster that had overwhelmed their defenders. The Confederates came fiercely on behind. Hays and Hoke crossed Rock Creek near the railway bridge and rushed into the town, capturing thousands of prisoners.[3] The survivors streamed up the slopes of Cemetery Hill, where Steinwehr's division formed the only nucleus, and one of doubtful solidity, on which to rally. The situation was black indeed. The First Corps was reduced to a mere remnant barely 2500 strong. The morale of the Eleventh Corps was destroyed, and the men, in spite of the efforts of their officers, were only rallied with extreme

[1] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."
[2] Doubleday's report.
[3] Hoke's report, Official Records.

difficulty.[1] Fortunately there had arrived on Cemetery Hill an able and energetic commander in the person of General Hancock, who had been sent forward by General Meade, on receipt of the news of Reynolds' death, to take command of all the troops at Gettysburg. Under his supervision some sort of a line was finally formed, and the batteries placed so as to command the approaches from the town.

Luckily for the Federals, their opponents were too much disorganised by their rapid advance to follow up the victory promptly. General Lee had arrived in person on the field at the moment when the Confederates were making their combined attack at the close of the day. It was a triumphal moment for him. Everywhere the enemy was giving way, and from the crest of Seminary Ridge he saw his disorganised masses pour through the town and up the hill beyond. The show of resistance made by Hancock did not deceive him, and appreciating the importance of carrying this position, he despatched one of his staff to Ewell with instructions "to press those people, and secure the hill if possible."[2] But the latter had not got his troops in hand for a fresh attack. Early had formed Hays and Hoke in position to advance, but his other brigades were away on the left flank,[3] and Rodes' division was in some disorder and not yet up. Heth and Pender had halted on Seminary Ridge. It was possible that the Federals had received large reinforcements, they showed a bold front, and under the circumstances Ewell decided to use his discretion and await the arrival of Johnson's division before renewing the attack.[4] Johnson reached the field shortly before sunset, and was at

[1] Hancock's report, Official Records.
[2] Taylor.
[3] Early's report, *ibid.*
[4] Ewell's report, *ibid.*

once moved forward. But the situation had now materially altered. Slocum's Corps, marching from Taneytown, reached Cemetery Hill about 7 p.m.,[1] and part of the Third Corps came up a little later. These fresh troops made the position practically safe against a *coup de main*, and Lee, having ascertained that the enemy had been reinforced, decided to make no further advance that night.

It had indeed been a day of disaster to the Union. Over 6000 Federals had been killed or wounded, and between 3000 and 4000 captured, an aggregate of nearly 10,000 casualties, together with three guns lost. The First Corps had gone into action about 8200 strong, and the Eleventh Corps about 9000. To this must be added Buford's two brigades, numbering some 2800 sabres, making the total Federal force on the field roughly 20,000. The Confederates brought into action upwards of 27,000 men from first to last. Hill lost 2400, Ewell about 3000, making the total Confederates loss 5400, about 20 per cent. of the numbers engaged.[2]

4. Night of July 1.

About 10 p.m., at his head-quarters in Taney town, General Meade received a despatch from Hancock reporting the disaster at Gettysburg. Rumours of misfortune had been coming from the front all day, and he had already notified his corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march on Gettysburg. On the receipt of Hancock's report all uncertainty was at an end. The enemy was evidently concentrating his entire strength at Gettysburg. Slocum and Sickles, acting without orders, had already reached the field, and Meade had now no

[1] Slocum's report, Official Records.

[2] Doubleday, "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

other course open to him but to push forward the rest of his army to effect a counter-concentration. So the line of Pipe Creek was definitely abandoned, and the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps ordered forward to Gettysburg, Meade himself starting for the same place at 11 p.m.[1] At 7 a.m. on the morning of July 2 the Second Corps reached the battlefield, followed at 8 a.m. by the remainder of the Third and part of the Fifth. The rest of the Fifth arrived about noon, and Newton's division of the Sixth Corps about 2 p.m. The rear of that corps, brought up by Howe's division, which had to march over 30 miles from Manchester, did not reach the field till as late as 5 p.m.[2]

The positions of the Confederate forces at midnight on July 1 were as follows: Hill's Corps bivouacked on Seminary Ridge,[3] Rodes' division and part of Early's in the town, Johnson's division in the fields east of Rock Creek. Longstreet's Corps was strung out along the road between Chambersburg and Gettysburg, McLaws' division 2 miles from the latter place, Hood at Greenwood, Law's brigade at New Guildford, and Pickett's division at Chambersburg. Stuart, with the cavalry brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, Hampton, Chambliss, and Jenkins, was hurrying south from Carlisle, Robertson with his own and Jones' brigade moving north from Williamsport. Imboden was at McConnelsburg in the Cumberland Valley, collecting supplies.

5. Description of the Field.

Cemetery Hill is an oval-topped eminence, with gently sloping sides, rising immediately south of the town. A thousand yards to the south-east rises the

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[1] Meade's report.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Anderson's division reached the field about 4 p.m., but took no part in the action.

wooded crest of Culp's Hill, connected to the Cemetery Hill by a saddle or neck of ground. Round its eastern base winds Rock Creek, a small stream, some 30 feet wide and 6 inches deep, with wooded banks. East of Culp's Hill the ground is wooded and hilly. To the south it changes to flat, open fields, intersected by small watercourses, which drain into Rock Creek. Cemetery Hill is prolonged to the south by what is known as Cemetery Ridge, a slight undulation of the ground, almost entirely bare of trees, which extends some 2500 yards as far as Wiekert's House. A mile away to the west, across a flat plain destitute of cover, runs the corresponding crest of Seminary Ridge, showing up from the Cemetery against the sky line as a broken line of dark woods.[1] At Wiekert's House the open ground that marks Cemetery Ridge disappears, and is succeeded by a medley of woods, bogs, and thick undergrowth, out of which rises the steep, rocky eminence of Little Round Top. This forms a spur of the still loftier Round Top, or Sugar Loaf Mountain. Both these hills are covered with woods from base to brow, their sides are very steep, and their surfaces extremely rugged and broken. Their summits command magnificent views over the surrounding country. As regards the roads, the following should be noted: First, the Taneytown pike, running due south in rear of Cemetery Ridge and Round Top. Secondly, the Baltimore pike, ascending the northern face of Cemetery Hill, then turning eastwards and crossing Rock Creek, leaving Culp's Hill on the left hand. Thirdly, the Emmittsburg pike, which branches off

[1] It should be remembered that neither Cemetery Hill nor the ridge of the same name form at all conspicuous natural features. Viewed from the Lutheran Seminary, they are hardly noticeable; the objects that actually strike the eye are Culp's Hill and Round Top. The same is true of Seminary Ridge. From the Union position it does not look like a ridge at all.

from that to Baltimore at the foot of Cemetery Hill and then runs south-west diagonally across the fields between the two ridges.

6. Dispositions of the Union Army, Morning of July 2.

General Meade arrived in person on the field about 1 a.m., looking tired and anxious.[1] As soon as it was sufficiently light, he went forward to examine the position. The line to be held was about 7500 yards long, from Round Top on the left to Culp's Hill on the right, and was in shape somewhat like the letter J, the vertex of the curve being formed by Cemetery Hill. The high hills on the flanks and the open ridge in the centre, with its excellent field of fire, afforded admirable positions for defence. On the other hand, the ground did not lend itself well to counter attack, and the Seminary Ridge, about a mile away, would afford an enemy good positions for his artillery. However, the first drawback did not worry General Meade, whose plans were based almost entirely on a passive defence.

Having inspected the position, Meade proceeded to make his dispositions to hold it. By 11 a.m. his line was completely formed. On the right was the Twelfth Corps, under Slocum, his right flank resting on a small stream that flows into Rock Creek near McAllister's Mill, and his left on Culp's Hill. The troops had spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their lines with log breastworks and abattis of felled trees.[2] On Slocum's left was the Eleventh Corps holding Cemetery Hill, its right connecting with Wadsworth's division across the head of the valley that runs up between the two hills.

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[1] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."
[2] Greene: "Battles and Leaders."

The remainder of the First Corps formed a local reserve in rear of the Cemetery.[1] On Howard's left was the Second Corps, under Hancock, holding Cemetery Ridge. Sickles' Third Corps was ordered to prolong the line as far as Round Top, while the Fifth Corps, under Sykes, formed a general reserve at Power's Hill. The Sixth Corps had not yet reached the field. Meade's head-quarters were established in a small cottage on the Taneytown pike, and his ammunition trains and reserve artillery were parked by the cross-roads near Wiekert's House. Buford's cavalry division watched the left flank, but was withdrawn about 1 p.m. and sent to Westminster, with orders to guard the supply trains which had been assembled at this point.[2]

General Sickles was very much dissatisfied with the position allotted to him to defend. Owing to its close and intricate character, it afforded no field of fire to the front, no well-marked line on which to deploy his command, and no position for his artillery. In addition to all this, the Emmittsburg road, running parallel to his front at a distance of some 1500 yards, offered an excellent site for the enemy's batteries, whence he could bombard the line upon which Sickles was required to form his corps. The Emmittsburg road seemed to offer a far more advantageous position. It would give him a good field of fire to the front and flanks, excellent sites for his artillery, and its possession would be denied to the enemy. It had, however, some grave disadvantages. His left flank would be *en l'air*, and the only remedy would be to *refuse* his

[1] The First Corps received a strong reinforcement in the shape of Stannard's brigade, which came up on the night of the 1st, but took no part in the battle that day. General Newton took over the command of the First Corps on the 2nd, Doubleday resuming the command of his division.

[2] Buford's division was in urgent need of rest and recuperation.

left by swinging it back towards the Round Tops, thus making the line a salient. Furthermore, the position was too long for the numbers at his disposal, and his right flank would lose its connection with the left of the Second Corps. Sickles rode over to headquarters and explained the situation to General Meade, who sent his Chief of Artillery (Brig.-General Hunt) to report on the suitability of the alternative position. What happened subsequently is rather obscure, but Sickles seems to have considered that Hunt had authority to authorise the proceeding, and about 2 p.m. he commenced to move his troops forward to the new line.[1] Birney's division, on the left, was disposed as follows. Graham's brigade was posted at the angle, in an enclosure called the Peach Orchard, surrounded by low rubble walls. On his left was De Trobriand, facing south-west on sloping ground leading down to a little boggy stream which crossed his front. Next to him was Ward's brigade prolonging the line as far as Devil's Den, a low oval-shaped hill, covered with trees and large boulders. Devil's Den is separated from the Round Tops by a swampy hollow, full of dense undergrowth, through which meanders a water-course called Plum Run. Humphreys' division was formed along the Emmittsburg road, Carr's brigade in the front line, Brewster and Burling in support. It will be noted that the Round Tops, which formed the key to the whole Federal position, remained unheld. The responsibility for this remarkable piece of negligence rested on General Sickles, whose conduct will be referred to later. The Federal artillery was disposed as follows :—

17 batteries (81 guns) on Cemetery Hill, commanding the approaches from north, east, and west.

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[1] See General Hunt's account in "Battles and Leaders." See also the reports of Meade and Sickles, Official Records.

7 batteries (40 guns) along the crest of Cemetery Ridge, in rear of the Second Corps.

10 batteries (56 guns) by the Peach Orchard, of which 5 were placed along the Emmittsburg road, facing north-west, and 5 perpendicular to the road, facing south-west.

One 6-gun battery on Devil's Den, and a second in rear of De Trobriand's brigade.

The reserve artillery (121 guns) was parked by the cross-roads near Wiekert's House.

The strength of the Union army on the morning of July 2, including only men actually present for duty with the colours, was:

Corps.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Total.	No. of guns.
First Corps (Newton)	3700	500	4200	27 [1]
Second ,, (Hancock)	12400	600	13000	24
Third ,, (Sickles)	11200	700	11900	30
Fifth ,, (Sykes)	12000	550	12550	26
Sixth ,, (Sedgwick)	14500	1050	15550	48
Eleventh ,, (Howard)	5400	600	6000	25 [2]
Twelfth ,, (Slocum)	8200	400	8600	20
Artillery Reserve (Hunt) ..		2200	2200	110
Details			1900	
Total	67400	6600	75900	310

The returns for June 30 [3] show a total of 100,800, exclusive of the cavalry corps, borne on the muster rolls of the army. Deducting 10,000 casualties on July 1, we are left with a balance of nearly 14,000 men absent from the ranks either by desertion, straggling, or other causes. The rapid march to the battlefield probably accounted for a large number of the stragglers.

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[1] 1 gun was lost on July 1.

[2] 2 guns lost on July 1.

[3] See "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

7. Confederate Dispositions for the Attack.

With the earliest streaks of light General Lee was in the saddle, examining the enemy's position.[1] In accordance with his habit on important occasions, he held an informal council-of-war, at which his corps commanders were invited to give their views on the situation. General Longstreet, impressed by the strength of the enemy's flanks, and by the deadly field of fire afforded to his centre by the wide stretch of open fields between the two ridges, was strongly against an attack; and urged the alternative scheme of endeavouring to manœuvre the enemy out of the strong position he had taken up by operating against his left flank, and so threatening his lines of communication with Washington.[2] The merits of this scheme will be discussed later. It is sufficient here to say that in the absence of his cavalry, General Lee considered such manœuvres impracticable, and preferred the alternative plan of following up his unexpected victory of the previous day by pressing the attack forthwith, in the hope of catching his opponent unready, with part of his army still in the rear.[3] But on which flank should his attack be made? A careful examination of the ground by Culp's Hill soon convinced him that a general assault on this side was impracticable, owing to the broken nature of the ground. Moreover, the movements of troops towards this flank would be visible to the enemy on Cemetery Hill. About 8 a.m. Lee returned to the Seminary. Colonel Long, of his staff, and his Chief of Artillery, General Pendleton, had in the meantime examined carefully the enemy's left flank, and brought back a favourable report.[4] The Confederate com-

[1] White: "R. E. Lee."
[2] Longstreet: "From Manassas to Appomatox."
[3] Lee's report.
[4] See Pendleton's report.

mander then decided on his plan of battle, which was as follows :—

" It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavour to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in.

" General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's centre, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and to co-operate with his right division (Anderson's) in Longstreet's attack.

" General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer."[1]

In considering this plan, it should be borne in mind that at this time (between 8 and 9 a.m.) the Federal left wing followed the crest of Cemetery Ridge as far as the neighbourhood of Wiekert's House and there ended, Birney's division being on the flank. The Third Corps had not yet taken up its ultimate position on the Emmittsburg road ; it had, in fact, only just reached the field, while the Fifth Corps was not yet quite up, and the Sixth many miles away. Lee's plan of attack is simple and clear. He proposed to make a feint on the enemy's right flank, a holding attack on his centre, and a decisive attack, of an enveloping nature, with 16,000 men, on his left, with the object of crumpling up that flank and rolling it in on the centre.

It was most important that the attack should be opened as soon as possible, before the enemy should have time further to strengthen his line, or to receive additional reinforcements. The orders given were

[1] Lee's report.

verbal only, and their exact wording has since been the subject of bitter controversy, but there is no doubt that Longstreet was ordered to move as soon as possible with the troops he had with him.[1] This, however, he did not do. Shortly after sunrise the divisions of Hood and McLaws reached Seminary Ridge, but Law's brigade of Hood's division, which had started at 3 a.m. from New Guildford, 24 miles away, did not reach the field till nearly noon.[2] Not until then did Longstreet set his corps in motion towards Round Top, and the march thus tardily commenced was still further delayed by bad staff arrangements. Moreover, it soon became evident that General Lee's orders had been framed under a misapprehension of the enemy's dispositions, for the position that Longstreet was to have taken up was found to be already occupied by Sickles.[3] This necessitated a change in Longstreet's intended movement. It was not till nearly 4 p.m. that McLaws' division reached its allotted position, wheeled to the left, and deployed in the woods by Warfield's House, while Hood, marching past his rear, formed into line on his right across the Emmittsburg road. The line of woods, which border Seminary Ridge, concealed his division from the view of the Federal troops at the Peach Orchard, and from the signallers on Little Round Top. On the left of McLaws was formed Anderson's division of Hill's Corps, in line along Seminary Ridge. Pender's division was formed in two lines on the left of Anderson, his left resting on the Hagerstown pike near the Lutheran Seminary. Heth's division, which had been much shaken by the action on July 1, was massed in reserve behind Pender and took no part in the fighting this day. Rodes'

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[1] See Appendix C.

[2] Law: "Battles and Leaders."

[3] Longstreet: "From Manassas to Appomatox."

division of Ewell's Corps was drawn up facing Cemetery Hill, his line passing through the centre of the town and connecting on the right with Pender, on the left with Early. Half of the latter's division was formed in the fields east of Cemetery Hill, the brigades of Smith and Gordon being detached to the northeast to watch the left rear of the army. On Early's left was Johnson's division on the left bank of Rock Creek, facing Culp's Hill. The artillery was posted as follows :—

Longstreet's Corps.

10 batteries (37 guns), under Colonels Alexander and Cabell, along the edge of the woods by Warfield's House. Objective, the Peach Orchard. Range about 600 yards.

2 batteries (8 guns), under Colonel Henry, on the right of Hood's division facing Round Top.

Hill's Corps.

12 batteries (44 guns), under Colonels McIntosh, Garnett, and Pegram, along the line held by Hill's Corps. Objective, Cemetery Ridge. Range about 2000 yards.

Ewell's Corps.

5 batteries (20 guns), under Colonel Brown, near the Seminary.

4 batteries (16 guns), under Colonel Carter, in the fields north of the town. Objective, Cemetery Hill. Range 2000 yards.

4 batteries (16 guns), under Major Latimer (Andrew's battalion), behind Rock Creek. Objective, Culp's Hill. Range about 1200 yards.

The effective strength of the army of Northern Virginia on the morning of July 2 [1] was as follows :—

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[1] See "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

	Strength of all Arms.	Guns.
Longstreet's Corps ..	25,650	83
Ewell's ,, ...	21,150	81
Hill's ,, ...	18,300	77
Total ..	65,100	241

8. Attack on the Union Left and Centre.

The morning passed quietly in both the Union and Confederate lines, with the exception of a persistent but desultory firing kept up between the hostile patrols and skirmishers. General Meade had at one time considered the feasibility of attacking Johnson's division in its isolated position facing Culp's Hill, but an unfavourable report, made by Slocum, caused him to abandon the idea. General Lee had taken up his position on Seminary Ridge near Hill's head-quarters, and here he remained all day, seated on the stump of a tree, sometimes chatting with his staff, at other times studying carefully the enemy's position through his field-glasses. His manner was cheerful and confident, but as the day wore on, and still there came no sign or sound of Longstreet, his impatience became intense. Again and again his staff heard him exclaim, "What can be keeping Longstreet! What can be keeping him!"[1] It was past 4 p.m. before the crash of artillery from the woods to the south announced that the attack had commenced at last. The ten Confederate batteries, posted along the edge of the woods by Warfield's House, opened fire simultaneously upon the Peach Orchard. The Federal artillery instantly replied. At such close range the fire could not fail to be very

[1] Long: "Memoirs of General Lee."

deadly, and on both sides the loss in men and horses was very great.[1] General Sickles, realising from the intensity of the fire that the main attack was about to be directed against his front, sent back hurriedly to Sykes requesting reinforcements. The Fifth Corps, wearied with its long march of eighteen miles, was resting near Power's Hill, and Sykes, thinking that there was no special need for haste, waited till his men had drunk their coffee before setting them in motion towards the Peach Orchard.[2] General Meade had also hurried to the point of danger. He was much dissatisfied with the line which Sickles had thought fit to occupy, but seeing that the enemy was on the point of attacking decided that it was now too late to attempt to correct it. He therefore contented himself with sending his Chief Engineer, Brig.-General Warren, to report on the safety of Sickles' left flank, and ordering Caldwell's division of the Second Corps to reinforce his right.[3] Warren reached the summit of Little Round Top about ten minutes before Longstreet launched his attack, and was startled to find it unoccupied save by some signallers. But he experienced a still greater shock when he discovered that the Confederate infantry were already deployed in the woods in front of him, and were actually on the point of advancing. Hurrying down the hill to report this critical state of affairs, he came upon Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, going out on the Peach Orchard road to reinforce Sickles. In view of the urgency of the situation, Warren took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, without referring to

[1] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders." Also Hunt, *ibid.*

[2] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 167. General Sykes' own report is extremely difficult to follow. It does not afford a satisfactory explanation of his delay in marching to the assistance of the Third Corps.

[3] Meade's report, Official Records.

Barnes, and, with a hurried explanation of the circumstances, sent him to the hill top.[1]

The Confederate attack was made in echelon of divisions from the right. About 4.30 p.m. Hood's division advanced, the slanting sunlight shining on their long lines of bayonets as they swept forward in magnificent order across the valley. A few minutes later Hood fell, severely wounded, but this misfortune failed to check the steady advance of his command. On the right Law's Alabama brigade pressed forward through field and wood until it reached the foot of Round Top. Here the brigade inclined to the left towards the spur formed by Little Round Top, the regiment on the right passing over the summit of the main mountain and descending on the further side. Thus this important position, which commanded the entire left wing of the enemy, was actually in Confederate hands; but by some extraordinary negligence no garrison was left on its summit, and Law's brigade began to climb the south face of Little Round Top.[2] As chance would have it, Vincent's Union brigade was scaling the north side at the same moment. The Federals reached the top first by a bare margin, and received their opponents with a volley at point-blank range. Then among the tumbled boulders and dense thickets there began a confused and bloody struggle for the possession of the hill. Vincent was quickly reinforced by Weed's brigade and by Hazlett's battery, which was dragged up by incredible exertions to the crest. In the meantime Robertson's Texan brigade advanced to attack Devil's Den. He was met by a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, and the brigade wavered, but Benning, coming up in support, carried the whole forward, and the Confederates, sweeping irresistibly over the hill,

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[1] Warren: "Battles and Leaders."

[2] Law, *ibid.*

captured three guns of Smith's battery and drove Ward's brigade in great disorder across the wheatfield.[1] Halting only to re-form his ranks, Robertson led his brigade across Plum Run against the western side of Little Round Top, while Law attacked from the south. Again and again the Confederates renewed their charges, but their opponents fought with desperate determination to cling to their position. The loss on both sides was most severe. Weed, Vincent, and Hazlett, were all struck down, with 550 of the rank and file, while on the Confederate side the loss in the two brigades amounted to over 1000 men.[2]

At the same time that Robertson and Benning attacked Ward, Anderson advanced against De Trobriand. Such difficulty did the latter have in holding his ground, that Burling's brigade was thrown in to support him. The whole of Hood's division being now engaged, McLaws advanced to storm the Peach Orchard. Here was the real focus of the struggle. The position was protected by stone walls, and had in front a bare sloping glacis, over which the assaulting lines had to advance. Longstreet in person, hat in hand, led his troops forward under a storm of bullets until the head of Kershaw's brigade charged across the Emmittsburg road. Here it wheeled to the left, and attacked the batteries in rear of the Peach Orchard. This movement exposed Kershaw's right to an enfilade fire from part of De Trobriand's line, but Semmes, coming up at the critical moment, reinforced Kershaw and repulsed the counter-attack, falling himself mortally wounded at the same moment.[3] Colonel Alexander pushed forward one of his batteries as far as the turnpike, where it came into action

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[1] Smith's report, Official Records.

[2] Law: "Battles and Leaders." Also Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

[3] Kershaw: "Battles and Leaders."

against the Peach Orchard, taking the troops holding the angle in enfilade.[1] Simultaneously, Barksdale, who had been impatiently awaiting the order to advance, led his Mississippi brigade at the front, swept over the wall, and drove back Graham in the utmost disorder. Now was shown the fatal weakness of the salient angle, for when the Peach Orchard was captured, both Humphreys' and Birney's lines were taken in flank. Humphreys, with commendable promptitude, swung back part of his line at an angle to the road, and for a time managed to hold his own,[2] but Birney's position was untenable, for not only did Barksdale threaten his right flank, but Robertson, by the capture of Devil's Den, had already turned his left. The whole line gave way, and retreated in much disorder through the wheatfield in rear of the position. Then Alexander, limbering up his batteries, took them at a hand gallop across the fields, and came into action again on the Emmittsburg road against the retreating enemy.[3] The six Federal batteries behind the Peach Orchard were in great danger. Kershaw was pressing forward against them in front, while Barksdale was threatening their flank and rear. Retreat was inevitable, but owing to the great number of casualties among the horses, this was an operation of extreme difficulty. Nevertheless it was in great measure successfully performed. Many of the guns were run back by hand, others had to be left on the field, and fell for a time into the enemy's hands. All that were brought off, mingled together, their organization completely lost, were massed by General Hunt in rear of Plum Run along the edge of a wood, and did much by their fire to cover the retreat of the Federal infantry.[4]

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[1] Alexander, "Battles and Leaders."
[2] Humphreys' report, Official Records.
[3] Alexander, *ibid.*
[4] Hunt: "Battles and Leaders."

At the moment that Birney's line gave way and retreated across the wheatfield, the leading brigades of the Fifth Corps were on the point of arriving to their support. Had they reached the field twenty minutes earlier, their arrival might have turned the scales, but now it was too late. Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades of Barnes' division advanced in line in rear of Birney to cover his retreat. The rush of fugitives through their ranks threw them into disorder, and before this could be rectified Anderson and Wofford charged them in front and flank, crumpled them up, and flung them back. Sykes sent forward Ayres' division as a last hope, and Caldwell's division of the Second Corps was thrown in as well to stem the advance of the exultant Confederates. For a moment they succeeded. Brooke's brigade forced back Semmes' almost as far as the Emmittsburg road, but Barksdale and Wofford struck in upon his right flank, and Caldwell, finding his division unsupported and almost surrounded, had no choice but to struggle back as best he could to Cemetery Ridge. This isolated Ayres, who was fiercely attacked on his right flank, and only succeeded in extricating himself with the loss of 1000 officers and men. At this moment General Sickles, trying to rally the beaten troops, was himself struck by a fragment of shell, which tore off his right leg. He had to be carried from the field, the command of his corps devolving upon General Birney.[1]

Every one of the reinforcements sent in to save the Third Corps had been checked, outflanked, and thrown back in a shattered condition, and the Confederate advance was still unchecked. Fortunately for the Union army, Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps had not yet been engaged, and Wright's division of the Sixth had been brought up by Meade, when he

[1] See reports of Birney, Longstreet, Caldwell, and McLaws.

perceived the disaster that was overtaking Sykes.[1] Posted on the steep ridge that rises behind Plum Run, north of Little Round Top, these two divisions formed a solid nucleus of fresh troops, on which the shattered fragments of the Third and Fifth Corps could rally. The Confederates, too, were in much disorder by their rapid advance, and the line of massed batteries behind Plum Run swept with their fire the ground over which they must press their attack further. Barksdale, impatient of delay while aught remained to be accomplished, led his brigade against the guns and actually captured Watson's battery at the point of the bayonet. But the success was only momentary. Willard's brigade of the Second Corps, detached from Hancock to strengthen the threatened left rank, was thrown in to retake the battery. Barksdale was shot down while imploring his men to stand firm, and died within the Federal lines. His brigade, exhausted by their previous efforts, could not hold their ground, and were hurled back almost as far as the Peach Orchard. But Willard's success was as brief as that of Barksdale. His impetuous counter-attack uncovered his flanks. He fell dead on the field, and his brigade, surrounded and routed, was flung back to its original position with a loss of 700 officers and men.[2]

It will be remembered that when Barksdale broke through Sickles' line at the Peach Orchard, Humphreys swung back his left to meet an attack on that flank, and retained his right on the Emmittsburg road. His position, however, was necessarily very insecure, and it only needed a vigorous effort to overthrow him. Hill's orders were to co-operate in Longstreet's attack with his right division, and with the remainder to threaten Cemetery Ridge, and so

[1] Meade's report, Official Records.
[2] McLaws' report, *ibid.*

prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to either of his flanks. Anderson's division was ordered to attack in echelon of brigades from the right, as soon as McLaws should be fairly engaged with the enemy. Wilcox's and Perry's brigades were facing Humphreys, Wright and Posey opposite Gibbon's division of the Second Corps on Cemetery Ridge. The attack was pushed gallantly home by Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, but owing to a misunderstood order Posey did not stir.[1] Humphreys' line gave way almost instantly, falling back through a tangle of woods and enclosures towards Cemetery Ridge, followed closely by the Confederates, yelling with exultation. Hancock threw in two regiments to support Humphreys' right,[2] but these were immediately routed by Wright and driven back with the rest. Humphreys fell back slowly, struggling to retain his ground, but Anderson's attack was irresistible, and he was forced back to Cemetery Ridge, losing over 2000 officers and men out of the 5000 which he had originally taken into action.[3] Doubleday's division was brought rapidly up from Cemetery Hill to cover his retreat, and this succour was sorely needed, for the Confederates, flushed with victory, were pressing on to storm the ridge. Wilcox and Wright actually reached the crest, but Perry was beaten back by the concentrated fire of several batteries. Now was the time when a strong reserve should have been at hand to follow up and secure the success which Wilcox and Wright had so gallantly won. The situation was intensely critical. The Federals were straining every nerve to hold Longstreet back, their centre had been broken through, a little more and the battle would be won. But the nearest troops

[1] This is evident from Posey's report.
[2] Hancock's report.
[3] "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

that were in a position to support Anderson were those of Pender's division, nearly a mile away across the valley, and Pender had not moved.[1] Wilcox maintained his position on the crest for a short time, but he was soon menaced by greatly superior numbers, for Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps was hurriedly brought up by General Meade in person to retake the lost position.[2] Wright, whose left was exposed by Perry's failure to advance, was obliged to retreat, and then Wilcox, seeing the hopelessness of further effort, extricated himself as well as possible from his perilous position and withdrew across the Emmittsburg road.[3] The loss in Anderson's division in this splendidly executed attack was extremely severe. Wilcox lost fifty per cent. of his strength, Wright forty-two per cent., the total loss in the three brigades amounting to over 1900 men.

By this time it was 8 p.m. and almost dark. On Longstreet's front the Confederates were surging against the ridge behind Plum Run, the red flashes from their rifles stabbing the darkness among the tangled woods. It would be difficult to describe the state of confusion into which Longstreet's Corps was thrown by these four hours of desperate and successful fighting. Regiments and brigades were all mingled together in a confused mass, while the gathering darkness and the broken ground added to the disorder. The loss of life had been frightful. Hood's division had lost 2200 men, McLaws 2100, about 25 per cent. of their fighting strength. On the Federal side it was still greater. The Third Corps had suffered over 4000 casualties, the Fifth 1900, the reinforcements from the Second Corps 2000. But the bare figures give no idea of the frightful ferocity of the fighting,

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[1] General Pender had been wounded. See page 101.

[2] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

[3] Wilcox's report.

nor of the shocking appearance of the ground over which Longstreet's Corps had charged. The wheatfield and the hollow behind it, which had formed the chief centre of this dreadful struggle, were in truth a very "Valley of Death." Yet Longstreet, who, once the action had commenced, showed an energy and resolution beyond praise, proposed a further attack, and went forward to Plum Run to examine the enemy's line.[1] But the position was too formidable. The divisions of Crawford, Wright, and Howe, 12,000 fresh troops, none of whom had as yet fired a shot, were massing on the ridge before him, while the shattered and disorganised divisions of Barnes, Birney, and Caldwell were being rallied and re-formed. His own troops were exhausted by their previous efforts, while the darkness and the general disorder all urged against a renewal of the attack. On the right the prolonged struggle for Little Round Top still swayed to and fro. About 7 p.m. Fisher's brigade of Crawford's division was sent to reinforce the Union troops. Pushing forward round the south side of the hill he struck Law's right flank, rolled it up, and forced him to fall back towards Plum Run, while the Federals, following up this success, seized and held the summit of Round Top.[2] Desultory firing continued in this part of the field till past 9 p.m., when it finally ceased. Reluctantly abandoning the idea of a further attack, Longstreet decided to withdraw his troops to the position previously occupied by Sickles. Barksdale's brigade held the Peach Orchard, Semmes and Benning Devil's Den; Wofford, Anderson, and Kershaw were withdrawn across the wheatfield, while Law and Robertson maintained and entrenched their positions on the slopes of the Round Tops. No counter-attack on a general scale

[1] Longstreet's report, Official Records.
[2] Fisher's report, *ibid.*

was attempted by the Federals, but McCandless' brigade was pushed forward towards the wheatfield, and harassed Anderson somewhat in his withdrawal.[1] So ended the long and bloodily contested struggle in this portion of the field.

9. Attack on the Union Right.

General Lee's plan of battle directed that, as soon as Longstreet commenced the principal assault on the enemy's left, Ewell was to make a holding attack on his right, to be converted into a real one if opportunity offered. It was of course essential to the success of the scheme that Longstreet and Ewell should both attack simultaneously. Otherwise it was possible that one might be crushed by a concentration against him, before the other could come into action. Ewell's instructions, transmitted to his division commanders, were that Johnson should attack Culp's Hill, and the other divisions the Cemetery, Early from the east and Rodes from the west, the sound of Longstreet's guns at the Peach Orchard being the signal for the attack to commence.[2] Pender on Rodes' right, had been instructed by General Hill to hold his division in readiness to threaten Cemetery Ridge, and to co-operate with Anderson or Rodes, as opportunity might offer.[3]

By 4 o'clock Johnson had his four brigades in position, facing Culp's Hill on the left bank of Rock Creek, and Early on his right held Hays and Hoke ready to attack the Cemetery, but his other two brigades were still in the rear, two miles away, and Rodes had not yet commenced to disengage his troops from the streets of the town and deploy for the attack. Soon after 4 p.m. the roar of Alexander's batteries far away by Round Top broke the silence, and announced

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[1] Crawford's report. [2] Ewell's report. [3] Hill's report.

the commencement of Longstreet's attack. Now was the time for Ewell's Corps to advance. But Gordon's brigade, which had been ordered in to support Early, had not yet come up, and Johnson was feeling his way cautiously forward through the dense woods below Culp's Hill. The assault was accordingly delayed, but a heavy fire was opened on Cemetery Hill by the Confederate batteries east of Rock Creek, under Major Latimer, and by those north of the town, under Colonel Carter. The enemy's artillery, established in and about the Cemetery, replied promptly, and for an hour the artillery duel was hotly maintained. The Confederate batteries were outnumbered by their opponents, besides having none of the advantages of position, and suffered considerable loss without being able in any way to keep down the hostile fire.[1] All along the line, from the Cemetery to McAllister's Mill, the Union troops stood to arms, expecting an assault, but two hours passed, and the Confederates gave no sign.[2] General Meade was in a state of terrible anxiety. He had seen the Third Corps cut to pieces, the Fifth had been thrown in, and all that could be spared from the Second, and still Longstreet's advance was unchecked. Believing that it was too late now to expect an attack on his right, he ordered the Twelfth Corps to vacate their trenches, march at once to Round Top, and report to General Sedgwick.[3] This was done, the divisions of Williams and Geary quitting their lines about 7 p.m., upon which General Meade in person took charge of the column, and led it to its destination.[4] But General Slocum, who was aware that

[1] Ewell's report.

[2] Greene: "Battles and Leaders."

[3] Meade's report.

[4] Williams' division, commanded by Ruger, was brought up to reinforce Humphreys (see page 95). Geary lost his way, and did not come up in time.

the enemy was massing opposite Culp's Hill, was uneasy as to the safety of the Union right, and he obtained permission to retain Greene's brigade on Culp's Hill, to hold the vacated trenches.

It was fortunate indeed that he did so. Hardly had Ruger and Geary commenced their march, when Johnson delivered his long-delayed assault. The brigades of Nicholls, Jones, and Steuart were formed in line, Walker's brigade being detached to watch the left flank, owing to a report that the enemy was advancing from that quarter.[1] Through the deep shadow of the woods the Confederate infantry advanced towards the hill top, when a deadly volley from the enemy's breastworks met them at close quarters. Nicholls' and Jones' brigades rushed forward with a cheer, but failed to carry the formidable works before them. Again and again their officers, displaying the most superb courage, led them against the position, only to be beaten back each time with terrible loss. As soon as he saw Johnson thus fairly engaged, Early had ordered Hays and Hoke to advance on Cemetery Hill, without waiting for Gordon.[2] The attack was pushed home in the most gallant manner. Four of Latimer's batteries shelled the position for a few minutes, and then the infantry crossed the fields and began to climb the hill. As they advanced they were met by a furious fire of artillery and musketry from front and flank, but, without halting, Hays' Louisianians charged Von Gilsa's brigade, drove them back, captured Wiedricht's battery, and reached Ricketts' on the crest of the hill. A murderous hand to hand struggle ensued for the possession of the guns. Had Gordon been up to reinforce Hays, he might have made

[1] The enemy proved to be Gregg's cavalry division, which reached the field from Hanover about 6 p.m.

[2] Early's report.

good his footing; but just as the success gained by Wilcox and Wright had been rendered abortive by the failure to give them support, so now the fruits of Hays' splendid charge were thrown away in an equally disheartening manner. For a moment there was dismay in the Union ranks. Doubleday's division, forming the local reserve, had been hurried away to meet Wright's assault. Shurz's division could not be relied upon. At this crisis Hancock sent Carroll's brigade to the help of the Eleventh Corps.[1] Had Rodes attacked as was intended, he would not have dared so to weaken his own lines; but Rodes' division was still filing out of the streets of the town, and he took no part in the fight whatever. Carroll's arrival turned the scales. Instead of friends Hays found only enemies. Hoke's brigades had been beaten back by the terrible artillery fire, thus exposing Hays' left. Finding themselves unsupported and their flank threatened by Carroll, the Confederates fell back slowly and in good order, taking with them 75 prisoners and some captured colours. Considering the hazardous character of the attack, their loss was not excessive, amounting to about 200 in each brigade;[2] this was mainly due to the waning light, which interfered with the aim of the Federal gunners.[3]

On the extreme left the Confederates had been more successful. Steuart's brigade, pushing up the slopes of Culp's Hill, found the breastworks at this point held by nothing more than a few sentries. They were quickly scattered and the works captured. Steuart was now in a position to enfilade the right of the Federal line, which he was rolling up, capturing a

[1] Hancock's report.

[2] In popular accounts of the battle, Hays' brigade (the Louisiana "Tigers") is described as having been almost annihilated. The absurdity of this is shown by Hays' official report, in which his loss on this occasion is given as 23 officers and 158 men, total 181.

[3] Doubleday.

number of prisoners and a stand of colours. Greene quickly called up his small reserve to check him, but the Federal position was intensely critical, and it needed little more to render the whole line untenable.[1] Fortunately for Greene it was now quite dark, and the flashes of the rifles were all that there was to indicate the positions of the hostile lines. Both sides were in much disorder, and Steuart, who had almost won the key of the position, decided not to hazard the success already gained by a further advance in the dark, but to remain where he was in the captured works and wait for daylight.[2] Nicholls and Jones, the latter wounded, had suspended the attempt to storm the rest of the line, and about 10 p.m. the firing gradually ceased. Including Early's division, the Confederate loss was about 1000 officers and men; that of the Federals not more than 600.

A word of explanation is required here to account for the failure of Rodes' and Pender's divisions to take any part in the assault on Cemetery Hill, a failure which threw away every chance of success. Shortly before Johnson launched his attack, General Pender, riding along his line, was struck by a fragment of shell and severely wounded, an injury which the subsequent hardships of the retreat rendered a mortal one.[3] An unaccountable delay occurred before General Lane, the senior brigadier in the division, was notified that the command had devolved upon him. He was ignorant of the orders that Pender had received, and while he was sending to Hill for instructions the time for action had come and gone.[4] The failure of Rodes to co-operate in the attack is less easy to explain. He did not commence his move-

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[1] Greene: "Battles and Leaders."
[2] Steuart's report, Official Records.
[3] Hill's report, *ibid.*
[4] Lane's report, Official Records.

ment early enough. He had to move his troops out of the streets by a flank, change direction to the left, and then advance twice as far as Early; by the time he was ready to do this, it was too late.[1] The result of this general muddle was that, instead of a general attack of 12,000 men upon Cemetery Hill, Early's two brigades, little more than 3000 strong, advanced alone and unsupported to attack three times their number, strongly posted behind entrenchments, and backed by a powerful line of batteries.

About 9 p.m. the divisions of Ruger and Geary, returning to their lines by Culp's Hill, stumbled into the Confederate sentries holding their own breastworks. For the first time the Federals realised the imminent danger that threatened their right flank. Johnson had seized a position within four hundred yards of the Baltimore turnpike, and could he make good this footing he would render indefensible the whole of the Federal right wing. Ruger hesitated to incur the risks of an attack in the dark, and the random shots of the Confederate sentries were the last fired that night. The weary troops slept on their arms in the positions they occupied at nightfall, aware that the struggle, so bloody and terrible, was still undecided, and would be renewed on the morrow.

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[1] Rodes' report, Official Reports.

CHAPTER V.

GETTYSBURG, THE BATTLE OF JULY 3.

1. Preparations to Renew the Battle.

The night of July 2 passed quietly, unbroken by any collision between the hostile piquet lines. Shortly after the firing had ceased the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac received orders to attend a council-of-war at General Meade's head-quarters. The question they were asked to decide was: Should the army remain and give battle again, or should it retreat? The day had been one of sad disaster to the army of the Potomac. The aggregate loss from the two days' fighting amounted to the appalling total of 19,000 men, the whole army was in a state of the greatest disorder, and only the Sixth and Twelfth Corps, which had been barely engaged, were in reliable condition for battle. The responsibility that rested on General Meade was heavy indeed. His army was all that stood between the invaders and the rich, unprotected States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, and its defeat might well prove a death-blow to the Union. It is not too much to say that the arduous exertions of the week, the terrible responsibility of his position, added to anxiety, want of sleep, and physical exhaustion, proved a strain almost more than General Meade could bear. In this crisis his officers afforded him the moral support of which he was so much in need. It is a common saying that a council-of-war never fights, but in this

instance at least it is untrue. All were impressed by the severity of the punishment which the army had received, nevertheless all were of the opinion that the battle ought to be fought out to the bitter end. Nowhere else in Pennsylvania would they find another position so strong for defence as the one that they were now holding, and a retreat after the events of the day would be a clear acknowledgment of defeat, most disastrous to the morale of the army. After some discussion General Butterfield, Meade's Chief of Staff, put to each officer in turn three questions: Should the army remain on Cemetery Ridge, should it take the offensive, and if it was decided to remain, how long? All, without an exception, voted to remain. It was also decided unanimously to await an attack, and not to take the offensive. On the third question there was considerable difference of opinion. General Meade, who had listened attentively to the views of his officers, though taking little part in the discussion himself, remarked briefly, "Such, then, is the decision," and so the council broke up.[1]

At daylight on July 3 General Lee, quitting his head-quarters on the Chambersburg pike, rode over to the Peach Orchard to consult with Longstreet.[2]

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[1] See Gibbon's account in "Battles and Leaders." General Meade was afterwards accused of having made up his mind to retreat, and it is said that he had definitely instructed his Chief Staff Officer, General Butterfield, to draw up the necessary orders. The statement was denied by General Meade; in any case, the action affords no proof of any such fixed intention on his part, being merely a precaution such as a prudent general would always take in view of possible emergencies.

[2] At this council-of-war there were present, besides General Lee, the following officers: Generals Longstreet, McLaws, and Anderson, Brig.-General Wilcox, and Colonels Taylor, Long, and Venable, of Lee's staff. No written record of the proceedings was made, and the orders that were subsequently given were verbal only. Their exact wording has been in

On the whole the results of the previous day's fighting had been in favour of the Confederates. They had driven in the enemy's left wing a distance of three-quarters of a mile, had completely routed two of his corps, and had secured a lodgment on the right of his line at Culp's Hill. A prompt renewal of the attack appeared to offer every prospect of success. Lee's report runs as follows :—

"The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render to the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly detemined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left (Round Top), from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was therefore reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was

dispute ever since. Nor do the official reports of the chief actors do much to solve the mystery, for they disagree on certain essential points. General Lee's own report is vague and somewhat contradictory. It has almost the air of being so written as to palliate the errors that were made in the execution of his orders; this makes it very difficult to understand what his original intentions really were. Probably the mystery will never be thoroughly cleared up. For a criticism of Longstreet's action see Appendix C.

directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.

"A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet and his batteries placed in positions, which it was believed would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely." [1]

It will be noted that Lee states that "the general plan was unchanged." This would imply that he originally meant to renew the attack on the enemy's left flank; but, owing to the representations made by Longstreet of the great strength of the enemy's position at Round Top, he having stripped his centre to reinforce his wings, Lee decided to alter his plan, and to make his attack instead against the enemy's centre on Cemetery Ridge. If the centre could be broken in, the whole line would be disrupted, and the Federal right wing, pinned between the assaulting column and Ewell's troops at Culp's Hill, would probably be destroyed. It was true that the centre was the strongest part of the whole line, and could not be carried save by a heavy sacrifice of life, but Lee could boast that he commanded troops, who had never yet failed to respond to any call that he had made upon them. Pickett's division, on whom the bulk of the work was to fall, was composed entirely of Virginian regiments, the very flower of the Confederate infantry, and these had not yet fired a shot in the battle.

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[1] Lee's report.

It should be carefully noted that by the terms of Lee's report, McLaws and Hood were not to participate in the attack. This was to be carried out by Pickett, Heth, and part of Pender's division, the remainder of Hill's Corps to be held in readiness to take advantage of any success that might be gained. We shall see how lamentably Hill failed to carry through his share of the concerted plan, and what disastrous consequences resulted therefrom. The orders having been issued, the meeting broke up, and Lee, after riding along the front of his line as far as the outskirts of Gettysburg, took up a position with his staff near Hill's head-quarters on Seminary Ridge.

2. The Fighting on the Union Right.

It was not till 2 a.m. on the 3rd that Meade had been informed of the danger that threatened his right wing from Johnson's partially successful attack the night before.[1] It was imperative to dislodge him as soon as possible, or the safety of the whole Union army would be imperilled. Meade therefore directed the Twelfth Corps to attack at daylight, and drive the enemy out of the captured breastworks. During the small hours of the morning five batteries were got into position to bear upon Steuart's lines and assist in the attack, while Ruger's brigade, temporarily commanded by Colgrove, reoccupied the works on the extreme right of the line, which were separated from those in Steuart's possession by a shallow, swampy ravine. The positions taken up by Ruger's and Geary's divisions formed a re-entrant angle, the vertex being towards the Baltimore pike and the two flanks resting on the breastworks held respectively by Greene and Colgrove.[2] The Confederates were also fully alive to the importance of maintaining the

[1] Meade's report, Official Records. [2] Williams' report, *ibid.*

valuable foothold they had secured in the enemy's lines. During the night Smith's brigade had been brought up to reinforce Johnson, and also O'Neal and Daniel from Rodes' division, but owing to the steepness of the slopes it was found impossible to get up any artillery.[1] The strength of the force under General Williams' command was about 9000 men, opposed to some 10,000 under General Johnson.

It was just growing light at 4.30 a.m., when the Federal batteries, posted along the Baltimore pike, opened a furious fire, at a range of 600 to 800 yards, on the entrenchments held by Steuart. Twenty minutes later Williams ordered the infantry to advance. The attack came as a surprise to Johnson, who had not expected the enemy to take the offensive.[2] Nevertheless he was not taken off his guard, and his troops, standing to arms in the grey light of dawn, successfully repulsed the attempt to retake the lost entrenchments. For three hours they were subjected to a sustained and continuous shell-fire, to which they were unable to reply. Johnson had been directed to make his attack in concert with Longstreet, and to wait for the sound of the latter's guns, but seeing how his men were suffering under the artillery bombardment, he considered it inadvisable to wait any longer.[3] At 8 a.m. the assault was renewed all along the line. O'Neal reinforced Jones and Nicholls' brigades in a renewed effort to storm the breastworks on Culp's Hill. Steuart and Daniel advanced across the marshy brook in their front against Ruger, while Walker, commanding the celebrated Stonewall brigade, assaulted the works held by Colgrove. In spite of the most sustained and heroic efforts on the part of all concerned, no lodgment was effected anywhere in the Union lines. About 10.30 a.m. the Stonewall brigade moved to the

[1] Ewell's report. [2] Johnson's report. [3] *Ibid.*

right opposite Greene's breastworks, and the assault was renewed against both Ruger and Geary, but without avail. The Federal position was too strong, and the numbers engaged too nearly equal to afford the Confederates a fair chance of success. They had hitherto resisted all efforts to drive them from their own lines, but shortly after 9 a.m. Niell's brigade of the Sixth Corps crossed Rock Creek, and began to menace Johnson's left flank. He detached Smith's brigade and part of Walker's to meet the threatened attack, but in view of the isolated situation of his division and the danger to which it would be exposed by a counter-attack in force, this movement against his flank made his position manifestly intenable. Reluctantly he decided that no other course was open to him but to withdraw.[1] About 11 a.m. Steuart and Daniel abandoned the entrenchments, which had cost so much blood to hold, and fell back with the rest of the command to the right bank of Rock Creek, in which position they remained till midnight. No further fighting took place, except between the piquet lines, which maintained a brisk fire all day. The losses of the Confederates in the struggle for Culp's Hill had been very severe. Including the brigades of Daniel, O'Neal, and Smith, their casualties in the two days' fighting amounted to some 2400 killed, wounded, and missing. The Federals, fighting largely behind breastworks, suffered much less, their casualties being under 1200,[2] some of which were caused by the fire of their own batteries. This unexpected result of the fighting had a most prejudicial effect on General Lee's plans. He relied largely for success on proper concerted action between Longstreet and Johnson, and now before Longstreet was even ready to commence the attack, Johnson had been forced to relinquish the footing he had secured in the enemy's

[1] Johnson's report. [2] "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

lines, and the pre-arranged co-operation between the two wings was upset at the outset.

3. Situation in the Centre.

While the duel for Culp's Hill was being fought out on the Union right, Longstreet was making his arrangements for the assault on the enemy's centre, although he was very doubtful of its chances of success. Pickett's division was drawn up behind a belt of woods in a small hollow opposite some buildings, called Codori's, on the Emmittsburg road. On his left was formed Heth's division, now commanded by Pettigrew, his four brigades being placed in line, and the brigades of Scales and Lane, commanded by Trimble, in support in rear of the right of Pettigrew's division. There was no support in rear of the left. On the right of Pickett, about two hundred yards in rear of the Emmittsburg road, were drawn up the brigades of Wilcox and Perry, which were also intended to take part in the assault. On Pettigrew's left the line was prolonged by the two remaining brigades of Pender's division, Thomas and Perrin, and then by Ramseur, Dole, and Iverson, of Rodes' division, as far as the outskirts of Gettysburg. Wright, Posey, and Mahone formed a local reserve in rear of Pettigrew. As regards McLaws and Hood, Longstreet had ridden over to Round Top about 9 a.m. and instructed Law, in command of Hood's division, to be prepared to renew the attack on his front as soon as Pickett was launched to the assault. Law replied that to do so was madness.[1] The Federals had spent the night strengthening their lines, and their front now bristled with stone parapets and breastworks. However the threatening attitude kept up by Law had the effect of holding the enemy to his

[1] Law: "Battles and Leaders."

works all day, and prevented him from sending any considerable reinforcements to other parts of the line.[1] McLaws' division remained in the positions it had occupied at the close of the previous day, and did nothing. The Confederate artillery was posted as follows: The artillery battalions of Alexander and Cabell were brought forward from Seminary Ridge and placed by the Peach Orchard. The Washington artillery, under Major Eshleman, hitherto in reserve, was posted along the Emmittsburg road, and on its left Pickett's divisional artillery, under Colonel Dearing. The whole of the artillery of Longstreet's Corps, a total of 75 guns actually in action, was placed under the command of Colonel Alexander.[2] Along the slopes of Seminary Ridge, from Pickett's position to the Hagerstown pike, were 70 guns, composed of the artillery battalions of Garnett, Lane, Poague, Pegram, and McIntosh, all of Hill's Corps. Still further north were Carter's batteries of Ewell's Corps, numbering 16 guns. The ranges of all these batteries to the nearest points of the Federal line varied from 1000 to 2000 yards.

Turning to the Federal dispositions, it should be noted that the organisation of the Army of the Potomac had been greatly dislocated by the indiscriminate reinforcing of one part of the line from another, which had taken place on the evening of July 2. The different corps were reduced to a confused medley of units, incapable of taking the offensive or indeed of performing any manœuvre whatever. Thus on the left the line was composed of the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and part of the Second Corps, all mingled together, while the right of Culp's Hill was held by a medley of troops from the First, Eleventh, and Twelfth

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[1] Humphreys' division was the only unit that was withdrawn from the Union left to reinforce the centre.

[2] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders."

Corps. No attempt was made by General Meade, either during the night or the following morning, to remedy this state of affairs, a necessary preliminary to any idea of taking the offensive. His preparations were confined solely to the artillery. General Hunt was very active in placing batteries on the crest wherever there was room for them, but the Federal position being a convex one, there was not so much space for the deployment of artillery as there was along the Confederate front, and a large proportion of the batteries was left in reserve. About 80 guns were posted finally, six batteries on Cemetery Hill, five along Hancock's front, ten under Colonel McGilvery extended along the ridge to the south, and one battery on Little Round Top. All of these guns, with the exception of some on Cemetery Hill, were placed in the open, unprotected by any form of cover, a neglect which was to cost them dearly.[1]

One must now describe in some detail the nature of Hancock's position, for this part of the Federal line was about to become the scene of the most desperate fighting of the battle. Hancock's line was held by the divisions of Gibbon and Hays, Caldwell having been called away to reinforce the Fifth Corps. The brigades of Willard,[2] Smyth, Webb, and Hall held the front line, with Harrow's brigade in support in rear of the left. Willard's right connected with Steinwehr's division on Cemetery Hill. Along the front of the Second Corps ran a low stone wall, which had been entrenched and placed in a state of defence. Webb formed his brigade with two regiments holding

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[1] Hunt: "Battles and Leaders."

[2] Willard's brigade was ordered to return to its original position on Cemetery Ridge after its repulse by McLaws on the Federal left on the evening of the previous day. Carroll's brigade of Hay's division retained the position on the east flank of Cemetery Hill which it had taken up at 9 p.m. on July 2, when repulsing Early's attack.

the wall and the remainder in support on the reverse slope of the crest, his left resting on a clump of trees, which stands on a small knoll near the centre of Hancock's position. Between the two lines were the batteries on the brow of the slope. Hall's right flank rested similarly on the clump of trees, and his left on Stannard's brigade of the First Corps. The ground in front forms a gently sloping glacis, absolutely bare of any form of cover, and intersected by post and rail fences. A conspicuous object in the foreground is the Emmittsburg road, which runs diagonally across the front of the Federal position, while three-quarters of a mile away across the fields stretches the belt of woods, which marked the Confederate line.[1]

4. Longstreet's Attack: The Artillery Duel.

Shortly after 1 p.m. Pickett reported to Longstreet that his division was ready. It had been arranged that the signal for the Confederate batteries to open was to be two guns fired by the Washington Artillery. About 1.15 p.m. Major Eshleman, in command, received the order from Longstreet to commence firing. The reports of the two signal guns rang out immediately on the still air. There was a slight pause, and then a hundred and forty guns came simultaneously into action.[2] The Federal batteries opened at once in reply. General Hunt, who watched the battle from Cemetery Ridge, says: "The scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, while the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns."[3] The first effects of this

[1] See reports of Hancock, Gibbon, and Hall, Official Records.
[2] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders." [3] Hunt, *ibid.*

terrible bombardment fell on Meade's reserve ammunition column, which had been parked on the reverse slope of the ridge, and received all the shells which just grazed the crest. No less than six ammunition caissons blew up in succession, and as the smoke of the explosions rose in the air, the Confederate yells of triumph could be heard for a mile along the line.[1] A salvo of shells fell into General Meade's head-quarters on the Taneytown road, killing many horses of the staff, and compelling the removal of head-quarters to Power's Hill, where Meade remained till the cannonade ceased.[2] The chief fury of the bombardment fell on Webb's portion of the line, the clump of trees on his left forming a convenient ranging point for the Confederate gunners. The Union artillery, exposed to full view on the crest, suffered severely, Cushing's, Brown's, and Arnold's batteries being put out of action and Woodruff's terribly damaged. Five officers were killed, nine wounded, while the loss among the rank and file and the destruction of horses and material was very great.[3] It would have been greater still had the Confederate fire been concentrated on different points of the enemy's line in succession, but the fire was too dispersed to secure the full effect possible from so many batteries in action against a common objective.

The artillery duel was maintained without a break for nearly two hours, and the expenditure of ammunition was in consequence enormous. General Hunt, going along the Federal line, was alarmed to find that the contents of the limber boxes were running short. There was an ample supply in the ammunition park, but time would be required to get this up and distribute it, and the enemy's infantry might advance at any moment. Meade was not to be found, so Hunt,

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[1] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."
[2] Hunt: "Battles and Leaders." [3] *Ibid.*

acting on his own responsibility, directed each battery that he passed to cease firing and husband its ammunition. The order was obeyed by all except those along the front of the Second Corps, which received express orders from Hancock to continue the fire.[1] Shortly before this Colonel Alexander, who was in command of all the Confederate batteries on the Emmittsburg road, received a message from Longstreet, which ran as follows :—

" Colonel—If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralise him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers."[2]

Such a communication was equivalent to handing over to Alexander the command of the assaulting column, a sufficiently extraordinary proceeding on the part of a general officer of Longstreet's rank and reputation. Alexander replied that he could only judge of the effect by the return fire, and that his ammunition would soon run low. Longstreet's answer, a condensed repetition of his previous note, left Alexander in a painful state of uncertainty as to the wishes of his commanding officer. He decided to ascertain Pickett's opinion of the situation, and on consulting that officer found him perfectly confident of success, though fully aware of the magnitude of the task before him. Then, Alexander says, he felt that he could not let the attack suffer by any indecision on his part. He returned to his guns, and wrote to Longstreet, " General—When our fire is at its best, I shall order Pickett to charge."[2]

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[1] Hunt's report. [2] Alexander: " Battles and Leaders."
[3] *Ibid.*

For half an hour longer the cannonade continued; the enemy's fire coming back as persistently as ever. Then suddenly the batteries on Cemetery Hill ceased firing, limbered up, and disappeared.

Now, if ever, was the time. Alexander's note to Pickett ran, "For God's sake come quick. The 18 guns are gone; come quick, or my ammunition will not support you properly." Pickett rode over to Longstreet, and asked if the time had come. Longstreet, convinced in his own mind that Pickett was marching to annihilation, could not bring himself to speak the fateful words, and merely bowed his head. Raising his sword to the salute Pickett replied firmly, "I shall lead my division forward, sir," and immediately turned away and went to his command.[1]

5. Assault on Cemetery Ridge: Repulse of Pickett and Pettigrew.

Longstreet rode forward to a point where he could watch the troops march past. Alexander says:—

"Longstreet, leaving his staff, came up alone to where I was. It was then about 2.40 p.m. I explained the situation, feeling then more hopeful, but afraid that our artillery ammunition might not hold out for all we would want. Longstreet said, 'Stop Pickett immediately, and replenish your ammunition.' I explained that it would take too long, and the enemy would recover from the effect our fire was having, and we had, moreover, very little to replenish with. Longstreet said, 'I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now, but that General Lee ordered it, and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed.'

"I listened but dared not offer a word. The battle was lost if we stopped. Ammunition was far too low

[1] Longstreet: "From Manassas to Appomatox."

GETTYSBURG, POSITIONS JULY 2.

to try anything else, for we had been fighting three days. There was a chance, and it was not my part to interfere. While Longstreet was still speaking, Pickett's division swept out of the wood and showed the full length of its grey ranks and shining bayonets, as grand a sight as ever a man looked on. Joining it on the left, Pettigrew stretched farther than I could see. General Dick Garnett, just out of the sick ambulance and buttoned up in an old blue overcoat, riding at the head of his brigade, passed us and saluted Longstreet. We had served on the plains together before the war. I rode with him a short distance, and then we wished each other good luck and a good-bye, which was our last."[1]

We can imagine the feelings with which Longstreet must have watched those troops march past him in all the pride of war to what he felt convinced was useless slaughter. As the brigades passed him, sitting erect in his saddle and returning the salutes of the officers, the faces of the men were lit with confidence and hope. Even their opponents could not resist exclamations of admiration at the long lines that swept across the fields against them in such perfect order. Then all along the crest the Federal batteries opened once more. Every gun was engaged, except the batteries on Hancock's front, which had exhausted their long-range shell, and were reserving their case-shot for close quarters. On the other hand, at this the crisis of the battle, when their fire should have been at its hottest, the Confederate batteries stood silent, almost every round in their ammunition chests having been expended. Unmolested by the enemy's artillery, the Union gunners were therefore able to pour their whole fire upon the advancing infantry. In spite of the hail of shell the Confederate divisions moved on unbroken, and passed across the Emmitts-

[1] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders."

burg road in the same regular order in which they had commenced the attack. Here occurred a momentary pause to close the ranks, somewhat disordered by climbing the fences which border the road. The left of Pickett's line crossed the road by Codori's house, so that his line of advance, if continued, would have thrown him on Stannard's brigade, but at this point the column swerved to the left, and led towards the clump of trees that formed the centre of Gibbon's line. Then the whole fury of the storm burst upon the assaulting columns. From the batteries in their front, from Cemetery Hill and from Little Round Top, shell and case-shot tore through their crowded masses, while the Federal infantry, posted behind stone walls and breastworks, poured in incessant volleys at close range. Pettigrew's line was visibly shaken by this awful fire, but animated by the example of their officers the troops still pressed blindly on. Davis' brigade actually reached Hay's line, and left their colours on the stone wall, but this was the utmost they could do. The brigade of Marshall (late Pettigrew), composed of newly-joined conscripts, bewildered by the uproar and disheartened by the fall of nearly all their officers, hesitated and broke up. Then a strong force of the enemy's infantry delivered a counter-attack on the left flank of the line. This decided the issue. Pettigrew and Trimble's command gave way and retreated in great disorder and confusion to their original position.[1]

Pettigrew and Trimble had been flung back, but Pickett's division had still to be reckoned with. As the Virginians pressed on, they passed diagonally across the front of Stannard's brigade, and he, seeing the opportunity, swung his line round to the right, and poured a deadly fire into their flank.[2] This

[1] Swinton: "Campaign of the Army of the Potomac." Gibbon's report. Heth's report.

[2] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

caused Kemper's brigade to crowd in on the centre, and Armistead's men closing on the leading brigade at the same time, the whole rapidly merged into a solid yelling mass, which charged straight on Gibbon's position. Garnett and Kemper, gallantly leading their men, were both shot down within a few yards of the stone wall, and the loss in the ranks was fearful. But nothing could check that iron infantry. Webb's front line broke to the rear, the Virginians poured over their entrenchments, and their colours were planted triumphantly on the stone wall.

By the little group of staff officers and orderlies who surrounded Longstreet, the course of Pickett's assault was watched with astonishment and delight. To them it seemed that the victory was already won, and Colonel Freemantle, of the British Army, turning to Longstreet, exclaimed, "General, I would not have missed this for anything in the world!"[1] But the veteran soldier was not deceived by the appearance of success, and his keen glance already foresaw the ultimate catastrophe. Pickett had indeed broken the first line, but behind it was a second, strongly held, and backed by artillery. General Armistead, at the head of a handful of men, all that he could collect, charged Cushing's battery, and fell dead within the enemy's lines, with his hand resting on one of the guns.[2] The spot where he fell has been fitly called the High Water Mark of the Rebellion, for never before or after did the Confederacy stand so near, as at that moment, to the realisation of all its hopes. But now for the third time in this disjointed battle a fatal blunder threw away all the fruits of the success that Pickett's charge had won. His division was left

[1] Freemantle: "Three Months in the Field with the Confederate Armies."

[2] General Armistead's memorial, on the spot where he fell in so heroic a manner, is the sole Confederate monument on the battlefield.

entirely without support. On his left Pettigrew and Trimble had been beaten back. On his right, Wilcox and Perry, having no orders, had not advanced. In this tremendous crisis General Anderson failed most lamentably to carry out the important part that had been assigned to him in General Lee's plan of attack. His orders were to hold his division in readiness to move up in support if it should become necessary.[1] Not until Pickett and Gibbon had actually crossed bayonets over the stone wall did he consider it time to send orders to Wilcox to advance, and by the time his staff officers had found the latter and delivered the message, the crucial moment had come and gone.[2] To Posey, Wright, and Mahone Anderson gave no orders at all, although two of these brigades had not fired a shot in the battle, and had they advanced when Pettigrew's troops were seen to hesitate, they might have rallied the wavering line and carried it with them to victory. But it was not to be. Not a man moved to go to the help of Pickett's gallant division, which was left to fight the battle out as best it might. The clump of trees in the centre of Gibbon's line was the centre of a dreadful melée, in which the opposing ranks were packed into a dense mass four deep, firing into one another at a few yards distance. Armistead's brigade had driven a wedge into Gibbon's line, and were enfilading Hall's brigade on Webb's left. Hall threw in his supports at right angles to his front line to meet this attack, and Harrow's brigade, hitherto in reserve, was thrust in wherever there was room.[3] The Confederate battle flags flew in a long line on the stone wall, and each became the special mark of Union bullets. The batteries, which Colonel Alexander had sent forward to follow up the storming column, did good service at this point, their shot cutting lanes through the crowded masses of Hall's

[1] Anderson's report. [2] Wilcox's report. [3] Hall's report.

brigade.[1] Webb, Hancock, and Gibbon were all wounded, nearly every field officer in Pickett's division had fallen, and still neither side would give way. So dreadful a struggle could not last long. Humphreys' division, hurriedly sent for from the left flank, was brought up to reinforce Hall. Stannard was pressing heavily on Pickett's unprotected right flank, and a strong line of infantry, hastily collected from different regiments, threatened his left. Human valour could do no more. The order to retreat was reluctantly given, and the remnants of Pickett's command, abandoning the stone wall, fell back across the fields. But many of the best and bravest of his troops, those that had forced their way furthest into the enemy's lines, were inevitably left behind, and having done all that brave men could do, were compelled to lay down their arms.

At the moment that Pickett fell back, Wilcox and Perry advanced to his support. There was nothing left for them to support, but in obedience to their orders they pressed on across the Emmitsburg road to within five hundred yards of the position on the ridge, which Birney's division was holding. Here the terrible artillery fire compelled them to halt. It was so obvious that nothing could be gained by the isolated attack of 2000 men on a whole army that Wilcox, after vainly trying to get instructions, ordered his command to retreat; this was done in good order, the Federals making no attempt to follow.[2] Perry, who had been directed to conform to the movements of Wilcox, withdrew also, but in the great uproar the order to retreat was not heard by the left of his line, and Stannard's Union brigade, making a sudden counter-attack, captured a number of prisoners.[3] Wilcox and Perry between them lost 360 men in this singularly ill-timed movement.

[1] Gibbon's report. [2] Wilcox's report.
[3] Doubleday: "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."

In this attack Pickett's division lost two brigadiers killed and one mortally wounded, nine field officers killed and eight wounded, and 2843 killed, wounded, and missing of the rank and file out of 5000 who took part in the assault. Pettigrew and Trimble had between them upwards of 3000 casualties, and the total Confederate loss in the attack cannot have been much short of 6000 men. The Federals had not won this great success without paying a heavy price for it. Stannard's brigade had 350 casualties, Hay's division 500, and Gibbon's, which had borne the brunt of the attack, 1600, nearly 50 per cent. of its strength. Including the casualties among the batteries and in other units from the bombardment, the total Union loss may be placed at about 3,000 officers and men.[1]

The disorder and alarm in the Confederate lines when Pickett's and Pettigrew's shattered and disorganised divisions retreated to Seminary Ridge was very great. A general counter-attack all along the enemy's line was expected to be launched immediately, and at the time neither Hill nor Longstreet was in a condition to meet it. At this critical moment General Lee left his staff and rode up all alone to the point where Alexander stood.[2] Never did those noble qualities, by which he won all men's hearts, shine more brightly than at this disastrous moment. His very presence acted like magic on the disheartened troops. His unruffled bearing and kindly words did wonders to allay the tendency to panic.[3] The stragglers, as they came in, were rallied, and lay down quietly in the positions assigned to them, fresh ammunition was got up for the batteries, and the reserves were so posted as to present a bold front to the

[1] For details of casualties see "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.

[2] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders."

[3] Freemantle: "Three Months in the Field with the Confederate Armies."

enemy. The Confederates need have had no fear. General Meade was not a commander who took any risks. He was too thankful to have repulsed the determined assault, that had so nearly disrupted his centre, to have any thought of taking the offensive. Moreover, a general counter-attack of this nature must be carefully prepared beforehand. It cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment, and we have already noted how Meade had taken no steps to disentangle his army from the confusion into which it had been thrown by the general mixing up of units on the previous day. A short time after Pickett's repulse a great burst of cheering that went rolling down the Union lines did indeed seem to portend an advance of some sort, but nothing happened. It was caused by the arrival on Cemetery Ridge of General Meade, who rode down the line receiving the cheers of his men, and it was now evident that the Federals had no intention of following up their success.

6. Cavalry Actions: Confederate Withdrawal to Seminary Ridge.

During the morning, Brig.-General Kilpatrick, with the cavalry brigades of Merritt (Buford's division) and Farnsworth, had moved over from the Union right flank to the left, with orders from General Meade to attack the exposed flank of Law's division (late Hood) and crumple it up.[1] Law had been informed by his scouts of Kilpatrick's approach, and took steps to protect his flank and rear by posting part of Anderson's and Robertson's brigades between the Emmittsburg road and Plum Run.[2] About 5 p.m., some time after all firing in the centre had ceased, Kilpatrick moved forward. Merritt's brigade and

[1] Kilpatrick's report. [2] Law: "Battles and Leaders."

part of Farnsworth's were dismounted, and advanced against Anderson's Georgia regiments, and Kilpatrick, seeing as he thought a favourable opportunity to attack the rear of Law's division, ordered Farnsworth, with two regiments, the 1st West Virginia and the 1st Vermont, to charge. The former were repulsed by a steady and well aimed rifle fire from the 1st Texas, but the latter, led by Farnsworth in person, rode down a thin line of skirmishers and swept across the valley towards Devil's Den. Their career, however, was short. At Snyder's House, the 4th Alabama was hurriedly drawn up to meet them, and a well-directed volley from this regiment compelled them to sheer off. Repulsed in an attempt on Henry's batteries near the turnpike, and exposed to a galling fire from two sides, the mass of horseman disintegrated into scattered parties, which broke their way more or less successfully back to the main body. But Farnsworth, as though disdaining to return from defeat, rode towards Round Top, followed by less than a score of troopers, charged the 15th Alabama, who faced about to meet him, and was shot down within a few yards of their bayonets. In this brief action Farnsworth's brigade had about a hundred casualties, of which sixty-five were in the 1st Vermont. The charge, although gallantly delivered, was made in insufficient strength, and proved a complete failure. Had General Meade massed the bulk of his cavalry on his left flank, instead of on his right, and had the Federal infantry holding the Round Tops co-operated with Kilpatrick by attacking Law and Robertson in front at the same moment that the cavalry were launched against their flank and rear, it is possible that the whole of Longstreet's right wing might have been cut to pieces.[2]

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[1] Kilpatrick claims in his report that this charge of Farnsworth's prevented Law's division from taking part in Longstreet's

General Lee's plan of battle assigned an important part to his cavalry. As soon as the main attack was developed, Stuart was directed to move with the whole of his command round the Federal right wing, and place himself across the Baltimore pike.[1] If, as Lee confidently expected, the enemy was driven from his positions on the hills, then the attack of Stuart's troopers on their flank and rear could not fail to have great results. Soon after 10 o'clock he moved forward with the brigades of Jenkins, Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss, and halted with his command on some rising ground known as Cress Ridge, whence flows a small stream called Cress Run. Here he discovered that a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry was in his front. This was Gregg's division, which had been posted in the morning at the bridge over White Run, but had moved forward simultaneously with Stuart, whose movements were watched and reported to him from Cemetery Hill.[2] The opposing sides were very fairly matched. Stuart's four brigades numbered about 5000 men, and he had with him three horse-artillery batteries. Gregg had the brigades of Custer (Kilpatrick's division), McIntosh, and Irvin Gregg, some 4000 sabres, with six batteries of artillery.

While the great artillery duel that preceded Longstreet's attack was at its height, Stuart brought his batteries into action on the brow of Cress Ridge. The Union artillery, posted near the Hanover road, replied promptly, and under cover of this fire McIntosh's brigade was thrown forward as a line of dismounted skirmishers towards the wooded crest occupied by the Confederates. A brisk action was maintained for some time with varying fortune until Hampton's

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assault. This is absurd. Law had already reported to Longstreet that to renew the attack on the Round Tops was impossible (see p. 110).

[1] Lee's report. [2] Gregg's report.

brigade, supported by a part of Fitzhugh Lee's, suddenly appeared out of the woods and charged forward across the fields. So unexpected was the attack that the Federals had no massed body of cavalry ready to meet it, but Custer and Gregg, acting with the greatest vigour, sent forward against Hampton every regiment that could be thrown in, Gregg leading the counter-charge in person. A confused melée ensued, in which both sides suffered severely, and General Wade Hampton was borne to the rear badly wounded about the head with sabre cuts. It was a moment when victory would have fallen to that side which could have sent forward a fresh body of cavalry, however small, to strike the other in flank. But on neither side was such a force at hand, and after a fierce struggle the combatants separated, exhausted by their efforts, and fell back to their original positions. The action was in every respect a drawn one. The Federals lost 300 men, the Confederates 240, the loss of Wade Hampton, a tried and able officer, being a severe blow to them. Desultory firing was kept up till dark, when Stuart, in obedience to orders received from Lee, withdrew to Seminary Ridge.[1]

With the failure of Longstreet's assault, Lee's last bolt was shot. He had no more troops left with which to renew the attack, his ammunition was almost exhausted, and his army, of which almost every unit had been severely engaged, had suffered a loss of nearly 30 per cent. of its original strength. To disengage his wings from the awkward positions they occupied, and make timely preparations for the inevitable retreat, were the problems that now absorbed his attention. As the afternoon wore on, a movement of withdrawal commenced along the Confederate front. The batteries on the Emmitts-

[1] See reports of Stuart and Gregg.

burg pike were withdrawn gun by gun, first to Seminary Ridge and thence to Willoughby Run.[1] Longstreet's divisions then evacuated the positions they held, close up to the Union lines, and fell back on Seminary Ridge. The movement, a difficult and dangerous one, especially so for Law's division, was successfully executed with hardly any molestation from the enemy. The latter made no movement, except to push forward the brigades of Nevin and McCandless to harass McLaws in his retreat. A regiment of Benning's brigade, mistaking its orders, advanced instead of retiring, and being attacked by Nevin and McCandless, was badly cut up before it could extricate itself.[2] With this exception the withdrawal was effected without the loss of a man. This inactivity of the Federals was due to the orders of General Meade, who instructed Sykes to feel the enemy, but on no account to bring on a general engagement. Johnson's force was withdrawn from Culp's Hill at midnight, and marching round behind Gettysburg took up a position on Seminary Ridge on the left of Lee's line.[3] During the evening and throughout the night pick and spade were busy in the Confederate bivouacks, and at daylight on July 4 a long line of entrenchments crowned Seminary Ridge, behind which Lee's troops, unshaken by the terrible ordeal that they had been through, were confident in their ability to inflict a bloody repulse on any attempt of the enemy to attack them in their own lines.

The losses of the army of the Potomac in this desperately contested battle were 23,045 killed, wounded and missing of all ranks, and those of the army of Northern Virginia 20,451.[4] The Federals

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[1] Alexander: "Battles and Leaders." [2] McLaws' report.
[3] Johnson's report.
[4] See detailed statement of losses at end of volume; these are

also lost seven pieces of artillery and captured none. It will be noted that the Federals, although fighting throughout on the defensive and often behind breastworks, had more casualties than their opponents. This unusual result was due to the terrible losses suffered by the First and Eleventh Corps in their disastrous retreat from the battlefield of July 1, and to the almost equally severe punishment inflicted on the Third Corps when it was driven from the Peach Orchard. Whenever the Union troops were successful in holding their lines and repulsed the attack, they inflicted a far greater loss than they received. A remarkable feature of the battle was the great number of officers of high rank who fell on both sides. Their names were :—

Killed or mortally wounded.

Army of Northern Virginia : Maj.-General Pender, Brig.-Generals Armistead, Garnett, Kemper, Semmes and Barksdale.

Army of the Potomac : Maj.-General Reynolds, Brig.-Generals Weed, Farnsworth and Zook, Acting Brig.-Generals Vincent, Cross and Willard.

Wounded.

Army of Northern Virginia : Maj.-Generals Hood and Heth, Brig.-Generals Scales, Anderson, Robertson, Jones, Hampton and Jenkins.

Army of the Potomac : Maj.-Generals Hancock and Sickles, Brig.-Generals Warren, Gibbon, Webb, Graham, Paul, Barlow, Barnes, and Stannard.

The number of officers of all ranks, killed, wounded or missing in the Army of the Potomac was 1574, an

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based on the details given in Vol. III., " Battles and Leaders." Other accounts place the Confederate loss as high as 30,000. But this may perhaps be due to an error in counting the wounded Confederate prisoners *twice over*, that is, both in the list of wounded and also in the list of prisoners.

eloquent testimony to their courage and self-sacrificing devotion. The percentage of loss to numbers engaged was in many of the units extraordinarily high. The First Corps was almost annihilated. It lost 67 per cent. of its strength, the Second Corps 36 per cent., the Third Corps 35 per cent. On the other hand, Slocum's Corps suffered comparatively little, and Sedgwick's was barely engaged. Turning to the Confederate casualties, the losses in the divisions of McLaws, Hood, Rodes, and Johnson varied from 25 to 30 per cent., while in Pickett's and Heth's it was over 60 per cent. The brigades of Posey and Mahone, of Anderson's division, were the only units in the whole army not actively engaged on one or more of the three days. Lee had fought his army almost to the last man in his determination to secure victory. But no man can command success, and if the task that he demanded of his troops was too much even for them, yet the slaughter that they inflicted on the enemy was so great that the battle only ended finally with the mutual exhaustion of both combatants.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT.

1. Military Situation Night of July 3.

On the night of July 3, the Federal forces in the strategic area were situated as follows :—

At Gettysburg :—The Army of the Potomac, reduced to about 60,000 effectives.

The cavalry divisions of Gregg and Kilpatrick, about 8000 sabres.

At Westminster :—The cavalry division of Buford, about 3000 sabres.

At Carlisle and Harrisburg :—11,000 militia, under General W. F. Smith.

At Frederick, Maryland :—11,000 men, under General French.

At Beverly, Western Virginia :—The cavalry brigade of Brig.-General Averill.

At New Creek, Western Virginia :—5000 men, under General Kelley.

About 5000 reinforcements from the garrison of Washington were sent, first to French at Frederick, and then to the Army of the Potomac, between July 4 and July 10, bringing its total effective strength up to 65,000, exclusive of the cavalry.

The Army of Northern Virginia, reduced to about 50,000 effectives, exclusive of Stuart's cavalry force, lay entrenched on Seminary Ridge at Gettysburg. General Imboden's cavalry brigade, 2000 strong, reached the field from Chambersburg on the 3rd,

while the battle was still in progress.[1] On the same day the brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been ordered up from the Shenandoah Valley on the 29th, arrived in the neighbourhood of Fairfield, where they met and cut to pieces a detachment of Federal cavalry.[2] Corse's brigade of Pickett's division, about 2000 strong, had marched from Richmond on June 23 to join the army in Pennsylvania. There were no other Confederate forces anywhere in the strategic area.

The situation of the Confederate army on the night of July 3 was a very perilous one. It had been unsuccessful in a great battle, in which its losses had amounted to thirty per cent. of the whole army. It was separated by a vast distance from its own base, with the enemy's forces between it and Richmond. It was encumbered with immense trains, with 4000 prisoners, and with large numbers of wounded. Most serious of all, its ammunition was almost exhausted, and there was no prospect of obtaining fresh supplies nearer than Williamsport. On the other hand, the enemy had been so crippled by the battle that for the time he was unable or unwilling to assume an active offensive, but a few days would see him largely strengthened by the arrival of fresh troops. Lee's army seemed doomed. It seemed impossible that he could withdraw his shattered forces, his prisoners, and his vast trains in safety to the south side of the Potomac. Such was the belief of President Lincoln and the people of the Northern States. Other events contributed to their feeling of approaching triumph. Vicksburg fell on July 4, and it was felt with reason that, could the Army of Northern Virginia be destroyed before it could cross the Potomac, the rebellion would be stamped out at a blow. For a time the fatal policy of interference and discouragement,

[1] Imboden : " Battles and Leaders." [2] Robertson, *ibid.*

which marked the usual conduct of the Government towards the Army of the Potomac, was laid aside, and Lincoln and Halleck did all in their power, by forwarding reinforcements and supplies, to enable Meade to achieve the result they so ardently desired.

The extreme danger of the situation was clear enough to General Lee, but his quiet, confident bearing gave no indication of the anxiety he must have felt. Retreat was of course inevitable, but for the sake of the morale of the army it was to be made as leisurely as possible. The most difficult part of the operation was the withdrawal of the prisoners and trains. The former would require a large escort, and were therefore to march with the troops by the Fairfield road to Hagerstown. The trains were to move by way of Cashtown to Chambersburg, and thence to Williamsport. The duty of escorting them was assigned to Imboden, an energetic and capable officer, whose brigade, not having been engaged, was the freshest in the army. His instructions were to cross South Mountain by the Chambersburg road, thence march to Williamsport by the most convenient route, and without a halt till the Potomac should be reached. He was to rest there long enough to feed his animals, and then ford the river and march without halting to Winchester.[1]

2. The Confederate Retreat.

The 4th July, the anniversary of the Signing of the Declaration of Independence, broke on a silent field. The opposing armies lay watching one another from the tree-covered slopes of Gettysburg, and in the cornfields and woods lay the wounded and dead in thousands. Meade apparently anticipated a further attack, and kept his lines well closed up and his troops under arms. The day of rest was very welcome to

[1] Imboden : " Battles and Leaders."

the Confederate Army, which, since it had left its lines behind the Rappahannock on June 14, had done little else but march and fight. All the dead that lay inside or near their lines were buried, the wounded looked after, and such as were considered fit to travel placed in the ambulances and empty wagons for transportation to Virginia. The operation of marshalling the huge train along the roads ready for the start took much longer than was anticipated, and it was not until late in the afternoon that the long column finally started towards Chambersburg. Imboden had under him Hampton's brigade and four batteries, in addition to his own command, forming a total of 3500 men and 23 guns. Shortly before the start the rain came down in torrents, and continued so all night. The violence of the storm was intense, and the sufferings of the wounded men in the jolting wagons indescribable. The roads were reduced to a state which made them in places almost impassable for vehicles, and many of the wagons broke down. But Imboden's fierce energy conquered all obstacles. His orders were that nothing whatever was to stop the progress of the column. If a wagon broke down it was to be instantly turned off the road and abandoned. These resolute measures were effective. On the morning of the 5th the head of the column reached Greencastle, and continuing the march without a halt entered Williamsport the same evening, the remainder coming in on the following day.[1] Throughout the retreat no molestation was received from the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, whose movements we shall follow presently, but some damage was caused by a detachment of Averill's cavalry from Beverly, Western Virginia, which attacked the train near Mercersburg and captured some sixty wagons. But now Imboden's good fortune seemed to have ceased. At

[1] Imboden : " Battles and Leaders."

Williamsport an ominous state of affairs was revealed. On the morning of the 3rd a detachment of cavalry, sent out from Frederick by General French, had made a raid on the town, and had destroyed the bridge by which the army had crossed the Potomac into Maryland. This was not all. The river, swollen by the heavy rains, was now a swirling flood, spreading over its banks, impossible to ford. The stars in their courses seemed to be fighting against the South, and the very elements conspiring to prevent the escape of Lee's sorely tried army.

During the night of July 4, Lee put his army in motion towards Fairfield. Hill's corps led the column, then Longstreet escorting the prisoners, and then Ewell, Early's division forming the rearguard. The rear of the army did not get under way till near dawn of the 5th. On the morning of the 5th, finding that the enemy had disappeared, Meade began to consider the question of pursuit. His most ardent admirers cannot but acknowledge that his subsequent movements were leisurely in the extreme. His army, it is true, was terribly battered and exhausted, but it had had an entire day to rest and recuperate, and the prize to be gained was so immense that no consideration whatever should have been allowed to stand in the way of a prompt and energetic pursuit. But Meade's dominant trait was caution. On the 5th he sent out Sedgwick's Corps to follow up the enemy's line of retreat, while part of his force was moved forward to occupy the abandoned Confederate lines. Sedgwick overtook Lee's rear-guard a short distance beyond Fairfield, delayed by the congested trains of Ewell's Corps passing through Eyler's Gap.[1] Early took prompt measures to form a line of battle, and Sedgwick, after looking to it, decided that it was too strong to attack with his present force, and sent back for

[1] Early's report.

reinforcements. But Meade had now changed his plans. Instead of following up the enemy's direct line of retreat, he decided to move south, keeping east of South Mountain, and cross by the lower gaps into the Cumberland Valley.[1] Two reasons influenced him in this decision. Firstly, he might otherwise be compelled to force Eyler's Gap against a strong rear-guard, which would entail an assault and possibly a day's delay; secondly, by marching to Frederick he would be able to unite with the force there under General French, and with the reinforcements which Halleck was sending from the garrison of Washington. In the meantime, General W. F. Smith had entered the Cumberland Valley from Harrisburg at the head of 11,000 militia, and General Kelley, with 5000 men, was advancing from New Creek, Western Virginia, on Williamsport. On the 6th, French was ordered to re-occupy Harper's Ferry with part of his force. This was done, Kenly's brigade reaching that place the same day, followed by the brigades of Briggs and Naglee on the 7th.[2] This brought up the total strength of the garrison now holding the works on Maryland Heights to about 6000 men.

3. Cavalry Movements and Action at Williamsport.

General Meade realised fully the importance of sending out his cavalry as soon as possible to harass the Confederate retreat. The following orders were issued to the division commanders on the morning of July 4[3]:—

Kilpatrick's Division:—To march via Emmittsburg to Mechanicstown, and cross South Mountain by Monterey Gap.

Gregg's Division:—Huey's brigade to report to Kilpatrick at Emmittsburg.

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[1] Meade's report. [2] French's report. [3] Pleasonton's report.

Irvin Gregg's brigade to march by Cashtown in pursuit of the Confederate trains.

McIntosh's brigade to Emmittsburg, and remain there to protect the rear of the army.

Buford's Division :—From Westminster to Frederick, and thence cross South Mountain by Turner's or Crampton's Gap, and move on Williamsport.

As regards the Confederate cavalry, Stuart made the following dispositions to secure the passes leading across South Mountain into the Cumberland Valley : Fitzhugh Lee was ordered to act as rearguard to the column under Imboden's escort proceeding by way of Cashtown, Robertson and Jones to cover the rear of Lee's army on the Fairfield road, while Stuart in person, with the brigades of Jenkins and Chambliss, moved on the 5th by Emmittsburg and Mechanicstown to secure the gap at Monterey further south.[1] He found he was too late. Kilpatrick had passed through the gap on the evening of the 4th, twelve hours in front of Stuart. At daylight on July 5, leaving a small rearguard to hold the passes, Kilpatrick pushed on to attack Ewell's trains which were passing across his front on the Fairfield-Hagerstown road. In spite of a vigorous resistance on the part of the escort, a large number of wagons fell into his hands, many of them being full of wounded brought from Gettysburg. This mishap, which seemed so unfortunate at the time, proved eventually a rather lucky event for the Confederates, for it drew away Kilpatrick's attention from a far greater prize. On the morning of the 5th Imboden's convoy was filing slowly along the road from Greencastle to Williamsport, barely seven miles off. Kilpatrick had made his capture by 9 a.m. Had he pushed boldly on either to Hagerstown or Williamsport, he would have intercepted the convoy, and the greater part, if not all, of

[1] Stuart's report.

Lee's trains must have fallen into his hands. But at this moment he acted with extraordinary supineness. Withdrawing his rearguard from Monterey, he retired to Boonsborough,[1] where he arrived at 10 p.m., at the same time that Imboden's convoy was filing into Williamsport. Stuart now passed through the gap, and uniting his two brigades with Robertson and Jones, moved with the whole on Hagerstown. In the meantime Buford had reached Frederick, where he was joined by Merritt's brigade, and on the following day, July 6, he crossed South Mountain and advanced on Williamsport.[2] On the morning of the 6th, Kilpatrick moved from Boonsborough on Hagerstown to attack Stuart, under the impression that the bulk of the trains had not yet passed that point. It would be unprofitable to try to follow in detail the very confused fighting which ensued in the vicinity of Hagerstown, and which finally resulted in the repulse of Kilpatrick. He had in the meantime ascertained from Buford that the trains were not at Hagerstown, but Williamsport, and accordingly fell back in that direction, hoping to capture the place before Stuart could come up to relieve it.[3]

Imboden's situation was intensely critical. The river was in flood and the bridge destroyed. His own force did not number more than 2000 men, for he had been obliged to detach Hampton's brigade to watch the roads from the west in case Averill should advance from that direction. Buford and Kilpatrick were advancing to attack him from the east with 6000 men. In this emergency Imboden acted with an energy and decision beyond praise. He augmented his small force by arming 700 or 800 of the wagoners, who had driven the teams from Gettysburg, with rifles taken from the wounded, and formed a

[1] In his report Kilpatrick says: "To save my prisoners, animals, and wagons, I returned to Boonsborough."

[2] Buford's report. [3] Kilpatrick's report.

line on the hills east of the town, placing his guns in conspicuous places and making as much show as possible to deceive the enemy as to his real strength.[1] The ruse succeeded admirably. Buford pushed his advance very cautiously, under the impression that he had a large force in front of him. The action continued in a desultory manner all the afternoon, until at sunset a message arrived from Fitzhugh Lee, urging Imboden to hold out a little longer, as he would soon be up with help. The news was at once communicated to the men, and was received with a shout of exultation. They felt that their gallant defence had not been in vain, and began to push boldly forward against the enemy. Stuart was now pressing Kilpatrick hard in rear, and the latter, seeing that the prize had slipped from his hands, gave up the contest and withdrew by his left flank towards Buford. Both then fell back under cover of night to Turner's Gap, having lost some 400 men in the fighting at Williamsport and Hagerstown. Thus the whole of the vast trains entrusted to Imboden's charge had been brought almost intact from Gettysburg to the Potomac. This success was due partly to luck, partly to Imboden's energy, partly to the enemy's mistakes. Kilpatrick's supineness in wasting the 5th in inaction threw away the great chance he was given of intercepting the convoy, and the opportunity, once lost, did not recur. What it would have meant to Lee had the great camp at Williamsport been captured it is difficult to overestimate. In the straitened and impoverished condition of the Confederacy the vast quantities of lost stores and equipment could not have been replaced.[2]

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[1] Imboden: "Battles and Leaders."

[2] See Stuart's report for operations of the Confederate cavalry. Pleasonton's report is very general, and gives few details. Kilpatrick's is extremely confused, and gives quite a wrong impression of several actions, particularly that at Williamsport.

4. Movements on Williamsport.

On July 7, Longstreet's Corps, followed by the rest of the army, marched into Williamsport, having covered the distance from Gettysburg in two and a half days with hardly any molestation from the Union cavalry. Lee had succeeded in withdrawing his army from a dangerous position with great skill, and now when complete success seemed on the point of crowning the operation, the sudden rise of the Potomac threatened to bring everything to ruin. The position was a most embarrassing one. The river showed no signs of falling, and a week or ten days must elapse before it would become fordable again. In the meantime the Army of the Potomac, strengthened by numerous reinforcements, was hastening forward to intercept his retreat and drive the Confederates into the river. Lee set his engineers to work at once to build a new bridge, a long and tedious business, for all the materials for making boats and roadway had to be assembled *de novo*. Many of the wounded, who declared themselves able to walk, were ferried over the river in flat boats, and ordered to make their way independently to Winchester. All the prisoners, some 4000 in number, were similarly transferred to the Virginia shore, and sent under Imboden's escort up the valley to Staunton. In the meantime a defensive position for the army to take up was traced out and entrenched. It extended from Marsh Creek on the right flank in a convex curve to Conocohoochee Creek on the left, the length of the line being about nine miles, to hold which Lee had available some 45,000 infantry. This period of rest at Williamsport was of inestimable benefit to his troops, who rapidly recovered their spirits and self-confidence, as day after day passed and their lines grew in strength, while no enemy appeared.[1]

[1] Lee's report.

As we have seen, the Confederate army reached Williamsport on the 7th. On the 6th Meade had set his troops in motion towards Frederick. On the 7th his head-quarters were transferred to that place, and his columns were wheeled to the right towards the lower gaps of South Mountain. A junction was effected at Frederick with the troops under General French, the latter officer taking over the command of the Third Corps, left vacant by the wounding of General Sickles at Gettysburg. On the 8th the First and Eleventh Corps were pushed forward to occupy Turner's Gap, Stuart, with four brigades behind Antietam Creek, watching Kilpatrick and Buford on the other bank. On the same date General W. F. Smith, moving down the Cumberland Valley, reached Waynesborough. As soon as Meade got into touch again with the enemy his advance became astonishingly cautious and slow. On the 9th the left wing of the army advanced through Crampton's Gap to the Antietam. On the 10th this wing crossed the creek, Stuart having fallen back. On the 11th Meade executed a lateral movement to the right to get into touch with Smith, who was approaching Hagerstown. On the 12th the army advanced on Williamsport, and took up a position from Hagerstown to Marsh Creek facing the Confederate lines. In the meantime General Kelley, with his mixed command of 5000 men, had reached Hancock, on the south side of the Potomac, about 18 miles west of Williamsport, where he was in a position to cut into Lee's line of retreat.

Meade had thus taken seven days to march a distance of rather under 50 miles, and five days to cover the last 20. What was the explanation of this extraordinary dilatoriness at a moment when everything depended on prompt decisive action on his part? It was certainly not for lack of encouragement from Washington. Lincoln and Halleck were

incessantly urging him to go on and drive Lee into the Potomac, sentiments which were echoed unanimously by the whole North. The very elements seemed to be fighting for him. His army, strengthened and rested, was eager to press on. The most reasonable explanation seems to be the impression produced upon General Meade's mind by the fury of the Confederate assaults at Gettysburg. He had a wholesome dread of the army of Northern Virginia. We find him writing to Halleck on July 6[1] that if a misfortune overtook the army, he hoped that a sufficient number of his force would reach Washington to make the Capital secure against capture. Such was the attitude of the commanding general three days after a battle which his country claimed as a great and decisive victory! His thoughts were fixed on the safety of his own army, not on the destruction of the enemy's. His movements were in consequence timid, slow, and half-hearted, and it is scarcely to be wondered at that the President began to grow impatient at a commander who hesitated to close with an adversary, whom he claimed to be beaten and demoralised, and whom Fate itself seemed to have delivered into his hand.

5. Lee Recrosses the Potomac.

Meade had wasted precious time, but he was up at last, and the swollen river still held Lee fast on the Maryland shore. The two protagonists were once more face to face, but now the positions were reversed. It was the Army of the Potomac that was now obliged to attack. Meade spent a large part of the 12th in examining Lee's position, pushing forward small bodies to feel the enemy, and entrenching along his own front. He discovered that the position before him was a most formidable one, strengthened throughout by earthworks, and resting on flanks that could

[1] Meade to Halleck, July 6, Official Records.

not be turned.[1] He had seen at the Antietam and at Friedericksburg the obstinacy with which the Confederate infantry could defend a position, and a bloody repulse at Williamsport would be a disastrous termination to what he could fairly claim to have been hitherto a successful campaign. And yet he should not have hesitated for a moment. If all else was doubtful this at least was plain. If advantage was to be taken of the finest opportunity that the Army of the Potomac was ever destined to have, of destroying its adversary at a blow, then the lines confronting him must be carried by assault, no matter at what cost of life. Meade seems to have felt the truth of this, for on the evening of the 12th he called a council-of-war of his corps commanders and expressed his intention of making a general attack on the following day. All but one were strongly opposed to the project.[2] Such a weight of adverse opinion was too heavy to be disregarded, though a stronger man might have done so, and Meade, against his own judgment, decided to postpone the assault until the enemy's lines could be more thoroughly examined. The examination was made, and the original order promulgated for the 14th. But the delay was fatal. Even when Meade was making up his mind, the prize was slipping out of his hands, and the chance, for it was not more than a chance, passed away unseized.

Day after day the Potomac had been falling, and the anxiety which Lee had felt as to his positon lessened also. The work of constructing a new bridge at Falling Waters was pushed on energetically. Buildings were pulled down to obtain timber for boats, part of the old structure was recovered, and

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[1] Meade's report.

[2] Meade's despatch to Halleck, July 13, does not state who was the solitary advocate of an assault.

by the 13th the bridge was ready. The river, though deep, was reported fordable at Williamsport, and on the night of the 13th, in the midst of a violent storm, Lee commenced his retreat. The movement, always a trying one to carry out in the face of an enemy, was conducted in perfect order. Ewell's Corps crossed by the ford, Longstreet and Hill by the bridge at Falling Waters. The operation, however, took longer than was anticipated, and at daylight Pettigrew's (late Heth's) division, forming the rear-guard, was still on the northern side, waiting to cross. By this time the enemy had discovered that the lines were abandoned, and the Federal cavalry came quickly swarming down to cut off the retreat of the rear-guard. In the scuffle that followed, the gallant Pettigrew, who had already received a wound at Gettysburg, was killed, and a number of stragglers, in all about 500, were cut off and captured. Three guns, which had stuck in the mud and could not be extracted, were also abandoned, the only pieces of artillery lost by the army throughout the campaign. The rest of the force effected their retreat in safety, and the Confederate army stood once more on the soil of Virginia.[1]

6. Movement to the Rappahannock.

Meade made no attempt to pursue, except to send part of Gregg's cavalry division across the river on the 15th to harass the retreat. Gregg accomplished nothing. He was vigorously attacked by Stuart, and retreated precipitately over the Potomac again with the loss of 100 men. Lee marched leisurely to Bunker Hill, which he reached on the 15th, meaning to cross the Blue Ridge into Eastern Virginia, but

[1] See reports of Lee and Meade. There seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of General Lee's description of these events. Kilpatrick's appears to be very much exaggerated.

the Shenandoah, swollen by the recent rains, was found to be unfordable. In the meantime, urged on by constant exhortations from Washington, Meade marched down the left bank of the Potomac, and on the 17th crossed by pontoon bridges laid at Harper's Ferry and Berlin. His plan was to move rapidly down the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, seize the gaps, and cut Lee off from his base at Richmond.[1] The Confederate commander now put his army in motion up the valley towards Chester Gap, thus retracing the same route that he had followed a month before. At one moment it seemed as though he was going to be out-manœuvred, for the Federal army reached Manassas Gap while the head of his own column was marching through Front Royal. But the danger was only momentary. Meade's burst of energy died away. A feeble attempt to cut off Ewell at Front Royal was easily repulsed, and on the 23rd the Confederate army passed through Chester Gap, and was once more between the enemy and Richmond. The march was continued towards Culpepper, Longstreet reaching that place on the 24th, and the rest of the army by the 29th. Lee then took up a defensive line behind the Rapidan. Meade marched slowly to the Rappahannock, but, acting under instructions from Halleck, made no attempt to push south of that river.[2] Thus the campaign came to an end within a few miles of the locality which had witnessed its opening scenes six weeks before.[3]

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[1] Meade's report.

[2] Halleck to Meade, July 30 : " Keep up a threatening attitude, but do not advance."

[3] The total casualties in the Union forces from June 3 to August 1, exclusive of those in General Dix's force, threatening Richmond, numbered 32,043. The casualties in the army of Northern Virginia during the same period were 22,052. (Official Records.)

CHAPTER VII.

CRITICISM ON THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

1. The Battle of July 1.

The battle of July 1 comes under quite a different category to that of the two succeeding days, and it is therefore proposed to discuss it separately. It forms one of the very few instances on record of a battle brought on by two armies meeting on the march. All the characteristic features of such actions are reproduced. In the first place, the course that the battle took was beyond the control of the commanders on either side. As the successive reinforcements came up, they were thrust in wherever their presence seemed most needed at the moment. There was no pre-arranged plan. The battle having been opened by the Federal cavalry, its subsequent development followed a line of its own. Secondly, there was on the Union side a repeated change in the command, due to the successive arrival of senior officers on the field, Reynolds, Doubleday, Howard, and Hancock. This had the natural effect of producing much confusion in the issuing of orders and counter-orders, while as each officer arrived on the field he found a situation which had already passed beyond his control, and although he might have foreseen the ultimate disaster, he was powerless to avert it. It is always difficult and often impossible to break off an action, when once the troops have become closely

engaged. If we examine the course of the battle from its commencement, we shall find that at one period only did an opportunity present itself to withdraw the Union troops and discontinue the action. This occurred about noon after the repulse of Heth's first attack on Reynolds' Corps. Had Doubleday, who was left by the death of Reynolds in command of the First Corps, then withdrawn his troops to Cemetery Hill, he could have done so in safety, for Heth was for the moment incapable of pressing him, and Rodes was not yet up. Doubleday's explanation for not doing so[1] is, firstly, that as Reynolds had selected the position, he considered it his duty to hold it; and, secondly, that General Howard, who had reached Cemetery Hill, was the senior officer on the field, and could have ordered the retirement had he deemed it advisable. Neither reason is satisfactory. Reynolds' action was dictated by the necessity of rescuing Buford's hard-pressed cavalry. To remain in such an exposed position, after this object had been successfully accomplished, was simply madness. Doubleday was aware that Ewell was approaching from the north, and his arrival on the field was bound to threaten the flank and rear of the First Corps. Doubleday's second excuse indicates a lamentable incapacity to assume responsibility. Howard had only just reached the scene. He was necessarily unaware how matters stood, and by the time he could have satisfied himself of the precise state of affairs in front of the First Corps the favourable moment would have passed. The chief responsibility for the disaster that overtook the Union arms must therefore rest on General Doubleday.

But a part of the blame must certainly be borne by Buford. It was he who gratuitously provoked

[1] See Doubleday's report.

the action, and it was in the effort to rescue him from his perilous position that the First and Eleventh Corps were hurried to their death. It has been asserted that by his action Buford saved Cemetery Ridge from falling into the enemy's hands, and thereby contributed largely to the ultimate success of the Union arms. But was this so? Had not Buford been so hard pressed, Reynolds would have halted on Cemetery Hill. The position that Buford took up covered the *town* rather than the ridge. There is nothing in his reports of the 30th and 1st to show that he appreciated the importance of the latter. Had he done so, it is inconceivable why, at Heth's approach, he did not evacuate the town and fall back on Cemetery Hill, a position which afforded admirable facilities for concealing the smallness of his force, whereas in the open fields north of Gettysburg concealment was impossible. It was only the enemy's ignorance of the strength of the Union forces holding Cemetery Hill that saved that position from falling into Ewell's hands at the close of the day. The only advantage possessed by Buford's position was that it denied the town to the enemy. This, in itself, was of no importance, certainly not worth the 10,000 men who were thrown away in the futile attempt to hold it. Of Buford's courage and energy there can be no question, but he cannot be acquitted of an error of judgment which proved most disastrous to the Union arms. The incident is very instructive from another point of view, for it shows how a single independent step on the part of a subordinate may sometimes force the hand of the Commander-in-Chief, and commit him to a line of action, which up to that moment had never even entered into his calculations.

The Confederates were peculiarly favoured by fortune on this occasion. The forces of Hill, Rodes, and Early, marching from widely separated points,

reached the field at precisely the right time, and in positions where they were most favourably situated for enveloping the enemy's force. This was not due to a pre-arranged scheme, but to a lucky chance. On the other hand, the Confederate commanders deserve high praise for the combined attack about 4 p.m., which finally won the day. It will be noted how the isolated attacks of Hill and Rodes were repulsed in turn with great loss, but when all the Confederate forces on the field advanced simultaneously they swept everything before them. Had they continued to press the pursuit beyond the town, there can be very little doubt that Cemetery Hill would have fallen also, for the Union troops were too disorganised by the disaster to offer prolonged resistance to a determined attack. General Lee's decision not to press the advance further that night has been severely criticised. By his over-caution he is said to have thrown away the fruits of the success which Hill and Ewell had won, and to have given the enemy breathing time to establish himself on a position, from which he was never afterwards driven. In considering the justice of such criticism, it should be remembered that one must judge a general's actions, not by what we know of the facts *now*, but by what he knew of them then. The charge of over-caution is not one to which General Lee laid himself open very often in his military career. Again and again he showed that he was prepared to accept the most appalling risk, if he considered the object to be gained was worth it. What was the situation as it presented itself to him at the moment when he appeared on the field? After a desperate struggle, his troops had driven the enemy from his position with great loss. The Federals had been rallied on a second position, which appeared a most formidable one. They had evidently been reinforced, but in what strength it was impossible to tell. His own troops had suffered severely in the

action, they were thrown into much disorder by their rapid advance, and were encumbered by a very large number of prisoners. The brigades of Hays and Hoke, which had been scarcely engaged, were the only troops in a condition immediately to advance. Would it have been wise to have thrown these two brigades in an isolated assault upon the enemy's position? The risk of their meeting with a disastrous repulse was certainly great. On the other hand, there is no situation, in which it is more permissible for a general to take unlimited risks, than when the enemy is beaten and flying, and his own troops are advancing in the full flush of victory. That General Lee fully realised the importance of Cemetery Hill is shown by his message to Ewell to "press those people, and secure the hill, if possible." But from his position at the Seminary it was not possible for him to judge exactly how matters stood in the firing line, and with his usual sound habit he relied upon the discretion of the man on the spot to decide whether his instructions were feasible or not. Actually there is no doubt that the Confederates did lose a priceless opportunity of securing the position, which afterwards cost them such a terrible and useless sacrifice of life. But at the same time, the circumstances were so doubtful, and the right action to take so difficult to decide, that one must hesitate to attach blame to either Lee or Ewell for their unfortunate over-caution on this occasion.

The chief honours of the day were undoubtedly won by the First Corps. In spite of the fearful losses they suffered, amounting to the fall of three men out of every five, no considerable number of men left the ranks at any time. Their retreat never degenerated into a rout, they contested every foot of the way, and when those that remained were finally rallied on Cemetery Hill, they were still in condition to offer a stout resistance to the enemy's further advance. The Confederates themselves acknowledged that their

opponents had never fought so well before. By a curious irony of circumstances, side by side with this grand display of soldierly valour, there was witnessed the inglorious rout of the Eleventh Corps, the only body of troops which did not win honourable laurels at Gettysburg. Since its disastrous defeat by Jackson at Chancellorsville, about a month before, the morale of the Eleventh Corps had left much to be desired. By a curious chance its opponents at Gettysburg were the same men who had driven the Germans in such terrible rout through the Wilderness. So great was the feeling of the rest of the army towards the Eleventh Corps after its second stampede within a month, that it was considered best to break it up; this was done, and the brigades composing it distributed among the other units of the Army of the Potomac.

2. Lee's Decision to Attack at Gettysburg.

Three possible lines of action were open to General Lee on the night of July 1st, when he found himself face to face with Meade at Gettysburg. They were :—

1. To await the enemy's attack.
2. To manœuvre the enemy out of his position.
3. To attack.

The first course was impracticable for two reasons. Firstly, it would yield to Meade the advantage of the initiative. This would have been fatal to Lee's campaign, for his strategy depended for success entirely on the maintenance of an active offensive. Only by incessantly attacking could he draw away the enemy's forces from his lines of communication, which he had deliberately abandoned, and which lay absolutely open to attack, from Richmond to Chambersburg. Secondly, having no magazines, he had to feed his army on the country, which could not be done if he remained more than two or three days in

one spot. Meade, having a good base at Westminster at his back, could have remained in occupation of his strong position at Gettysburg for an indefinite period, until the difficulties of supply forced his opponent to retreat or attack. Lee, in fact, found himself in the position of Massena before the lines of Torres Vedras, with this important difference however. Wellington's lines, resting on the sea, could not be turned, whereas Meade's flanks were very vulnerable. Would it have been possible to manœuvre him out of his position ? Many writers have blamed Lee severely for not taking this course, asserting that he threw strategy to the winds, and ran his head deliberately against a stone wall. There is no doubt that had Lee manœuvred against Meade's left flank, which was strategically the weakest point of his line, so as to threaten his opponent's communications with Washington, the latter would have abandoned the position and retreated. This is clear from his own despatches.[1] But would this have brought Lee any nearer to a decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac, the principal object of the campaign ? Gettysburg was not Meade's selected line of defence at all. His plans would not have been deranged in the least by being compelled to abandon it. His chosen position lay behind Pipe Creek, which he had already had partly prepared for defence. Had he retired from Gettysburg he would have fallen back behind Pipe Creek, and Lee would have been confronted with the same problem as before.

It remains then to consider what advantages Lee might hope to derive by adopting the third alternative, and attacking Meade at Gettysburg. In the first place it was imperative to Lee to bring on a battle

[1] Meade to Halleck July 2 : " If I am satisfied that the enemy is endeavouring to move to my rear, and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster."

as soon as possible. Every day's delay would have brought his adversary reinforcements from Washington, from Fortress Monroe, from Pennsylvania, while Lee could not hope for a single additional man. His ammunition was none too abundant, it could not be replenished except from the enemy's supplies after a successful battle, and in constant skirmishing it would have dwindled rapidly. Meade, on the other hand, could count on unlimited supplies. Secondly, it is one of the recognised maxims of war that a successful blow must be pushed home at once, if the full fruits of victory are to be gained. Ewell and Hill had struck a staggering blow at the Union army. The disaster to the First and Eleventh Corps undoubtedly exercised a discouraging influence on the Federal troops, while the Confederates were correspondingly elated. A week later the effect would have passed off, and the defeated troops would have recovered much of their morale. Thirdly, a rapid renewal of the attack promised to catch the enemy with part of his forces still in rear, and the whole wearied with long forced marches and confused by an unexpected concentration on unfamiliar ground. Lastly, one must take into account the temper of the Confederate troops. Historians relate that the Army of Northern Virginia never went into battle with more certain confidence of victory than at Gettysburg. Barksdale's attitude before the attack on the Peach Orchard, chafing and fuming at the head of his command, and crying to McLaws, "General, let me attack, let me charge!"[1] is typical of the whole. It cannot be wondered if Lee felt that, with such troops and with such a temper animating all ranks, there was no position, however strong, that their valour could not take. Taking everything into consideration, it will probably be acknowledged that Lee did right when he

[1] White: "R. E. Lee," p. 306.

determined to attack Meade at Gettysburg, and that his action, if very bold, was only on a par with his conduct of the whole campaign.

Analysis of the Federal Position.

It is interesting to examine how far the position occupied by the Union army fulfils the conditions of a good defensive position, as laid down in our "Combined Training."

1. The locality chosen should fulfil the strategic object.

This point has already been discussed. Meade's strategic object was to cover Washington, which could have been effected better from behind Pipe Creek. The fact that the issue of the campaign was fought out at Gettysburg was due to an accident, not in accordance with any preconceived plan.

2. The extent of the position should be suitable to the strength of the defending force.

The distance along the line from Round Top to the extreme right on Rock Creek was about 7500 yards. Meade had available on July 2 to occupy the line, 67,000 infantry or nine men to the yard.

3. A clear field of fire to the front.

The centre of the line fulfilled this condition well, for from the Cemetery ridge the available field of fire varies from 1400 to 1800 yards in breadth. But on both the flanks it was very bad, owing to the broken and wooded ground at Culp's Hill and Round Top.

4. The flanks of the position should be strong.

Both flanks rested on strong natural positions. At the same time, the fact that Meade's line of communications, via the Taneytown pike to Westminster, ran close behind Round Top was a weak point of the position. In other words, this flank, though tactically very strong, was strategically weak.

5. Good cover for firing line and supports.

Extremely good cover was provided on both flanks by the abundance of timber, which was rapidly converted into serviceable breastworks of logs, while on the open ridge in the centre the rubble walls gave very effective protection. Excellent cover was available for the supports on the reverse slope of the crest.

6. Good artillery positions.

Good positions existed in the centre and on Cemetery Hill, but on both flanks the ground was too broken and wooded for artillery to be employed effectively.

7. Good lateral communications.

The Taneytown pike, running in rear of the centre and left, afforded excellent lateral communication.

8. Good means of retreat.

The position is defective in this respect. If either flank had been successfully turned, to retreat by the Taneytown pike would have almost certainly involved the abandonment of the troops holding Cemetery Hill.

9. No good positions for the enemy's artillery.

Another defect. The Seminary ridge affords excellent positions, of which full advantage was taken.

10. Favourable ground for the decisive counter-attack.

The most serious defect of the position. No part of the line affords good facilities for a counter-attack. The ground on the flanks is too broken and complicated, while from the centre an advance would have to be made for nearly a mile over open fields, exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery on Seminary Ridge.

To sum up, the position was an excellent one for a purely passive defence, but for any movements, either in advance or retreat, it had grave disadvantages. It will be noted that the line formed a salient angle at Cemetery Hill. Now, a salient should generally

be avoided for two reasons. Firstly, one or both faces of the angle may be exposed to an enfilade fire; secondly, if the enemy breaks through at the angle, then both the sides are out-flanked. In the present case neither disadvantage existed. Owing to the lie of the ground round Cemetery Hill, it was not possible to enfilade either face of the salient from the Confederate positions, while the hill itself was so strong that there was little fear of its being captured, if held by good troops.[1] On the other hand, these disadvantages are well illustrated by the fight at the Peach Orchard on July 2. The line occupied by Sickles' Corps formed a salient at that point. When McLaws' division broke through at the angle, it out-flanked both Humphreys and Birney, with the result that each was thrown back with terrible loss.

3. The Confederate Attacks on July 2 and 3.

Lee's attack on July 2 was intended to be of an enveloping nature. He proposed to roll up the enemy's left wing with Longstreet's Corps, while making a holding attack upon his centre and right. The attack was partially successful, but failed to be completely so, for two reasons: firstly, the arrival of Sedgwick's Corps on the Federal left flank; secondly, the failure of Rodes' and Pender's divisions to take part in the attack. Owing to Longstreet's disobedience of orders in waiting till noon before he moved into position, his corps did not advance till after 4 p.m. This gave time for Sedgwick's Corps to reach the field, and his arrival checked Longstreet's hitherto victorious advance. The Confederate attack was ordered to be made in echelon of brigades from the right. Hood, McLaws, and part of Anderson's

[1] It is true that the hill was very nearly captured, but this was due to the shaken morale of the Eleventh Corps.

division advanced in the above order, but Posey's brigade did not, nor any of the brigades on his left. This left the rest of Anderson's division without support, and he was unable to retain the positions captured by Wilcox and Wright. Posey's inaction appears to have been due to the miscarriage of an order by some staff officer, and Pender's to the unfortunate wounding of that officer, and to the long delay that ensued in transferring the command of his division to the senior brigadier. The attack on the enemy's right wing was equally mismanaged. The division commanders were not notified in sufficient time of the orders that they were to carry out. In his report General Rodes states that he did not receive orders to advance on Cemetery Hill until after Longstreet had commenced his attack, with the result that by the time he had drawn his troops out of the town and was ready to move forward, Early had delivered his attack and had been beaten back. We may say then that the partial failure of the Confederate attack on July 2 was due to the following causes:—

Longstreet's delay in moving his corps into position.

The wounding of General Pender.

The mistakes made by several officers on the staffs of Hill and Ewell.

On July 3 Lee altered his plan from an enveloping to a penetrating attack. He intended to pierce the enemy's centre and so cut off his right wing, in somewhat the same way that Marlborough pierced the French centre and surrounded and captured the French right at Blenheim. On whom does the responsibility rest for the mismanagement of this attack, and for the consequent sacrifice of the assaulting troops? Owing to the fact that the orders given were verbal only, it is most difficult to arrive at their exact wording, but it is quite certain that the attack as actually carried out was not at all what General

Lee had intended.[1] The responsibility is generally laid on General Longstreet. He is accused of disobeying his orders in not employing Hood's and McLaws' as well as Pickett's division to make the attack. Now, although Lee's official report is not as clear as might be desired, yet we find that it expressly rules out Hood and McLaws from the list of troops to take part in the assault on the Union centre, and this evidence must be held to outweigh that of Colonels Long, Taylor, Venable, etc., that Lee did give orders to Longstreet to employ his other two divisions as well. The probable explanation is that these officers misunderstood Lee's instructions that McLaws and Hood should renew the attack *on their own fronts*, not on the Union centre, and Longstreet did give orders to Law, commanding Hood's division, to this effect. Lee states in his report that the assaulting column was to consist of Pickett's, Heth's and part of Pender's divisions, while the rest of Hill's Corps was to be held in readiness to take advantage of any success that might be gained. The responsibility thus rests not on Longstreet, who carried out his part in accordance with his orders, but on Hill, and more directly on Anderson, whose division was ordered to support Pickett and Trimble, and failed to do so.[2]

It is true that Anderson's division constituted

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[1] Imboden states that General Lee made the following statement to him on the night of July 3 with reference to this question (see "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III.),: "I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to-day in that grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported as they were to have been—but for some reason not yet fully explained to me were not—we would have held the position and the day would have been ours." Imboden's account gives an extraordinarily vivid picture of General Lee on this occasion, and should be read by all interested in the subject.

[2] See Anderson's report: "I received orders to hold my division in readiness to move up in support if it should become necessary." See Appendix C.

the only other troops holding the Confederate centre, and had they been thrown in and repulsed with the rest, Lee's army would have been in a position of the utmost danger. Consider what would have happened in that case, had Meade followed up the defeated troops by a heavy counter-attack upon the Confederate centre. Lee's army would have been cut in two, all the artillery on Seminary Ridge must have been captured, and Longstreet's Corps, isolated and surrounded, would probably have been destroyed. The Confederates would certainly have never seen Virginia again. There are few commanders indeed who, situated as Lee was, would have dared to expend their last reserves in so hazardous and doubtful a contest. Napoleon himself refused to do so at Borodino. And yet such was Lee's boldness that he was willing to take even this risk in his resolution to win victory at any cost.

4. Conduct of the Battle by Lee and Meade.

It has been said that Gettysburg was the worst battle Lee ever fought. This is true. And yet his tactical skill, his eye for ground, his infinite daring, were displayed as strongly here as on any field. Where he failed was in trusting too much to his lieutenants, and in neglecting to ensure that his orders were understood and carried out. There was too much friction among his officers. Longstreet in particular showed a lack of hearty co-operation and a spirit of insubordination, which called for severe censure. He deliberately disobeyed his orders on the second day, and thereby contributed largely to the miscarriage of the attack. He was not responsible for the errors committed on the third day, but he cannot be acquitted of negligence in not satisfying himself that he understood the plan of attack. Both Hill and Ewell showed throughout the battle a singular want of their customary energy,

and failed to exercise sufficient control over their subordinate commanders. Finally, the inefficient manner in which the staff duties of the army were performed was largely responsible for the lack of concerted action and the disjointed character of so many of the attacks. What was the reason for this? It was not due to lack of experience among the officers of the staff. Henderson points out[1] that in the battle of Chancellorsville, a month before, movements of a far more complicated character, in a very close and difficult country, had been directed by the Confederate staff with complete success. Yet what was done so well among the tangled thickets of the Wilderness was bungled hopelessly on the open fields of Gettysburg. Only one explanation seems adequate, that of over-confidence. The long series of Confederate victories in Virginia, of which Chancellorsville was the last and greatest, had inspired Lee's army with a contempt for its opponent, which was unjustified by the facts. At Chancellorsville it was not the Army of the Potomac that was beaten, but its commander. At Gettysburg it retrieved its tarnished reputation, and taught its opponents the bloody lesson that even the most heroic courage is useless, if the guiding brain of an army has neglected to do its work.

General Meade's handling of his troops exhibits both the virtues and the failings of his military character. He cannot claim any credit for having selected the position, but he made the most of its numerous strong points, and his dispositions were mostly judicious. It was a mistake, however, to have left the Eleventh Corps to hold the important position of Cemetery Hill, the key of the whole line. The morale of these troops had been so shaken by their defeat on July 1 that they could not be relied

[1] "The Science of War."

upon. Considering what Early's isolated attack accomplished, there can be little doubt that he and Rodes together would have carried the position. Meade should have placed his best troops on Cemetery Hill, and stationed the Eleventh Corps in the rear. The neglect to occupy the Round Tops on July 2 appears to cast a grave reflection on Meade. But, like his opponent, he suffered in having a fractious lieutenant, who preferred his own judgment to his chief's, and went to the length of disobeying his orders to give effect to it. It would be unprofitable to go into the details of the bitter controversy that afterwards arose between Meade and Sickles over this question.[1] There can be no doubt that Sickles was responsible for the neglect to occupy the Round Tops. He states in his defence that he received no orders to do so, but what is to be said for the intelligence of a commander who knows that an important position on his left, which enfilades his line, is unoccupied and yet neglects to look after the safety of his own flank? The plea of "no orders" is the feeblest excuse that a soldier can offer. If his corps was too weak to detach a brigade to Round Top, he should not have moved forward to the Peach Orchard. Meade must also bear a part of the blame. His attention was concentrated on his right, where he expected the enemy's attack to be made, and he certainly failed to realise the immense importance of the Round Tops. On the other hand, the greatest credit is due to General Warren, whose quick eye and fearless acceptance of responsibility saved the situation, and secured this vital point in the Union position.

Meade deserves great credit for the energy with which he stripped certain parts of his line to reinforce others, the fresh troops coming up repeatedly at the

[1] See "The Meade-Sickles Controversy" in Vol. III. "Battles and Leaders."

very moment when their presence was most needed. In this he was greatly assisted by the convex shape of the position and the excellent internal communications between all parts. The mixing up of units that resulted therefrom was unavoidable, but it is difficult to understand why Meade made no attempt subsequently to correct it. Had he found it necessary to evacuate the position, this disorganisation of units would have produced the most appalling confusion. It certainly rendered his army incapable of an offensive movement. Where Meade failed was in his neglect to seize the many opportunities which his opponent gave him of delivering an effective counter-stroke.[1] One has only to look at the plan of the battle, and see how Lee's army, numerically slightly inferior, encircled that of Meade, to realise what a risk the Confederate commander was running. It is true that the Federal position did not lend itself to counter-attack, but this disadvantage would have been discounted, had he delivered it when the Confederates were reeling back in disorder after their unsuccessful assault. One has only to compare Wellington's counter-stroke at Salamanca, or Lee's at Manassas, with Meade's inaction at Gettysburg, to realise the gulf that separates a mediocre general from a genius. It is a military maxim that by offensive action alone can decisive results be obtained in war. Had Meade assumed the offensive at Gettysburg, he might possibly have ended the war at a blow. As it was, Lee successfully effected his retreat, and the war was prolonged for two more weary years, at a cost of tens of thousands of lives and untold millions of money.

[1] But Lee, who knew Meade's cautious character, must have reckoned on this immunity. Against a commander like Grant he never took such risks. It is one of the marks of a great general that he always studies the character of his opponent.

CHAPTER VIII.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Objects and Results of the Campaign.

If we examine carefully the course taken by this campaign, we shall find that it divides itself naturally into three periods.

First period.—June 3 to June 22.—From the opening movements on the Rappahannock to the crossing of the Potomac by Ewell's Corps.

Second period.—June 22 to June 30.—Including the invasion of Pennsylvania up to the eve of the battle of Gettysburg.

Third period.—July 4 to July 31.—From the battle of Gettysburg to the end of the campaign.

In the first period the Confederates, having taken the initiative, acted throughout on the offensive. In the second, each side manœuvred for position, ending finally in a concentration of both armies on Gettysburg, a collision, and the resulting battle. In the third period, the offensive passed to the Federals, the Confederates being strictly confined to effecting their retreat in safety to the Rappahannock.

We have already considered the reasons which led the Confederate Government to decide upon an offensive campaign, and the objects they hoped to attain thereby. Briefly recapitulating these, they were—first, to carry the war into the enemy's country; secondly, to relieve the pressure on Vicksburg by compelling the Federal Government to withdraw troops

from the western theatre of war for the defence of Pennsylvania; thirdly, to end the war, if possible, by a decisive blow at Washington or at the Army of the Potomac. The campaign ended in failure, for of these three objects the first was attained for a brief period of some three weeks only, and the second and third not at all. It can hardly be said, indeed, that the fate of Vicksburg was affected at all by the events of the campaign, for even had the battle of Gettysburg ended in a decisive victory for the Confederates, it would not have delayed the capitulation of the fortress, which was signed while the issue of the battle still hung in the balance. On the other hand, the third objective was within an ace of being attained. It is a commonly accepted opinion that at Gettysburg the South stood within a stone's throw of Independence. Whether a disaster to the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil would have broken the dogged determination of President Lincoln it is impossible to say,[1] but we can easily imagine the state of panic into which all the Eastern States would have been thrown, and the enormous pressure that would have been brought to bear by the Peace Party upon the President to end the war. The blunder which left Pickett's division unsupported averted the disaster, and gave the Northern States renewed hopes of ultimate success. On the other hand, if the Confederates failed to attain any of the hoped-for results of their offensive campaign, they could point to the fact that the loss, both in men and material, sustained by the enemy in repulsing the invasion, had been far greater than that which they had themselves suffered, that they had given the enemy a taste of the sufferings of

[1] It is recorded that when the Confederate invasion was sweeping all before it in Pennsylvania, President Lincoln made use of the following prayer: "O Lord, this is Thy fight, but your faithful people can't stand another Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville."

war upon his own soil, and that his plans for a summer campaign in Virginia had been effectually upset.

2. General Lee's Strategy.

General Lee's conduct of the opening moves of the invasion was brilliant in the extreme. It forms a most interesting example of that form of strategy which is brought into play when two armies are manœuvring to cut the other's lines of communication. In his "Operations of War," Hamley points out that in such a case the commander who succeeds in doing so *first* will invariably force his opponent to give up his designs against the enemy's communications, and fall back to protect his own. This is exactly what happened in the present instance. By taking the initiative, and by carefully veiling his movements behind a cloud of cavalry, Lee succeeded in placing his army in a position to strike at Washington before Hooker had left his lines on the Rappahannock. At the time Hill's isolated corps was the only force standing between Hooker and Richmond. A rapid advance on the Confederate Capital would have inevitably compelled Lee to hurry back to its defence. But in the general atmosphere of panic and bewilderment only one thing was clear to Lincoln and his Cabinet. It was that a Confederate army of unknown strength was within striking distance of Washington. The pressure of public opinion was in consequence so great as to compel Hooker, against his will, to fall back to the defence of the Capital, and to abandon all his own designs upon the enemy's communications. One should note also the admirable manner in which Lee succeeded in concealing his ultimate intentions. His operations form a model of secrecy and successful mystification of the enemy. No one knew whether he meant to invade Pennsylvania, or make a dash upon Washington, or a flank movement against

Hooker, or simply a raid in force on the part of his cavalry. Hence arose the panic in the threatened States, the paralysed movements of the Federal armies, and the utter bewilderment of the Federal Government.

Turning to the second period of the campaign, that is from the crossing of the Potomac on the 22nd to the accidental encounter of Hill and Reynolds at Gettysburg on July 1, we find Lee's strategy marked by the most extraordinary boldness. His lines of communication were practically abandoned to look after themselves. With the exception of the two cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, he left not a man in his rear when he marched into Pennsylvania; Harper's Ferry, which lay so threateningly on the flank of his communications, he ignored entirely. Its possession by the Confederates seemed so essential to a successful advance up the Cumberland Valley, that up to the moment of its evacuation the garrison were in hourly expectation of attack. And yet his communications were never interrupted, save for the solitary incursion of French's cavalry from Frederick, when the pontoon bridge at Williamsport was burnt. What was the cause of this? Had Lee sound reasons for counting on such extraordinary immunity? There can be no doubt that he relied upon the confusion and panic, spread by his invading columns, to sweep all thoughts of offensive action out of the heads of the Federal Government. Once more he successfully played on the fears of the President and his Cabinet. Hooker, with soldierly insight, saw where Lee could be struck a damaging blow, and sought to obtain permission to use French's troops to cut the enemy's communications with Virginia. But Lincoln and Halleck, who could feel the gusts of popular clamour more acutely than Hooker, lost their heads completely, and could think only of defensive measures to protect the Capital. So great was this obsession on their part that even

after the repulse of Lee's army at Gettysburg we find Halleck still harping on the necessity to protect Washington in the following despatch, dated July 5: "So long as your movements cover Baltimore and Washington from Lee's main army, they are in no danger from any force the enemy may detach for a raid." The most daring strategy could be safely adopted against so unenterprising an enemy. The strongest admirers of President Lincoln will admit that in this instance the comparison is all in favour of his opponent, Jefferson Davis. The calm courage displayed by the Confederate President, when Richmond was threatened by the forces under General Dix, affords a striking contrast to the chronic state of panic, into which the Federal Cabinet always seemed to be plunged.

Unfortunately for the full success of Lee's strategy, he was deprived at this point of the services of the most important branch of his army, the independent cavalry force under Stuart. Stuart's absence had two fatal results. Lee could not obtain information of the enemy's movements, while his own were plainly revealed. This would have been serious enough in Virginia, a friendly country. It was fatal in Pennsylvania, where every farmer, who could count the troops that marched through his village, was sending priceless information to Meade. Meade's rapid forward march northwards was made possible by the knowledge he possessed that the whole of the Confederate army was in Pennsylvania. Had the cloud of cavalry been there to mask Lee's movements behind South Mountain, as they had been masked behind the Blue Ridge, Meade would have been held immovable in front of the lower gaps, just as Hooker had been held at Centreville, by the President's fears of a sudden dash upon Washington. In the meantime Harrisburg must have fallen to Ewell's attack, and Philadelphia itself might well have shared

the same fate. Stuart's absence at the critical moment sufficed to wreck Lee's strategy. That the disaster was not still greater was due to the enemy's mistakes. Had Meade kept his corps well closed up as he marched towards the enemy, instead of throwing his left wing forward beyond reach of support, the disaster that overtook Reynolds' and Howard's Corps might easily have fallen instead upon Hill and Ewell.[1]

We have already considered the reasons that induced Lee to give battle at Gettysburg. He accepted the challenge, he staked all upon the issue, and he lost. The position he found himself in was a desperate one. In his advance he had deliberately left his communications to look after themselves. But he now had no longer behind him the prestige of success—the fear of his invading columns to force the enemy to adopt a purely passive defence. Now that he was thrown upon the defensive, there seemed nothing to prevent the Federal forces uniting to throw themselves across his line of retreat to Virginia, and holding him back until the Army of the Potomac could come up to give the finishing blow. But at this crucial moment Lee secured an immunity, which is possessed by every great commander who has made his name feared, and whose reputation compels caution on the part of his assailants. This is the secret of Meade's extraordinary delay, and of his slow and hesitating advance from Frederick to Williamsport. He was daunted by the menace of his great opponent's fame. He had indeed foiled the lion's spring, but he hesitated to face the lion at bay.

[1] White, in his "Life of Lee," describes the latter's intense anxiety, as he rode along the Cashtown road towards the sound of Hill's guns at Gettysburg. Ignorant as he was of the enemy's movements, the fear that some portion of his own scattered army might be attacked and crushed by superior numbers overshadowed all else in his mind.

Just as the terror of Napoleon's name enabled him to march with his Guard unmolested through the Russian ranks at Krasnoi, so Lee, by the dread which he had inspired in his opponents, was permitted to retreat untouched with his prisoners, his wounded, and his trains, from Gettysburg to the Potomac.

3. Federal Conduct of the Campaign.

The first point that must strike any one who studies the history of this campaign is the vicious system of control that obtained among the Union armies. General Halleck was nominally in command of all the Union forces in the theatre of war, but his actual position was rather that of military adviser to the President, who retained in his own hands the power of directing the movements of the armies. The commander of the Army of the Potomac, the largest and by far the most important force in the field, had nominally no control whatever over the movements of the other armies in the strategic area, while as regards his own command he was allowed to take no important step without reference to Washington. Lincoln and Halleck still clung to the ruinous system of distrusting the man on the spot, and trying to direct operations from a distance. In those cases where General Hooker was allowed to direct the movements of armies other than his own, the channel of command was so badly defined as to produce the most extraordinary confusion. What for instance could be more absurd than the following ?

Halleck to Hooker, June 22.

" The Department of Washington will continue as heretofore, your orders being given direct to General Heintzelman, he reporting them to head-quarters before executing them, where they conflict with his special instructions."

The following despatches are equally characteristic :

Hooker to Halleck, June 25 :

" Subjoined is a despatch this moment received. It speaks for itself. I request that General Slough be arrested at once, and charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them. You will find, I fear, when it is too late, that the effort to preserve department lines will be fatal to the cause of the country."

Enclosure to the above from Brig.-General Crawford to General Hooker :

" A despatch has been received during the night from General Slough, military Governor of Alexandria, informing me that the commanding officer of the Second Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, has been instructed by him not to recognise the orders sent to him to prepare to join the division, as directed in your despatch of June 23."

Halleck to Hooker, June 25 :

" The Second Brigade to which you refer in your telegram forms no part of General Crawford's command, which was placed at your orders. No other troops can be withdrawn from the defence of Washington."

Hooker to Halleck June 24 :

" Last evening the colonel commanding at Poolesville responded to his orders to march that he did not belong to my command, but would refer his orders to General Heintzelman. . . . I request that my orders be sent to me to-day, for outside of the Army of the Potomac I don't know whether I am standing on my head or feet."

The result of this general confusion was that the large Union forces in the field, vastly superior in numbers to the enemy, were dissipated in the pursuit of a dozen different plans, instead of being all co-ordinated towards the attainment of a common objective. The Federals possessed a numerical superiority

over the whole strategic area from Richmond to Harrisburg of nearly two to one, exclusive of the militia levies in Pennsylvania; and yet at the crisis of the campaign on the ridges of Gettysburg they were only able to put into line a force numerically equal to that of their opponents. The failure is the more striking when we compare it with what was achieved on the other side. Almost every Confederate soldier in Virginia was in Lee's army. Every other point was stripped bare of defenders, so that he might have a superiority of numbers at the decisive point.

Another factor which militated greatly against the Federal chances of success was the strong hostility that existed between the General-in-Chief and the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. We do not propose to discuss the rights and wrongs of the dreary wrangle that went on between Halleck and Hooker. There can be no doubt that both in character and talent General Hooker was unfitted for the high position he occupied. He was a stubborn fighter, and as the commander of a division had won honourable distinction on the battlefield. But he was too loud a talker, and his deeds kept too little pace with his words to win the confidence of his troops, while his manner towards his superiors and subordinates lacked that tact which is so essential to harmonious working. A very great responsibility must rest on President Lincoln for thus retaining in his post an officer, whom he knew to be unfitted for it, and at the same time refusing to give him that hearty and cordial support which he had the right to expect. It is almost inconceivable that two years of continual disaster in Virginia should have failed to teach the President that unity of thought and action between the Cabinet and the Army was the first essential to military success. Finally, President Lincoln was driven to do what he should have done long before, and to adopt the highly dangerous

expedient of a change in the supreme command of the army within a week of the battle, that was to decide the fate of the campaign.

4. General Meade's Strategy.

In criticising General Meade's handling of his army, one must bear in mind the circumstances under which he assumed the command. A certain amount of hesitation was excusable in a general upon whom the supreme command, with all its anxieties and responsibility, was so suddenly thrust. It was not to be expected that a new and untried commander would at once embark upon a bold strategic operation, which would have great results if successful, but was at the same time fraught with great risks. Meade cannot therefore be fairly blamed if he missed the opportunity, offered by the boldness of Lee's strategy, of throwing his army across the enemy's rear and cutting his line of retreat to Virginia. He deserves the highest praise for keeping his head when Stuart's cavalry were passing between his army and Washington, and communication with the Capital was interrupted. His forward march towards Gettysburg was prompt and vigorous, and proved completely successful in its immediate aim, which was to draw off the hostile forces threatening Harrisburg. But subsequently Meade's strategy suffered by the want of a definite objective. Instead of seeking out the invader wherever he might be, and giving him battle when found, he was above all things anxious to avoid having to assume the offensive. He thus missed the opportunity, that was afforded him by his superior information, of interposing between Ewell and the remainder of Lee's army, and so defeating his opponent in detail. To gain time and meanwhile to cover Washington was his main pre-occupation. He had already selected the line of Pipe Creek as a suitable position

in which to await the enemy's attack, if he advanced against the Capital; and he was manœuvring to bring his army on this alignment, when the accidental collision of his left wing with the enemy's forces at Gettysburg completely upset his plans. His different corps were immediately called upon to make a forced march to the sound of the enemy's guns. The distances they had to cover were roughly as follows :—

Second Corps.	From	Uniontown ..	19 miles.
Third Corps.	,,	Taneytown ..	12 ,,
Fifth Corps.	,,	Union Mills ..	18 ,,
Sixth Corps.	,,	Manchester ..	30 ,,
Twelfth Corps.	,,	Littlestown ..	11 ,,

We see in these frustrated plans and hurried marches the evil results of Meade's false move when he thrust his left wing forward into a position, where he was unable to give it timely support. The accidental encounter at Gettysburg on July 1 found Meade with the various portions of his army spread out over a front of 30 miles. He was suddenly compelled to change his whole plan, and to take up a new line of defence in the presence of the enemy. His different corps were called upon to make a long fatiguing march, and arrived on the field in driblets, with men tired and footsore, and with numbers seriously diminished by straggling. Had it not been for the fact that his opponent was partly in a similar position, and that circumstances, upon which he could not have counted, delayed the renewal of the battle for six hours longer than was necessary, he would have been called upon to fight with divided forces against a united enemy, and would probably have suffered a disastrous defeat.

It cannot be said that General Meade's conduct of the pursuit of Lee's army redounded greatly to his credit. The excuses that have been advanced for his caution previous to the battle do not hold good subsequently. While the enemy was still in the full

tide of success caution was perhaps justified. Defeat avoided was almost equal to victory gained. But when the enemy's invasion had been foiled, when he was retreating, baffled and presumably dispirited, with no purpose but to get safely away, then there was no excuse whatever for the neglect to pursue vigorously, and to convert, if possible, his repulse into a rout. Whether Meade would have been successful had he attacked Lee's lines at Williamsport is very doubtful. An inspection of the position after its evacuation by the Confederates convinced many of his officers that the assault would have had no chance of success. But this does not excuse Meade for permitting his opponent to retreat unmolested. His lines might have been impregnable, but he should never have been allowed time to make them so. Had Meade followed up the retreat energetically, he could hardly have been more than twenty-four or thirty-six hours behind, when he would have found a very different state of affairs to that which confronted him, when he actually appeared on the scene, *six days* after Lee's arrival at Williamsport. This was the view of the matter held by President Lincoln. On July 14 Meade received the following despatch from Halleck :—

" I need hardly tell you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore."

Meade replied by requesting to be relieved immediately of the command of the army, accompanying his resignation by the curt statement that as he felt the censure entirely undeserved, there was no other course open to him to pursue. But this would not have suited the Government. The resignation of the General-in-Command would have been a curious

commentary on the much-vaunted success of the campaign, and Halleck was directed to tone down his despatch by declaring that it was meant, not as a censure, but as a stimulant to further action. While Halleck's despatch contained nothing but the truth, the manner in which the censure was conveyed was very offensive to an officer with General Meade's high sense of duty, and it forms an example of the over-bearing manner that characterised General Halleck's relations with his subordinates. Meade's refusal to permit himself to be bullied by Washington conveyed a much-needed lesson, and had a most beneficent effect on the subsequent relations between the Cabinet and the Army of the Potomac.

Regarding the campaign as a whole, General Lee's operations are those of a bold and resolute commander, having absolute control over his army, determined to take any risk and go to any length to win the victory. On the other hand, we see in General Meade a commander of sound but mediocre abilities, new to his position, hampered by a timid and interfering Government, more intent on preserving his own army intact than on destroying that of his opponent. While the staunchness of his troops and the errors of the enemy gave him the victory at Gettysburg, he failed, owing to his excessive caution, to secure the fruits of that success; while his opponent, by his resolution and the brilliancy of his genius, extracted himself from an almost hopeless position, and withdrew with the honours of war, his own reputation and the confidence reposed in him by his army unshaken by the adverse results of the campaign.

5. The Cavalry Operations.

The operations of the cavalry commands of Stuart and Pleasonton form a most interesting study. In the course of a short campaign of two months'

duration, they afford examples of almost every sort of task, which the independent cavalry of an army may be called upon to perform; the reconnaissance, the cavalry screen, the cavalry battle, the conduct of a rear-guard, a pursuit, or an independent raid. The forces on each side were well matched both in numbers and efficiency. The Federal cavalry had improved enormously since the early days of the war, when the Confederate troopers had ridden round or through them at pleasure. Stuart's cavalry still retained the prestige of former triumphs and the enthusiasm which their leader always inspired. But against this must be set the greater material resources of the Federals in horses and equipment, whereas the poverty of the South was rendering it increasingly difficult to make good the incessant wear and tear upon the Confederate cavalry. The difference in the organisation of the two forces should be noted. Each numbered about 12,000 sabres, but Pleasonton's command was divided into divisions and brigades, whereas Stuart's force consisted of six brigades with no divisional organisation. The latter was undoubtedly the more suitable. Circumstances rendered it constantly necessary for Pleasonton to break up his divisions, or to transfer a brigade from one division to another. In other words, the organisation was too clumsy, and lacked the elasticity afforded by the simple brigade system of Stuart's Corps.

We have already commented upon the admirable manner in which Stuart covered the movements of the Confederate army from the Rappahannock to the Potomac. He never did better work. It forms an object-lesson of the way in which the independent cavalry of an army should be handled as a defensive screen. But when the Confederates crossed into Maryland the screen was withdrawn, and Stuart took three brigades on his raid round Meade's flanks and rear. The vast damage, which he inflicted on

the enemy, and the panic he produced in Washington, were but a poor compensation for the evils that resulted from General Lee's consequent ignorance of the enemy's movements. Such raids, specious and tempting as they seem, are generally a mistake. Hooker paid dearly for a similar error during the Chancellorsville campaign, when he sent away Stoneman with all his cavalry to attack Lee's communications. Grant repeated the mistake in '64. Lee has been greatly blamed for sending Stuart away at such an important period of the campaign. To judge how far such blame is justified, we must consider the orders upon which Stuart acted. They were as follows :—

"General—

"If General Hooker's army remains inactive you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Frederickstown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's corps, collecting information, provisions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army, and in the event of the enemy leaving their front retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes and bringing everything clean along the valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movement of the two brigades of the enemy moving towards Warrenton, the commander of the briga ds to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them ; but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland after to-morrow the better. The

movements of Ewell's Corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.

"I am, very respectfully and truly yours,

"R. E. LEE,

"General."

These orders, it will be observed, are perfectly clear. Stuart was to leave two of his brigades behind to guard the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and to move with the remainder across the Potomac as soon as possible after the 24th, that is, as soon as Longstreet and Hill were across. He was given a free hand to choose which point of passage he might consider the best, and was to judge for himself if it was possible to ride round the Federal rear. In either case, as soon as he was across, he was to get at once into touch with Ewell. The orders to the two brigades (Robertson and Jones) to be left behind are equally clear. They were to hold the gaps *as long as the enemy remained south of the river*, but as soon as Hooker commenced to cross they were to retire over the Shenandoah, leaving piquets in the gaps, move down the valley, and close in on the rear of the army. General Lee had therefore made ample provision to retain the services of his cavalry with the army. He did not expect Stuart to be absent more than a day or two, even if he took the extreme course of riding round the Federal rear, and as soon as Hooker crossed the Potomac he expected to be informed of the movement by the two brigades left behind in the valley. But at this crisis both Stuart and Robertson failed him. Stuart committed an error of judgment by persisting in his raid, when Hooker's unexpected northward movement plainly indicated that he could not hope to get into touch again for several days with Ewell's troops, as his orders directed. Robertson's

error was a graver one. Hooker crossed the Potomac on the 25th. Robertson did not start north till the 29th, four days later, and he did not actually cross into Maryland till July 1, when the armies had already come into collision at Gettysburg. He therefore gave the Union army a start of six days. In other words, he entirely neglected to obey his instructions to cross the Potomac as soon as Hooker did so, and then close in on the Confederate army. The fact that his command travelled in two days from Martinsburg to Fairfield shows that there was no excuse for his pottering south of the river, which had the effect of leaving Lee at the most critical moment of the campaign without a single trooper.[1]

Turning to the movements of the Federal cavalry during the first phase of the campaign, Pleasonton distinctly failed to achieve any results of value. His superior numbers enabled him to force Stuart back to the Blue Ridge, but he failed to penetrate the cavalry screen and see what was behind. On the other hand, when Stuart uncovered Lee's front by going away on his raid, the Federal cavalry kept Meade well supplied with the most valuable information. Buford's division was indefatigable in this respect, but it is difficult to understand why Kilpatrick and Gregg wasted so much time in the neighbourhood of Hanover on June 30 and July 1. They had fought Stuart there on the 30th, but instead of hanging close to his heels, they lost touch with him, and spent all the following day trying to find him again, when their presence would have been invaluable at Gettysburg. It is a significant contrast in energy that Stuart went to York and Carlisle and thence to Gettysburg in the same time that it

[1] Robertson's defence in "Battles and Leaders" makes no attempt to explain why he remained so long in the Valley in direct disobedience to his orders.

took Gregg and Kilpatrick to reach the latter place from Hanover, only 14 miles away. Nor can it be said that the Federal cavalry took full advantage of the opportunities offered of harassing the Confederate retreat. It will be noted what an advantage Lee here derived from the friendly shelter of South Mountain, which protected his left flank as he withdrew down the Cumberland Valley. The range is impassable for cavalry except at the gaps, and hence it was only necessary to hold these points to render the passage of the supply trains comparatively secure. Stuart was too late to close the Monterey Gap, and by slipping through at this point Kilpatrick was able to do a good deal of damage. But for his own slackness on the 8th, when he fell back to Boonsborough, he might have done a great deal more. By making a wide detour to the south, Buford was able to pass through Crampton's Gap and attack Williamsport, but the firmness and resource shown by Imboden saved both the situation and the trains. This was a costly blunder on the part of Buford, who was completely deceived by the boldness of Imboden's tactics.

In all these operations the cavalry on both sides combined with great success the somewhat conflicting rôles of mounted infantry and cavalry proper. They generally dismounted to attack or hold a position, but they also repeatedly charged with the sabre, showing a dash and *élan* which seems to have suffered nothing from their constant fighting on foot. It is well known that one of the most difficult of problems is to teach cavalry to use the rifle and fight well dismounted, without at the same time impairing their efficiency in shock tactics. It speaks well for the adaptability and natural dash of the American troopers that they did succeed in combining these two opposing rôles in a remarkably efficient manner. Those writers who advocate the abolition of cold steel for cavalry often quote the example of Stuart's squadrons as

an argument confirming their case, thus giving the impression that the Confederates relied solely on fire effect. This is misleading. The true deduction to be drawn is not that cavalry should be converted into a kind of glorified mounted infantry, but that what has been done once can be done again, and that, with this example before them, it is surely possible for our cavalry leaders to make their men equally efficient with both rifle and cold steel, and thereby to emulate, or even outshine, the record of the great Confederate commander.

6. The Federal Militia.

There is a lesson, taught by this campaign, which has a special significance for our own country. It is the criminal folly of relying in a national crisis upon untrained troops. When Lee's army crossed the Potomac, and his cavalry were riding far and wide through Pennsylvania, a proclamation was issued by General Couch in Harrisburg, calling upon all able-bodied men to enrol themselves in the militia for the defence of the State. Some 35,000 men answered the call and shouldered a rifle to resist the invaders. What kind of service did they render? The following extracts from Meade's despatches help to supply an answer:—

Meade to Halleck, July 11:

"From the representations of General Spinola that the nine-months' men (militia) of his command could not be relied upon, and my own experience of troops under such circumstances, I have directed the regiments of his brigade to be posted in the rear. Troops of this character can be of little service."

Meade to Halleck, July 13:

"General W. F. Smith of the advanced division of General Couch's forces has arrived here to-day, but from the organisation and condition of these troops,

and the short time they have to serve, I cannot place much reliance upon them."

Halleck to Meade, July 27 :

" It is supposed that General Couch's forces being militia are about melted away. They would be worthless if ordered forward."

Owing to the careful way in which they were kept in the rear, the militia had few opportunities of showing their quality, but on the few occasions that they became under fire their behaviour was not good. The engagement at Wrightsville, Pennsylvania, on June 28, is an instructive example. A militia force, about 1200 strong, was posted at this point to protect the great bridge across the Susquehanna. There was every inducement for these men to fight well. They were placed in a strong position, the post confided to them to defend was a most important one, they were fighting on their own soil, some of them almost in sight of their homes, against a foreign invader. And yet when Gordon's brigade, barely superior to them in numbers, advanced to attack their position, they fled at the first shot, throwing away their arms and burning the bridge they were required to defend. The men of Stone's brigade, who fought and died where they stood at Gettysburg, and the militia at Wrightsville, who so disgracefully abandoned their post, came of the same stock, for all were Pennsylvanians. What, then, was the difference between them ? The former had been transformed by two years of war into seasoned soldiers, with discipline and regimental pride to give solidity to their ranks. The latter were nothing but a collection of armed citizens, brave enough individually and animated by the sincerest patriotism, but without discipline, cohesion, or the habit of instinctive obedience to orders, without which an army is only an incoherent mob. The lesson is not confined to this campaign. It is taught by every war in which

volunteer troops have played a part. It was shown at Bladensburg in 1813, at Belfort in 1871, in South Africa in 1900. It forms a very grave warning to the people of this country. Patriotism without training is worse than useless. It leads to nothing but a criminal slaughter of helpless men. Those who take up arms in the wild fever and excitement of a war scare are not those who serve their country best in the face of the enemy. It is the man, who in times of peace, without the artificial stimulus of inflammatory speeches and music-hall songs, sets himself to learn the duty of a soldier and to fit himself to carry a rifle ; he is the man who proves his worth in the hour of trial, and reflects honour, not disgrace, upon his colours.

7. Conclusion.

To sum up. In appearance the campaign of Gettysburg ended in a draw ; but in real fact it proved decisive of the war. In saying this, we do not use the word in the sense in which Austerlitz, Jena, or Waterloo, for example, were decisive of the respective campaigns in which they figured. In each of these instances a single overwhelming victory annihilated the enemy's army in the field, and ended the war at a blow. Nothing of this kind occurred at Gettysburg. Tactically, that action resembles rather Zorndorf, Eylau, or Borodino, battles which, after a murderous slaughter, were ended only by the mutual exhaustion of both combatants. In its strategic results Gettysburg resembles more nearly the battle of the Metaurus, which decided the issue of the Second Punic War ; or the defeat of the Greeks before Syracuse, which decided the fate of Athens. The Athenians put their whole strength into one supreme bid for victory, and when the fortune of war decided against them under the walls of Syracuse, their ultimate defeat became

only a question of time. So it was with the Confederacy. The army which fought at Gettysburg was the strongest, the bravest, and the best equipped, that the South ever put into the field. Superhuman efforts had been made, every other point had been stripped of defenders, in order that Lee might win a decisive victory upon Northern soil. At Gettysburg the Confederate star rose to its zenith ; afterwards its lustre diminished daily. The subsequent struggle was long and bitter. The dreadful slaughter in the Wilderness, the bloody battles round Petersburg, were still to come ; but with the failure of Pickett's gallant charge the hope of ultimate victory passed away from the Confederate standards, until two years later the last act of the long tragedy came to its close at Appomatox.

FINIS

APPENDIX A

I. Organisation of the Army of the Potomac during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Commander—Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade.

General Head-quarters:
- Chief Staff Officer—Brig.-Gen. Butterfield.
- Provost Marshal-General—Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick.
- Chief of Artillery—Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt.
- Engineer Brigade [1]—Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Benham.

First Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds. [2]
- First Division—Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
  - First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Meredith.
  - Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Cutler.
- Second Division—Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
  - First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Paul.
  - Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Baxter.
- Third Division—Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday.
  - First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Rowley.
  - Second Brigade—Col. Stone.
  - Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Stannard.
- Artillery Brigade—Col. Wainwright.

Second Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock.
- First Division—Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell.
  - First Brigade—Col. Cross.
  - Second Brigade—Col. Kelly.
  - Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Zook.
  - Fourth Brigade—Col. Brooke.
- Second Division—Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
  - First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Harrow.
  - Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Webb.
  - Third Brigade—Col. Hall.

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[1] Not present at Gettysburg.

[2] On General Reynolds' death, the command of his corps was assumed temporarily by General Doubleday. On July 2nd General Newton took the command.

Second Army Corps (*continued*).
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.
First Brigade—Col. Carroll.
Second Brigade—Col. Smyth.
Third Brigade—Col. Willard.
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Hazard.

Third Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles.[1]
First Division—Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Graham.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Ward.
Third Brigade—Col. De Trobriand.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Carr.
Second Brigade—Col. Brewster.
Third Brigade—Col. Burling.
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Randolph.

Fifth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. George Sykes.
First Division—Brig.-Gen. James Barnes.
First Brigade—Col. Tilton.
Second Brigade—Col. Sweitzer.
Third Brigade—Col. Vincent.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
First Brigade—Col. Day.
Second Brigade—Col. Burbank.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Weed.
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
First Brigade—Col. McCandless.
Third Brigade—Col. Fisher.
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Martin.

Sixth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick.
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Horatio C. Wright.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Torbert.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Bartlett.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Russell.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe.
Second Brigade—Col. Grant.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Neill.
Third Division—Maj.-Gen. John Newton.[2]
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Shaler.

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[1] When General Sickles was wounded, the command of his corps passed to General Birney.

[2] When General Newton assumed command of the First Corps, his division was commanded by General Wheaton, who handed over the Third Brigade to Col. Nevin.

Sixth Army Corps—Third Division (*continued*).
Second Brigade—Col. Eustis.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Wheaton.
Artillery Brigade—Col. Tompkins.

Eleventh Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard.
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
First Brigade—Col. von Gilsa.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Ames.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Coster.
Second Brigade—Col. Schimmelphennig.
Artillery Brigade—Maj. Osborn.
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Shurz.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. von Amberg.
Second Brigade—Col. Krzyzanowski.

Twelfth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Henry Slocum.[1]
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.
First Brigade—Col. McDougall.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Lockwood.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Ruger.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary.
First Brigade—Col. Candy.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Kane.
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Greene.
Artillery Brigade—Lieut. Muhlenberg.

Cavalry Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.
First Division—Brig.-Gen. John Buford.
First Brigade—Col. Gamble.
Second Brigade—Col. Devin.
Reserve Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Merritt.
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. David McGregg.
First Brigade—Col. McIntosh.
Second Brigade—Col. Huey.[2]
Third Brigade—Col. Irvin Gregg.
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Farnsworth.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Custer.

Horse Artillery.
First Brigade—Capt. Robertson.
Second Brigade—Capt. Tidball.

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[1] General Slocum was in command of the right wing on July 2nd. General Williams was then in temporary command of the Twelfth Corps, and Brig.-Gen. Ruger of the First Division.

[2] At Westminster, etc., and not engaged at Gettysburg.

Artillery Reserve—Brig.-Gen. Robert O. Tyler.
First Regular Brigade—Capt. Ransom.
First Volunteer Brigade—Lieut.-Col. McGilvery.
Second Volunteer Brigade—Capt. Taft.
Third Volunteer Brigade—Capt. Huntington
Fourth Volunteer Brigade—Capt. Fitzhugh.

II. Organisation of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Battle of Gettysburg.

Commander—General Robert E. Lee.
Chief of Artillery—Brig.-Gen. Pendleton.
First Army Corps—Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet.
McLaws' Division—Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.
Kershaw's Brigade.
Semmes' Brigade.
Barksdale's Brigade.
Wofford's Brigade.
Artillery—Col. Cabell.
Pickett's Division—Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett.
Garnett's Brigade.
Kemper's Brigade.
Armistead's Brigade.
Corse's [1] Brigade.
Artillery—Maj. Dearing.
Hood's Division [2]—Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood.
Laws' Brigade.
Robertson's Brigade.
Anderson's Brigade.
Benning's Brigade.
Artillery—Maj. Henry.
Artillery Reserve, First Corps—Col. Walton.
Alexander's Battalion.—Col. Alexander.
Washington Artillery—Maj. Eshleman.
Second Army Corps—Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell.
Early's Division—Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early.
Hays' Brigade.
Smith's Brigade.
Hoke's Brigade.
Gordon's Brigade.
Artillery—Lieut.-Col. Jones.
Rodes' Division—Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes.
Daniels' Brigade.
Iverson's Brigade.

[1] Not present at Gettysburg.
[2] Commanded by Law after the wounding of Hood on July 2nd.

Second Army Corps—Rodes' Division (*continued*).
Doles' Brigade.
Ramseur's Brigade.
O'Neal's Brigade.
Artillery—Lieut.-Col. Carter.
Johnson's Division—Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson.
Steuart's Brigade.
Nicholl's Brigade.
Walker's Brigade.
Jones' Brigade.
Artillery—Maj. Latimer.
Artillery Reserve, Second Corps—Col. Brown.
Dance's Battalion.
Nelson's Battalion.
Third Army Corps—Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.
Anderson's Division—Maj.-Gen. R. H. Anderson.
Wilcox's Brigade.
Wright's Brigade.
Mahone's Brigade.
Perry's Brigade.
Posey's Brigade.
Artillery—Maj. Lane.
Heth's Division [1]—Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth.
Pettigrew's Brigade.
Archer's Brigade.
Brockenborough's Brigade.
Davis's Brigade.
Artillery—Lieut.-Col. Garnett.
Pender's Division [2]—Maj.-Gen. William D. Pender.
Perrin's Brigade.
Lane's Brigade.
Thomas' Brigade.
Scales' Brigade.
Artillery—Maj. Poague.
Cavalry Division—Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.
First Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton.
Second Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Robertson.[3]
Third Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.
Fourth Brigade—Brig.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee. [4]
Fifth Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Jenkins.
Sixth Brigade—Brig.-Gen. Jones.[5]

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[1] Commanded by Trimble on July 3rd.
[2] Commanded by Lane after the wounding of Pender on July 2nd.
[3] Not present at Gettysburg, but engaged at Fairfield on July 3rd.
[4] Commanded by Chambliss.

APPENDIX B

I. Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Gettysburg.[1]

General Head-quarters	4
First Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Reynolds (killed)	
Head-quarters	5
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Wadsworth	2155
Second Division—Maj.-Gen. Robinson	1690
Third Division—Maj.-Gen. Doubleday	2103
Artillery Brigade—Col. Wainwright	106
Total First Army Corps..	6059
Second Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Hancock (wounded).	
Head-quarters	7
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Caldwell	1275
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Gibbon (wounded) ..	1647
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Hays	1291
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Hazard	149
	4369
Third Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Sickles (wounded).	
Head-quarters	2
First Division—Maj.-Gen. Birney	2011
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Humphreys	2092
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Randolph	106
Total Third Army Corps	4211

[1] Extracted from the details given in Vol. III. "Battles and Leaders."

Fifth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Sykes.	
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Barnes	904
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Ayres	1029
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Crawford	210
Artillery Brigade—Capt. Martin	44
Total Fifth Army Corps..	2187
Sixth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Sedgwick.	
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Wright	18
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Howe	16
Third Division—Maj.-Gen. Newton	196
Artillery Brigade—Col. Tompkins	12
Total Sixth Army Corps	242
Eleventh Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Howard.	
Head-quarters	4
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Barlow (wounded) ..	1306
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. von Steinwehr	946
Third Division—Maj.-Gen. Shurz	1476
Artillery Brigade—Maj. Osborn	69
Total Eleventh Army Corps	3801
Twelfth Army Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Slocum.	
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Williams	533
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Geary	540
Artillery Brigade—Lieut. Muhlenberg	9
Total Twelfth Army Corps	1082
Cavalry Corps.—Maj.-Gen. Pleasonton.	
First Division—Brig.-Gen. Buford	418
Second Division—Brig.-Gen. Gregg	56
Third Division—Brig.-Gen. Kilpatrick	355
Horse Artillery	23
Total Cavalry Corps	852
Artillery Reserve—Brig.-Gen. Tyler	242

RECAPITULATION.

General Head-quarters	4
First Army Corps	6059
Second Army Corps	4369
Third Army Corps	4211
Fifth Army Corps	2187
Sixth Army Corps	242
Eleventh Army Corps	3801
Twelfth Army Corps	1082
Cavalry Corps	852
Artillery Reserve	242
Grand Total	23,049

II. CASUALTIES IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

First Army Corps.—Lieut.-Gen. Longstreet.

McLaws' Division	2178
Pickett's Division	2888
Hood's Division (Hood wounded)	2289
Reserve Artillery	184
Total First Army Corps	7539

Second Army Corps.—Lieut.-Gen. Ewell.

Staff	1
Early's Division	1188
Rodes' Division	2853
Johnson's Division	1873
Reserve Artillery	22
Total Second Army Corps	5937

Third Army Corps.—Lieut.-Gen. Hill.

Anderson's Division	2115
Pender's Division (Pender mortally wounded)	1690
Heth's Division (Heth wounded)	2850
Reserve Artillery	80
Total Third Army Corps	6735

Cavalry Division.—Maj.-Gen. Stuart.

Hampton's Brigade (Hampton wounded)	91
Fitzhugh Lee's Brigade	50
W. H. F. Lee's Brigade	41
Jones' Brigade (at Fairfield)	58
Jenkins' Brigade	not recorded
Horse Artillery	not recorded
Total Cavalry Division	240

RECAPITULATION.

First Army Corps	7539
Second Army Corps	5937
Third Army Corps	6735
Cavalry Division	240
Grand Total ..	20,451

APPENDIX C

Longstreet's Conduct at Gettysburg.

It is proposed in this note to examine, with rather more detail than is given in the text, the facts connected with Longstreet's handling of his corps in the fighting on July 2 and 3 at Gettys burg. The question is important, and cannot be passed over unnoticed, for Longstreet played the principal part on this occasion, and his action had a vital bearing on the ultimate result of the battle. Unfortunately, it gave rise to a very heated and bitter controversy between Longstreet and his brother officers, so that in examining the statements of the chief actors it is most difficult to get at the facts; to separate truth from exaggeration, facts from prejudice. The only original unbiassed evidence that we possess is afforded by General Lee's report, and this is silent on certain essential points.

To take first the battle of July 2. The charge against Longstreet is, that he received his orders to attack Meade's left flank by 8 a.m., and that it was not until 4 p.m. that he was in position to advance; that is to say, he took eight hours to move his troops about four miles and form them for battle. How was the time accounted for? In his Reminiscences, "From Manassas to Appomatox," and also in "Battles and Leaders," Vol. III., Longstreet states his own defence. The tone in each case is very violent, and not always in the best of taste, particularly his sneer at the personal courage of General Early, with whom he had always been on bad terms. The argument is also very diffuse, and wanders frequently from the point, but put briefly his explanation is this: firstly, that on the night of July 1 his troops were more than 20 miles from the field; and, secondly, that the positions he was ordered to occupy were in the enemy's possession. The first excuse is irrelevant, for all his troops, except Law's brigade, reached the field by 3 a.m., and both Hood and McLaws were ready to march at daylight on the 2nd.[1] Longstreet's second excuse holds good to a limited extent, for the enemy's occupation

[1] McLaws' report. Of course Pickett's division was still in the rear.

of the Peach Orchard did compel him to change his dispositions and so delay the attack. On the other hand, had he moved at once without waiting for Law, he would have forestalled Sickles' forward movement to the Peach Orchard, and this cause of delay would never have arisen. The crux of the whole question is this: Did Lee's verbal orders prescribe an early attack or not? The united evidence of Wilcox, Long, Taylor and other officers present at the council-of-war, is that the attack was ordered to be made by Longstreet, "as early as possible with the troops he had with him." Therefore Longstreet's delay of four hours, waiting for Law to appear, was in direct disobedience of these orders, and constituted a grave military offence, which no secondary circumstances beyond his control could palliate. We have already noted the disastrous results that followed from this unfortunate delay.

Turning to July 3, the usual verdict lays the blame for the mismanagement of this assault on Longstreet also. It is contended that he was ordered to employ McLaws' and Hood's divisions as well as Pickett's in the attack on the Federal centre, and that his failure to do so was the cause of the disaster. This is the assertion put forward by General Wilcox and Colonels Long, Taylor, and Venable, all of whom were present at the conference when Lee gave his instructions. Col. Venable goes further, and says that some time after he recalled the matter to General Lee, who replied, "I know it! I know it!" Now through the mist of personal prejudice and ill-feeling that envelops this controversy, the only safe guiding light we have is in General Lee's report; and, as stated in the text (see p. 95), this expressly rules out Hood and McLaws from the list of units to participate in the assault on the enemy's centre. Furthermore, a brief examination of the situation of these troops on the morning of July 3 will show the impossibility of such an operation. Both divisions were in close contact with the enemy. First to have withdrawn them, and then to have moved them to the left to unite with Pickett, would have been a most delicate and difficult operation, while by revealing the movement to the enemy it would have destroyed whatever chance there was of the assault proving a surprise. What, then, were General Lee's real intentions? No one supposes that he proposed to send 14,000 men to attack an army of 80,000 in an intensely strong position, and that the rest of his own army should look idly on. In the first place, it is quite clear that he intended McLaws and Hood to support the main assault by renewing the attack *on their own fronts*, not on the centre; and this would have been done had not these troops been so cut up by the previous day's fighting that their com-

manders considered a renewal of the attack impossible. This important fact was never reported to Lee, who was therefore unaware that the storming column would receive no assistance from the troops on its right. Secondly, we find the following important paragraph in Lee's report:—"General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance if required, *and avail himself of any success that might be gained.*" There is no need to look further than this. We have here a direct order to Hill to support Longstreet's attack, and if further evidence is required, it is afforded by Hill's instructions to Anderson to hold his division in readiness to move up in support. But if we go further, and try to find out why Anderson failed to do what was required of him, why three of his brigades never moved a yard, and the other two only when it was too late, we are stopped. Neither Hill's nor Anderson's report gives any help to solve the mystery. Hill and Lee himself were both at this point; it seems incredible that there should have occurred such appalling bungling under the very eyes of the General-in-Chief. Carelessness, overconfidence, and bad staff work are the probable explanation. To sum up, therefore, the responsibility for the failure to support the assaulting column must rest, not on Longstreet, but on Hill, and ultimately on Lee himself.

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